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Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax 
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance 
KYLE LOGUE* AND RONEN AVRAHAM** 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning of the law and economics movement, normative 
legal economists have focused almost exclusively on evaluating the ef­
ficiency of alternative legal rules. The distributional consequences of 
legal rules, therefore, have largely been ignored. It is tempting to con­
clude that legal economists are hostile or indifferent to concerns of 
distributional fairness. In fact, however, the discipline of economics 
has a great deal to say about distributional policy. 
The normative branch of economics, known as welfare economics, 
has always been deeply concerned with distributional issues.1 It is not 
that welfare economists purport to know a priori the "right" or "opti­
mal" distribution of resources. To the contrary, the standard ap­
proach among public finance economists has been to remain neutral 
on the types of inequality in society that ought to be the target of 
redistributive policy and how much, if any, redistribution is appropri­
ate.2 If those same economists, however, were provided with a theory 
of distributive justice, they then could build that theory into their 
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and participants at the Bar-Ilan University Faculty Seminar (Israel), the University of 
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1 The most comprehensive exposition of the welfarist approach to evaluating public pol­
icy is found in Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 1 14  Harv. L. Rev. 
961 (2001) [hereinafter Fairness I]. They subsequently turned their article into a book. 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Fairness Versus Welfare (2002) [hereinafter Fairness 11]. 
2 See Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 27 ("[W]e do not endorse any particular 
view about the proper distribution of well-being or income."); Ka plow & Shave II, Fairness 
I, note 1, at 988 (same); see also Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 142-60 (5th ed. 1999); 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 94-103, 476-79 (3d ed. 2000). 
157 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
158 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: 
framework for evaluating public policy.3 Indeed, economists have cre­
ated mathematical models of tax regimes to accommodate any num­
ber of theories of distributive justice: from the Rawlsian maximin 
criterion, which manifests a special concern for the well-being of the 
least advantaged members in society, to the various versions of utilita­
rianism, which, depending on the assumptions, can justify complete 
equalization of income or redistribution from the worse off to the bet­
ter off.4 Again, while economists are able to build these theories into 
their models, they typically do not endorse any particular theory of 
distributive justice. 
Many economists and most law and economics scholars, however, 
are far from neutral with regard to how to accomplish redistribution. 
To the contrary, although (as far as we know) no polls have been con­
ducted on this question, we believe it is a safe bet that a majority of 
legal economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of redis­
tribution is deemed appropriate or desirable, the exclusive policy tool 
for redistributing to reduce income or wealth inequality should always 
be the tax-and-transfer system.s Under this view, the legal system, by 
contrast, should never be used to reduce income inequality, but in­
stead should be used only to achieve efficiency. To put this view in 
more colloquial terms, the legal system should be used only to maxi­
mize the size of the pie; the tax-and-transfer system should be the ex­
clusive means of slicing it. 
This conventional economic view of the appropriate division of 
functions between the legal system and the tax-and-transfer system 
3 Indeed, determining how best to achieve society's preferences regarding distributional 
fairness is one of the primary objectives of the economic subliterature on optimal taxation. 
See, e.g., William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation {1947); J.A. Mirrlees, An Ex­
ploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 Rev. Econ. Stud. 175 (1971). 
Both Vickrey and Mirrlees were the 1996 recipients of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sci­
ences. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Rik­
sbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1996 
(Oct. 8, 1996) (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) http://www.nobel.se/economicsnaureates/1996/ 
press.html (mentioning their contributions regarding redistributive taxation). 
4 See generally Rosen, note 2, at 147-54 {discussing different views as to whether gov­
ernment should undertake redistributional policies and summarizing the implications for 
redistributive policy of Rawlsian and utilitarian social welfare functions). For a compre­
hensive formal treatment of different theories of distributive justice, see John E. Roemer, 
Theories of Distributive Justice (1996). 
5 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 124-27 (2d ed. 
1989); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Legal Sys­
tem]. As tax scholars know, the term "income" is far from self-defining. The same is true 
of the terms "consumption" and "wealth," which commonly are suggested as alternative 
tax bases. In Section II we say a few words about what we mean by the term income for 
purposes of this Article. As have the other participants in the redistributive rules debate, 
we take no position on whether income or consumption or wealth is the best measure of 
ability to pay but generally regard them as interchangeable for this analysis. 
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also seems to have produced a clear division of labor among welfarist 
policy analysts.6 On the one hand, tax scholars who apply the 
welfarist framework evaluate alternative tax regimes according to 
their ability to produce the desired level of revenue for the govern­
ment to spend on public goods while at the same time producing the 
smallest amount of distortion and satisfying society's distributional 
preferences. On the other hand, legal economists in nontax fields 
spend their time evaluating legal rules-such as the private law doc­
trines of contract, property, and tort-solely on the basis of those 
rules' ability or inability to correct market failures: to internalize ex­
ternalities, minimize transaction costs, provide efficient investment in­
centives, and generally help achieve allocational efficiency in the 
economy.7 It is this division of labor that justifies the legal econo­
mists' tendency to ignore distributional concerns.8 
6 "Welfarism" refers to a normative political theory that calls for government policy 
decisions to be made solely on the basis of their effects on the welfare of individuals in 
society. Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II ,  note 1, at 3-4. Sometimes welfarism is equated 
with welfare economics. See generally id. 
7 For a list of justifications for this division of labor among welfarist policy analysts, see 
Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 31-35; Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness I, note 1, at 
992-95. 
8 Chris Sanchirico calls this justification for legal economists' exclusive focus on the effi­
ciency of legal rules the "new efficiency rationale." Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstruct­
ing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1003, 1007 (2001) [hereinafter 
Efficiency Rationale]. The new efficiency rationale, as Sanchirico notes, has roots in the 
basic theories of welfare economics. In fact, this conventional view among legal econo­
mists can be understood as deriving from the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics, which is centrally important to the law and economics movement and to nor­
mative economics generally. The Second Theorem states, in effect, that under the condi­
tions of perfect competition a market economy can lead to any Pareto optimal point, that 
is, any efficient point, provided the government has the ability to make a lump sum redis­
tributive transfer of wealth. Recall that a "Pareto optimal" point is a distribution of re­
sources in society that is efficient, that is, a point from which no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off. Such points are normatively significant, according 
to the welfare economist, because reaching a Pareto optimal point means that, from a 
particular starting point in terms of resource entitlements, all available gains from volun­
tary trade have been made. Thus, achieving Pareto optimality maximizes social welfare if 
one assumes that the initial allocation of wealth was consistent with society's overall distri­
butional preferences as embedded in its social welfare function and that all trade is fully 
informed and voluntary. The innovation of the Second Theorem is to show that, even if 
the initial allocation of resources is inconsistent with the social welfare function, the fully 
competitive market nevertheless can maximize social welfare (including society's distribu­
tional concerns) if there is a perfectly nondistortive (or lump sum) system for making redis­
tributive transfers. Thus, the Second Theorem contains in it the division of functions 
between legal rules (correcting market failures and promoting competitive markets) and 
tax rules (correcting distributional inequities). This division of labor remained even when 
it became clear to scholars that no practical means of making nondistortive lump sum 
transfers exists. A major theme in this Article is that this division of labor has been drawn 
too starkly, and that the choice of the optimal policy instrument depends on comparative 
institutional advantage. 
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The economists' emphasis on the tax-and-transfer system as the pri­
mary means of redistribution is unremarkable. As we argue in Sec­
tion Ill, a good case can be made that the tax-and-transfer system 
should be the primary instrument for achieving society's income- or 
wealth-redistributive goals. What is somewhat remarkable, however, 
is the claim that the tax-and-transfer system should be the exclusive 
tool for income redistribution.9 What is more puzzling is the almost 
exclusive focus on money income or wealth as the target of redistribu­
tive policy. Of course, for economists and welfarist policy scholars 
generally, well-being rather than income or wealth is the ultimate tar­
get. Income or wealth is merely a proxy for the underlying character­
istic of subjective well-being.10 Therefore, those scholars would likely 
9 We recognize that, within the discipline of economics, there continue to be vigorous 
debates over the extent to which various policy instruments should be designed to further 
redistributive goals. To take just two examples, economists continue to debate whether it 
would be desirable to use distributional weights in regulatory cost-benefit analysis, e.g., 
Arnold C. Harberger, On the Use of Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analy­
sis, 86 J .  Pol . Econ. S87 (1978), as well as the use of educational subsidies rather than wage 
subsidies or other direct cash transfers, e.g., Richard Layard, Education Versus Cash Re­
distribution, 12 J. Pub. Econ. 377 (1979). Nevertheless it is our assumption that, at least 
among legal economists (that is, economists or economics-minded scholars who have ap­
pointments in law schools) there would be a consensus that, in fact, such policy tools as 
cost-benefit analysis and education subsidies should be kept separate from redistributive 
policy (that is, should be justified solely on efficiency grounds), with redistribution again 
limited to the tax-and-transfer system. (As for precisely what we mean (or what the litera­
ture means) by the distinction between legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules, see Section 
II.) 
In addition, like most legal economists, it seems that most contemporary classical liberal 
philosophers-the architects of modern distributive justice theory-advocate redistrib­
uting exclusively through the tax-and-transfer system. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice 274-80 (1971 ). The argument seems to be that redistribution through a tax-and­
transfer system is less restrictive of liberty and the ability to choose one's preferred path in 
life than are redistributive legal rules. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 276-312 (1986) 
[hereinafter Law's Empire] (arguing that the concern for other people's well-being is the 
responsibility of the government and not of the citizens in their daily transactions utilizing 
private property). For a critique of this sort of liberty-based defense of tax-and-transfer 
rules as the exclusive domain of redistributive policy, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract 
Law and Distributive Justice, 89 Yale L.J. 472 (1980). 
10 In this Article, although we do not adopt the welfarist framework that seems to un­
derlie most of normative economic scholarship, including law and economics scholarship, 
we assume, as explained more fully in Section IV, that some differences in well-being will 
be of concern to redistribution-minded policymakers. We note, however, that the debate 
over the use of redistributive legal rules has been conducted largely in welfarist terms. 
E.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. Legal Stud. 821, 
822-25 (2000) [hereinafter Legal Rules]; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5; Sanchir­
ico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as 
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. Legal Stud. 797 (2000) [hereinafter 
Taxes]. As we argue below, we believe that our framework should be attractive to 
welfarists as well as nonwelfarist policy analysts. See text accompanying notes 261-70. In­
deed, our entire framework can be recast in purely welfarist terms. 
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agree that the ultimate target for a redistribution-minded policymaker 
should be differences in overall well-being, not merely differences in 
wealth or income. 1 1  But those scholars nevertheless focus primarily 
on income or wealth as the relevant measure of or proxy for well­
being.12 That is, they tend to focus on monetary measures of well­
being to the exclusion of other, nonmonetary measures.13 Moreover, 
they never take a position regarding the best redistributive policy tool 
for nonincome-related measures of inequality of well-being, even 
though a comprehensive redistributive policy, even under the econo­
mists' welfarist approach, should be concerned about a broader range 
of inequalities of well-being. 
In this Article we develop a general framework for choosing the 
optimal redistributive policy instrument or combination of redistribu­
tive policy instruments, whatever one's vision of distributive justice 
might be. There are many different approaches to evaluating ques­
tions of distributive justice and redistributive policy. From all of the 
various approaches, however, it is possible to separate out two types 
of questions: First, what is the appropriate equalisandum (the thing to 
equalize, or the thing to redistribute with respect to)? Second, assum­
ing a given equalisandum, what limitations should be imposed on its 
redistribution?14 As to the first question, the "equality of what?" 
11 For example, Kaplow and Shavell clearly understand that, from a welfarist perspec­
tive, to the extent that the distribution of resources is considered important, it is the distri­
bution of overall well-being (and not just the distribution of income) that matters. See, 
e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Fairness II, note 1, at 30 ("[T]he distribution of income may matter 
to social welfare because it affects the distribution of well-being, and, under the welfare 
economic approach, social welfare may depend directly on how equally well-being is dis­
tributed among individuals."). Kaplow and Shavell, however, prefer to talk only in terms 
of income redistribution "for convenience" and because "much analysis of distributive is­
sues refers to the distribution of income and because many redistributive policies operate 
through individuals' incomes." Id. at 28-20 n.25. 
12 The economists' focus on money income typically is not an explicit assumption in 
their models, but rather is implicit in their analysis, which tends to treat income as the 
primary measure of differences in well-being. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing 
Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate Over Tax Reform 51 (2d ed. 2000) 
("There are two distinct aspects to the fairness of a tax system. The first, called 'vertical 
equity' by economists, concerns the appropriate tax burden on households of different 
levels of well-being. It is about how much tax should be paid by a family with $200,000 of 
income, versus a family with $50,000 of income, versus a family with $10,000 of income."). 
13 One important exception to the standard approach is Sanchirico's work on redistribu­
tive rules, discussed throughout this Article. As we discuss in greater detail below, see text 
accompanying notes 148-51, one of Sanchirico's main contributions, on which we build in 
this Article, is to show that there are other important proxies for well-being besides income 
or wealth. See generally Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note 
10. 
14 Although we present these two questions as being independent of each other, we are 
aware that they are interrelated. Specifically, one can favor a specific equalisandum pre­
cisely because of the limitations it implies. Nevertheless, we find it methodologically useful 
to divide the issues in this way. 
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question, political theorists have given a myriad of responses.15 For 
some the concern is solely with inequality of "welfare. "16 For others it 
is equality of "primary goods."17 For others it is equality of "re­
sources."18 For others it is equality of "access to advantage"19 or "op­
portunity for welfare"20 or "capability to achieve functionings."21 In 
fact, one of the main objectives of distributive justice theorists seems 
to be to define a single equalisandum that can capture all our intu­
itions about an egalitarian society.22 
In this Article we do not attempt to distinguish among these differ­
ent, sometimes overlapping conceptions of what should be equalized. 
We aim instead to analyze the purely functional. question of what 
would be the ideal redistributive policy instrument in various settings 
given some theory about what we want to redistribute. Under this 
approach, we need only adopt some fairly general and uncontroversial 
assumptions about society's main egalitarian intuitions and get on 
with our project. To that end, and to simplify the analysis and mini­
mize controversies over alternative visions of the good, we assume 
that any redistributive policy should acknowledge that some types of 
differences in well-being are worth intervention, independent of the 
1s The importance of the question, as Amartya Sen observes, lies in the fact that the 
judgement and measurement of inequality is dependent on the choice of the equalisandum. 
Further, "[e]quality in terms of one [equalisandum] may not coincide with equality in the 
scale of another. For example, equal opportunities can lead to very unequal incomes. 
Equal income can go with significant differences in wealth. Equal wealth can coexist with 
very unequal happiness. Equal happiness can go with widely divergent fulfilment of needs. 
Equal fulfilment of needs can be associated with very different freedoms of choice. And so 
on." Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 2 (1992). 
l6 John E. Roemer, Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare, 101 Q.J. Econ. 
751 (1986) [hereinafter Equality]. 
17  Rawls, note 9, at 62-63, 92. 
18 Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part I :  Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 
185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. & 
Pub. Aff. 283, 300-01 (1981) [hereinafter Equality of Resources] (including mental and 
physical capacity as resources). 
19 G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 916 (1989). 
20 Richard J. Arneson, Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil. Stud. 77, 77 
(1989). 
21 Sen, note 15, at 4, 39-55. 
22 Although there is considerable disagreement among distributive justice theorists con­
cerning the proper framework or vocabulary for analyzing issues of distributive justice, the 
theorists seem to share many of the same intuitions. For example, most would agree that 
an individual's inordinately expensive tastes or bigoted feelings toward certain groups 
should not be taken into account when making egalitarian calculations. Certain versions of 
welfarism include this approach. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Problems With Act-Utilitari­
anism and With Malevolent Preferences, in Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking 
89, 96-98 (Douglas Seanor & N. Potion eds., 1988) (arguing that certain preferences, even if 
entirely informed and rational, should be given no weight in the evaluation of social pol­
icy); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of 
Justice, in Kenneth J. Arrow, 1 Collected Papers of Kenneth J.  Arrow, Social Choice and 
Justice 104 (1983). 
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individuals' underlying resources. In a similar manner we assume that 
some differences in resources can justify redistributive intervention, 
irrespective of overall well-being.23 We also assume that not every 
inequality provides a justification for compulsory redistribution. For 
example, we generally do not consider differences (in well-being, op­
portunity for welfare, access to advantage, whatever) that stem from 
differences in physical attractiveness to be an appropriate justification 
for redistributive policy.24 
As to the question of what limitations should be placed on redistrib­
utive policy with respect to a given equalisandum, here too we do not 
try to defend any particular theory. Rather, we simply make some 
assumptions that we believe will resonate with widely held intuitions. 
For example, we assume that government redistributive policy should 
not target inequalities (of well-being, resources, or whatever) that re­
sult from individuals' informed, voluntary choices. Thus, we assume 
that any redistributive policy should seek to equalize inequalities that 
are the result of individuals' differing initial endowments of talent, 
wealth, opportunities, and the like-differences that derive entirely 
from an individual's genes or from her unchosen social and environ­
mental circumstances.25 In addition, we assume that redistributive 
policy should target inequalities of well-being that result from things 
that happen after an individual is born that affect the individual's well­
being, such as a debilitating injury or illness that is not the direct prod-
23 Thus we adopt a sort of mixed "resourcism" and welfarism approach to issues of dis­
tributive justice. We are by no means the first to adopt such an approach. See, e.g., Sen, 
note 15, at 12-38; Cohen, note 19, at 921. To get a sense of the implications of such a mixed 
approach, consider Cohen's example of the allocation of wheelchairs to the disabled. Co­
hen, note 19, at 917-18. The example involves a person whose legs are paralyzed and who 
needs an expensive wheelchair to get around. Cohen argues that egalitarians will recom­
mend giving him a chair before they ask about the welfare level to which the person's 
paralysis reduces him. The reason is that " [w)hen compensating for disability, egalitarians 
do not immediately distinguish between the different amounts of misery induced by similar 
disabilities in people who have different (dis)utility functions. They propose compensation 
for the disability as such, and not, or not only, for its deleterious welfare effects." Id. 
(emphasis omitted). This is because " [!Jame people need [wheelchairs] to be adequately 
resourced, whether or not they also need them to be, or to be capable of being, happy." Id. 
at 918. 
24 To rule out differences in physical appearance as a redistribution-worthy source of 
inequality may strike some as giving away too much. Of course, whenever one tries to 
draw distinctions between those types of inequality that deserve compulsory redistribution 
and those that do not, there will be an inevitable measure of recourse to one's own intu­
itions on the subject. And that is true here as well. We should emphasize that nothing 
essential in our functional analysis turns on our choices of assumptions regarding which 
types of inequality will justify redistribution. 
25 See generally Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 75 
(1990) ("People's fate should depend on their ambitions (in the broad sense of goals and 
projects about life), but should not depend on their natural and social endowments (the 
circumstances in which they pursue their ambitions)."). 
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uct of the person's life choices. In sum, we assume for the purposes of 
this Article that redistributive policy should try to eliminate or reduce 
only those inequalities that are attributable to "brute luck." Or, to 
use Ronald Dworkin's terms, we assume that a redistributive policy 
should be "endowment-insensitive" but "ambition-sensitive,"26 and 
we seek to provide a framework for choosing the optimal redistribu­
tive policy instrument to achieve that goal. 
For bona fide distributive justice theorists, our decision to focus on 
brute luck-based inequality of well-being without providing a full de­
fense of that assumption will be controversial. Presumably, however, 
most of those who object will complain that our theory provides too 
narrow (too stingy) a justification for compulsory redistribution. That 
is, one might argue that the government also should try to redress 
some types of inequality that are not the result of pure brute luck.27 
We do not necessarily disagree. We limit our analysis to brute luck­
based inequality, however, because it seems relatively uncontroversial 
that compulsory redistribution can be justified at least with respect to 
brute-luck-based inequality.28 Moreover, focusing on brute-luck­
based inequality responds to the legitimate efficiency concern of 
moral hazard inherent in any redistributive scheme-that is, the worry 
that the availability of redistributive transfers will distort incentives in 
various ways, such as by undermining work incentives.29 
26 Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 18, at 293, 330; see also Cohen, note 19, at 908 
(arguing that "the primary egalitarian impulse is to extinguish the influence on distribution 
of both exploitation and brute luck"). Brute luck, as distinct from "option luck," arises 
when an individual's misfortune is involuntary and is not the result of a risk she could have 
avoided. Welfarists therefore should find the distinction between brute luck and option 
luck similar to issues associated with moral hazard. Thus, they too should find this distinc­
tion relevant. Our conception of brute luck is somewhat broader than Dworkin's, how­
ever. For us, brute luck arises when an individual's misfortune is not the result of a risk she 
reasonably could have avoided. 
21 For example, some would argue that the focus on the brute luck/choice distinction is 
misguided, because it is nonexistent. Every choice, the argument goes, is the result of 
one's genetic, environmental, and social circumstances. See, e.g., John E. Roemer, Equal­
ity of Talent, 1 Econ. & Phil. 151 (1985). On this view, what should be equalized is well­
being defined generally. Roemer, Equality, note 16. By adopting brute luck-based ine­
quality as our redistributive target, we obviously reject this extreme version of determin­
ism. We adopt instead the view that individuals should be held responsible for (and left to 
live with) the results of at least some of their informed choices. 
28 See Kymlicka, note 25. 
29 In addition, some will object to our use of brute luck-based inequality because such a 
norm is impossible to apply. Every difference in well-being, the argument goes, is attribu­
table to an unknowable mix of brute luck and choice. We do not underestimate the seri­
ousness of this concern. Indeed, perhaps the most important and difficult task of the 
redistribution-minded policymaker is to develop reliable and, to the extent possible, pre­
cise ways of distinguishing the effects of individual choice from the effects of brute luck. In 
any event, these complaints are irrelevant to the main purpose of this Article. Although 
we explain our comparative advantage framework through the lens of a particular redis­
tributive goal (reducing brute luck-based inequality), the framework at the most general 
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Thus, our approach will be to assume that the policymaker30 has 
decided that some amount of redistribution is called for with respect 
to inequality of something, whether it is income, wealth, capabilities, 
or well-being. Which types of inequality should be so targeted and 
how much are questions that we leave unanswered.31 We focus on the 
institutional structures the policymaker should use to achieve 
whatever redistributive goals it has chosen?32 
Our general conclusion is that the redistribution-minded poli­
cymaker should choose the system that has a comparative advantage 
at redistributing with respect to the particular type of redistribution at 
issue. If we focus for the moment on the dichotomous choice between 
legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules (as the literature has tended to 
do), we answer this question by asking two related but independent 
questions: First, which of the two systems is the "better observer" 
with respect to the type of inequality that is being targeted? (That is, 
which system has a comparative advantage at observing the character­
istic with respect to which redistribution is desired?) Second, which 
system is the "better redistributor" with respect to that type of ine­
quality? One major theme of our analysis is that, whereas one institu­
tion may have a comparative advantage at measuring the particular 
type of inequality at issue, another institution may have a comparative 
advantage at doing the actual redistributing. For example, in some 
situations we may want to use the legal system to observe the relevant 
level could be applied to different conceptions of redistributive policy. We have tried, 
however, to choose a redistributive goal that is consistent with a wide range of theories of 
distributive justice. 
30 We use the term policymaker as if there were a single decisionmaker whose decisions 
somehow reflected the democratic will of society-the proverbial benevolent dictator. 
Thus, for most of this Article, we ignore problems of preference aggregation or public 
choice concerns. We return to this point in the Conclusion. 
31 For most of this Article, we assume that a redistribution-minded policymaker would 
likely regard each type of inequality as being largely independent of the other types of 
inequality. Thus, for example, if it could be shown that the tax system is the optimal policy 
instrument for dealing with income inequality, then a policymaker that seeks to use a dif­
ferent policy instrument to redistribute with respect to, say, differences in genetically de­
termined health prospects can ignore income differences. This assumption appears, on first 
blush, inconsistent with the standard assumption of welfarists that there is only one, unified 
criterion that the policymaker should care about (namely, individual well-being) and that 
whatever policy instrument is used to redistribute should take into account all available 
"proxies" for that unobservable characteristic. In Section IV, however, we argue that our 
independence is in fact consistent with the welfarist approach. See text accompanying 
notes 259-72. 
32 We realize that the choice of type and amount of redistribution may be linked to the 
functional question of which structure will be chosen to implement whatever redistributive 
policy is chosen. Our analysis assumes, however, that it is both conceptually possible and 
analytically useful to separate the institutional question (which we explore in this Article) 
from the substantive redistributive question (which we seek to avoid). 
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type of inequality or proxies for inequality and then have the tax-and­
transfer system make the redistributive transfer. 
Which brings us to another major theme of our analysis: The two 
existing categories-legal rules and tax-and-transfer rules-do not ex­
haust the universe of redistributive policy instruments. Even if every 
policy instrument in some way could be characterized with some com­
bination of those labels, it is not ultimately labels that we care about. 
It is institutional design. And our view, stated most generally, is that 
the policymaker should choose whatever institutional design works 
best for each type of targeted inequality. Nevertheless, it makes sense 
to begin the analysis with a look at the traditional categories; there­
fore, in Section II we provide a working definition of those terms. 
Section III adopts the legal rule/tax rule dichotomy and focuses on 
the type of redistributive policy choice that has dominated the redis­
tributive rules debate to date, that is, the question of income redistri­
bution. Hence, if we assume that the policymaker has decided to 
engage in a given amount of income redistribution (say, from the rich 
to the poor), what is the best policy tool for achieving that goal?33 
Applying our comparative advantage framework, we conclude that 
the tax-and-transfer system probably is in general better at observing 
or measuring individual income. After all, the tax system is designed 
largely, if not primarily, with that task in mind. We also conclude that 
the tax-and-transfer system is probably the better redistributor, for 
practical reasons having to do with the so-called "contracting around" 
and "haphazardness" problems associated with income-redistributive 
legal rules. Thus, with respect to dealing with income inequality, we 
generally side with those who believe that the lion's share of income 
redistribution should be done through the tax-and-transfer system, al­
though there may be some relatively small, supplementary role for the 
legal system in redistributing income. We also show, however, that 
one of the primary justifications for never using legal rules to reduce 
income inequality-the so-called double distortion argument34-has 
been overstated. By the same token, however, we show that certain 
arguments that have been made to support always using legal rules to 
reduce income inequality35 also have been overstated. 
Also in Section III, we examine some existing behavioralist justifi­
cations for using an income-redistributive "tort tax," such as a tort 
rule that requires "rich defendants" to pay a special income tax when 
held liable in court. Such a tort tax, some argue, might have some of 
33 Although the literature focuses on income inequality, it is understood that most of the 
same arguments could be made with respect to inequality of wealth as well. 
34 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10; Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5. 
35 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10. 
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the desirable characteristics of a probabilistic income tax: In particu­
lar, such an implicit tax might have less of a distortive effect on work 
incentives than a standard direct income tax.36 Our analysis of the 
tort tax, however, suggests that, even if an income-redistributive tort 
rule were feasible, the presence of liability insurance would under­
mine its nondistortive character, making it more like a direct tax with 
one important difference: Liability insurance companies rather than 
the IRS would determine and collect the taxes. Thus, whether a sup­
plementary tort tax would be desirable would depend, interestingly, 
on whether it would be desirable to have at least part of the income 
tax administered by private insurance companies rather than by a sin­
gle administrative agency such as the Service. If one sees value in 
privatizing such government functions (in order to benefit from the 
effects of competition) ,  a modest tort tax might be a useful adjunct to 
the existing tax system. 
Whereas Section III analyzes the existing redistributive rules de­
bate, and thus focuses on the problem of reducing income inequality, 
Section IV changes gears significantly. In Section IV, we take seri­
ously the idea that there are other types of inequality that society 
might want to reduce via redistribution. (Or, to put the analysis in 
welfarist terms, there are other proxies for welfare inequality that so­
ciety might want to take into account.) And it is with respect to non­
income sources of inequality (or nonincome proxies for well-being) 
that the tax-and-transfer system no longer has the clear comparative 
advantage. Indeed, we identify some examples in which the legal sys­
tem arguably has an advantage over the tax system as a means of 
redistribution. 
In Section IV, using an example from the field of insurance law, we 
explore how antidiscrimination rules can produce a sort of horizontal 
redistribution (cross-subsidization across consumers) that is not only 
feasible but arguably more efficient than the tax-and-transfer alterna­
tive. Section IV begins by asking whether a rule forbidding insurance 
companies from using certain types of genetic information in their un­
derwriting decisions might result in a redistributive transfer (from the 
better off to the less well off) in a way that minimizes administrative 
costs. Here again, we compare the legal rule approach (which in this 
case takes the form of a nondiscrimination norm) to a tax-and-transfer 
alternative. What we show, however, is that the choice of the optimal 
redistributive policy instrument in this case is more complicated than a 
simple choice of legal rule versus tax rule. Instead, the best choice 
may lie somewhere between those two extremes. For example, one 
36 Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51  
Vand. L.  Rev. 1653 (1998) [hereinafter Behavioral Economics]. 
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intermediate solution might entail a contract-based legal rule forbid­
ding insurance companies from discriminating on the basis of disease­
related genes together with a law requiring the purchase of insurance. 
Compulsory private insurance, of course, begins to resemble vari­
ous social insurance alternatives, such as Medicare or Social Security, 
which in turn have some of the characteristics of a tax-and-transfer 
regime. That is, the distinction between premiums and taxes begins to 
break down, as does the distinction between benefit pay-outs and in 
kind transfers. As a result, the analysis in this Section-and the les­
sons from norms of nondiscrimination in private insurance markets­
may have important implications for the optimal design of social in­
surance arrangements. For example, it is worth exploring the extent 
to which cross-subsidization within Medicare (from the well to the 
sick) can be understood as a relatively efficient system of horizontal 
redistribution. In any event, our point in this Section is to shift the 
focus away from simple comparisons of the paradigmatic cases of legal 
rules and tax regimes to a more subtle discussion of mixed regimes, 
especially those involving various types of insurance mechanisms. 
Section IV also analyzes two types of nonincome-based inequality 
that arguably can be reduced best via a tort rule. We explore the ex­
tent to which pain and suffering damages can be justified as a type of 
redistributive transfer from the better off (those who do not experi­
ence personal injuries) to the worse off (those who do). If such a re­
distributive transfer is something that society deems appropriate, we 
argue that the tort system has a comparative advantage with respect to 
making such transfers. We also consider a type of inequality that has 
been discussed in the existing redistributive rules literature: inequal­
ity with respect to an individual's "accident-proneness"-or the innate 
(in)ability to avoid accidents. For example, the aged or the disabled 
may have an inherently lower ability to avoid certain types of acci­
dents. Or, to use the law and economics term, such individuals have 
"high costs of care."37 If society determined that redistribution with 
respect to this sort of inequality were appropriate, how should it be 
done? Applying our comparative advantage framework, we explore 
the possibility of a negligence standard in which the due care standard 
is defined subjectively (based on each individual's own "cost of care") 
rather than objectively (based on the cost of care of the hypothetical 
reasonable person). We argue that a due care standard that is at least 
somewhat tailored to the individual's circumstances can be justified 
both on efficiency and distributive justice grounds. 
37 Michael B. Dorff, Why Welfare Depends on Fairness, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 847, 889 
(2002). 
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In this Article, then, we show that in applying our comparative ad­
vantage framework, income redistribution may be best accomplished 
primarily through the tax-and-transfer system (with some possible 
room for a supplementary lump sum tort tax), but there are nonin­
come measures of inequality with respect to which the legal system 
should play an essential redistributive role. Although we provide a 
framework that we believe can be useful in analyzing any question of 
redistributive policy, we explore in detail only a limited set of applica­
tions, on the theory that we cannot do everything in one article. In 
particular, most of our applications involve cash transfers, and only 
certain types of cash transfers.38 The one important exception in­
volves the example of horizontal redistribution in insurance markets, 
where a nondiscrimination rule with respect to genetically determined 
diseases would produce a sort of in kind redistribution-that is, redis­
tribution in the form of medical care. Moreover, except for a brief 
discussion in the Conclusion, we overlook a whole range of other 
types of redistributive policies, including, most prominently, disability 
law,39 antidiscrimination law more generally (that is, beyond the con­
text of insurance),  as well as anything having to do with the scope of 
property rights.40 Although our comparative advantage framework 
may indeed apply in those areas as well, such an inquiry is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
II . DEFINING SOME TERMS 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in applying our comparative ad­
vantage framework, we generally follow the convention within the 
38 Although economists tend to favor cash transfers over in kind transfers, we believe 
that any comprehensive theory of distributive justice must take into account in kind trans­
fers (such as regulating disabled individuals' access to public areas) as well antidiscrimina­
tion laws in general. The rationale behind the economists' preference for cash rather than 
in kind transfers is that cash is more fungible and thus permits transferees to have a greater 
degree of control over what the subsidy ultimately goes to pay for. Stiglitz, note 2, at 397-
400. For economists, it is almost always a good idea to let individuals decide what is in 
their own best interests. Even economists, however, will acknowledge some limits to this 
principle in cases in which there are good reasons to doubt that the transferees will make 
choices that are in their own long-run best interests. For example, even economists are 
willing to be paternalistic with children or with addicts of various sorts. Id. at 401-05. In 
addition, economists may accept in kind transfers if  necessary to avoid externalities or if  in 
kind transfers can be viewed as a sort of public good expenditures. As an example of the 
latter type of expenditure, it might make sense from an economist's perspective to install 
ramps in public places to accommodate individuals in wheelchairs if such ramps can be 
understood as a sort of public good. 
39 See generally Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle? The Choice Between Regulation 
and Taxation (1999). 
40 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741 (1999) 
[hereinafter Takings] (demonstrating how progressive distributive considerations can be 
grafted onto takings law without unduly hindering efficiency and other concerns). 
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literature of using the terms tax-and-transfer system and legal system 
. as if their meanings are clear and obviously distinct from each other. 
Of course, neither is true. One way of illustrating this point is to note 
that any legal rule could be recharacterized semantically as a sort of 
tax-and-transfer regime. For example, a tort liability rule can be 
recharacterized as a tax on tort defendants accompanied by an equal 
transfer to the tort plaintiff, with the administrator of the tax-and­
transfer regime being the courts and, to some extent, private insur­
ance companies. 
But to recharacterize a tort rule in this way does not change the fact 
that a tort rule is in many important ways different in institutional 
design from, say, the income tax. In our view the choice faced by the 
redistribution-minded policymaker is not so much an either/or deci­
sion as a more general question of institutional design.41 Neverthe­
less, it still makes sense at least initially to focus (as the existing 
literature has done) on a few core examples that do fit rather nicely 
into these categories. It is also important, as mentioned in the Intro­
duction, to understand and explore the other institutional designs 
available to the policymaker. To that end, one major objective of this 
Article is to begin to examine some of the intermediate redistributive 
policy options that lie somewhere between the extreme examples that 
have been the focus of the debate to date. For now, though, we ex­
plain what we (and others) generally mean by these dichotomous cat­
egories of tax-and-transfer system and legal system. 
We begin with the tax-and-transfer system. A tax might be defined 
as money or other resources collected by the government from indi­
viduals or firms.42 Taxes typically are determined by applying a tax 
rate (or series of tax rates, in the case of a progressive tax) to a given 
base of a particular taxable unit. It is the taxable unit (individual or 
corporation) that is legally responsible to pay the taxes. Taxes usually 
are imposed for one of three reasons: (1) to raise revenue to spend on 
public goods such as national defense or a legal system, which, by as­
sumption, the unregulated market cannot provide or cannot provide 
satisfactorily by itself, (2) to fund redistributive transfers either in cash 
or in kind from one group to another (usually from the better off to 
the less well off, or so we hope), or (3) to internalize externalities and 
41 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex 
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1 163 (1998). We are not the first to recog­
nize the multifaceted nature of the choice that faces the redistribution-minded poli­
cymaker. See, e.g., Kelman, note 39. 
42 Taxes also could take the form of in kind payments. For example, the military draft 
could be thought of as a type of tax for which payment must be made in the form of time 
devoted to military service. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524 (5th ed. 
1998). 
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enhance efficiency. One can imagine taxes on a wide range of tax 
bases, from those as broad as income or consumption to those as nar­
row as sales of cigarettes. 
On the transfer side, dollars raised through taxes can be spent in 
various ways.43 For example, they can be spent on public goods. Un­
less those public goods provide benefits to taxpayers precisely equal 
to (or in proportion to) the amount of tax they pay into the system, 
the provision of such public goods will effect some degree of redistri­
bution.44 In addition, tax dollars can be transferred directly to the 
least well off in society either as cash subsidies or some type of in kind 
benefits.45 Thus, one cannot determine the overall distributional ef­
fect of a tax-and-transfer system by focusing solely on the tax side or 
exclusively on the transfer side. Both sides of the ledger must be 
taken into account. The paradigmatic example of a tax-and-transfer 
regime seems to be an income tax that includes a transfer compo­
nent-that is, individuals whose annual income rises above a given 
amount pay taxes to the government, and those whose income falls 
below a given amount receive a transfer from the govemment.46 The 
latter part of the system sometimes is called a negative income tax. 
The participants in the redistributive rules debate seem to use the 
term legal rules to mean such private law fields as tort law, contract 
law, and property law and such nontax public law fields as environ­
mental law, product safety regulation, and labor law.47 Thus, legal 
rules are, essentially, all private law and all nontax public law. Spe­
cific examples of legal rules that have been characterized as redistrib­
utive, or potentially redistributive, include products liability rules 
making producers responsible for personal injuries caused by their 
products,48 consumer lending laws that limit the amount of interest 
that lenders can charge,49 minimum wage laws,50 and housing codes.51 
43 Alternatively, in kind tax payments of, say, labor can be devoted to any number of 
public purposes such as military service. 
44 Polinsky, note 5, at 120. 
45 Kelman, note 39, at 103. Such redistributive transfers themselves can be viewed as a 
sort of public good, in the sense that, without government compulsion, the same degree of 
redistribution from rich to poor could not be achieved. 
46 See Kronman, note 9, at 498-99. 
47 In his classic book, Polinsky includes such fields as nuisance law, contract law, auto­
mobile accident law, environmental law, and products liability law within his analysis of 
"legal rules." Polinsky, note 5. 
48 See Alan 0. Sykes, Reformulating Tort Reform, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 153, 1159 (1989) 
(reviewing Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences {1988)); 
Gregory Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 193, 194 (2000) (arguing that concepts of distributive justice should inform tort 
law generally). 
49 Kronman, note 9, at 473. 
50 Id. 
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With respect to some legal rules, the effect of the rules is to allocate 
risks between parties-between buyers and sellers, producers and 
consumers, drivers and pedestrians, polluters and the state.s2 As a 
result, legal rules, private and public, often give rise to insurance mar­
kets, as individuals or firms seek to shed the risk associated with those 
rules.s3 It makes sense, then, that if the full distributional effects of a 
redistributive legal rule are to be considered, the effects of the appli­
cable liability insurance market-such as the price and terms of the 
standard liability policies-also should be considered. Although some 
participants in the redistributive rules debate have recognized this 
fact,s4 we attempt to incorporate more fully into our general frame­
work the role of liability insurance as part of the so-called legal 
system. 
One other term that we should define at this point is "income." As 
other scholars writing in this literature have done, we focus on income 
as the primary measure of economic well-being and thus assume that 
income inequality is a primary target of any redistributive policy.ss 
Although for nontax experts, the meaning of the term income may 
seem obvious, any tax scholar, and any law student who has taken the 
introductory federal income tax course, knows otherwise. Giving 
flesh to the concept of income occupies a substantial fraction of the 
voluminous Code and even more voluminous regulations. Moreover, 
there is a large tax policy literature devoted to the question of what 
constitutes income. We do not expect to offer a comprehensive defini­
tion of income in this small space. We offer a tentative, functional 
definition to get things started, a definition shaped by the purpose of 
our analysis. 
At the most general level, an individual's income can be understood 
as a proxy for the more salient but unobservable underlying character­
istic of "ability to pay taxes." And this notion of ability to pay in­
cludes both the individual's human capital (that is, her earning power) 
and financial capital (for example, the return from her inherited 
wealth). We also define income to be roughly what the Code calls 
"adjusted gross income," which consists of an individual's wages and 
salary (income from human capital) as well as her rents, interest, and 
dividends received (income from financial capital) net of business-re-
51 Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of 
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale. L.J. 1093 
(1971). 
52 Polinsky, note 5, at 132-33. 
53 Id. at 53-55. 
54 See, e.g., Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663-67. 
55 See note 5.  
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lated expenses.56 What the tax lawyer or tax scholar immediately will 
notice about this definition of income is its omission of certain deduc­
tions, such as those for extraordinary medical expenses and for casu­
alty losses. We left those out intentionally, because whether to allow 
such deductions is a version of the question that this Article primarily 
addresses. That is, deductions for medical expenses or casualty losses 
should be allowed, under our framework, only if the income tax sys­
tem is the optimal system for achieving distributional equity with re­
spect to those characteristics. 
III. INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: THE CURRENT 
REDISTRIBUTIVE RULES DEBATE 
A. Applying the Comparative Advantage Framework 
The question this Section addresses, and the question on which the 
literature has focused, is what redistributive policy instrument or mix 
of instruments is the best means of redistributing with respect to in­
come inequality. Or to put the question in the spirit of the existing 
redistributive rules debate: Should redistribution with respect to in­
come always be left exclusively to the tax-and-transfer system or is 
there some role for income redistribution through the legal system? 
In our view, two further questions facilitate the choice of the optimal 
redistributive policy instrument-especially when comparing legal 
rules to tax rules: (1) Which institution (the tax system or the legal 
system) is the "better observer," that is, which is better at measuring 
each individual's income? and (2) Which institution is the "better 
redistributor," that is, once we have the information about income, 
which system should make the actual transfers? Again, these func­
tions could be performed by the same institution or by different insti­
tutions, and in some cases, by both. 
1 .  The Better Observer 
It seems uncontroversial that the income tax system would be a bet­
ter observer than the legal system when it comes to measuring in­
come. After all, the whole enforcement tax system (including the 
Code, the Service, and the like) was designed largely with that task in 
mind-to define the concept of income, to establish a set of tax rates 
that apply to different levels of income so as to assure the desired 
level of progressivity (or lack of it), and to set up a system of enforce­
ment (including wage withholding, information returns, and the threat 
of audits) to induce the maximal level of compliance with the minimal 
56 IRC § 62. 
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amount of enforcement costs. Even those who support some redis­
tributive role for the legal system seem to assume that something like 
the existing income tax regime would remain in place, at least as a 
source of information about individuals' relative incomes.57 
We do not claim that the existing income tax system is perfect or 
even nearly perfect. As far as we are aware, no one holds that view. 
All existing tax systems have flaws, and the U.S. system is no excep­
tion. Indeed, most tax policy scholarship is devoted to pointing out 
the many imperfections in existing tax regimes in this country and 
elsewhere. But the relevant comparison is between an idealized tax­
and-transfer system, after the flaws have been fixed (or minimized), 
and an idealized legal system, also devoid of flaws. Thus, the question 
we are interested in is which system, by its nature, would be the better 
proxy observer with respect to income. And again, if that is the ques­
tion, the obvious answer seems to be the tax-and-transfer system.58 
2. The Better Redistributor 
The second part of our comparative advantage analysis requires the 
policymaker to ask whether the legal system or the tax-and-transfer 
57 For example, even Sanchirico, who clearly sees some legitimate redistributive role for 
the legal system, never advocates outright abolition of the income tax. See generally 
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8. 
58 One qualification to this conclusion might be that the legal system could provide a 
sort of back-up audit function to the income tax system. That is, even if we need to have 
something like the existing tax system as a means of gathering certain basic pieces of infor­
mation about the vast majority of taxpayers' income levels, it might be useful if courts were 
to gather (and perhaps share with the Service) a more detailed picture of the wealth or 
income of the parties before it. The Service, for example, used to have a program called 
the Taxpayer Compliance Management Program ("TCMP"}, whose purpose was to subject 
a small number of randomly-selected taxpayers to a very comprehensive audit, much more 
comprehensive than the general audits performed by the Service. The purpose of the 
TCMP audits was to produce information about taxpayer compliance behavior that could 
assist the Service in its enforcement efforts, including its decisions regarding where to focus 
its enforcement resources. Congress abolished the program in 1998. In an effort to mea­
sure compliance in a less burdensome manner, the Service plans to implement a new pro­
gram known as the National Research Program ("NRP"), which also will review randomly­
selected returns. See George Guttman, IRS Moving Ahead on Taxpayer Compliance Sur­
vey, 95 Tax Notes 833 (May 6, 2002) (describing the now-extinct TCMP as well as the 
NRP). One possible alternative or supplement to the TCMP would be to have courts, in  
nontax cases, perform a similar function as part of implementing a redistributive legal rule. 
This, if we imagine courts seeking to engage in some measure of income redistribution via, 
say, tort law, we might imagine the courts relying not merely on the parties' tax returns, 
but engaging in full scale audits. Giving courts this sort of in-depth audit responsibility 
might even be better than having the Service do it in cases in which, because of the nature 
of the lawsuits, information concerning the parties' financial situation is relevant for rea­
sons independent of distributional policy. To be clear, we do not argue for replacing the 
tax system generally as a means of observing individual incomes, but rather argue for sup­
plementing the tax system with the legal system. 
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system is the better redistributor. The manner in which the tax-and­
transfer system redistributes income is fairly straightforward: High in­
come people are taxed more than low income people, with the lowest­
income folks receiving transfer payments. For now, assume that 
something like our existing tax-and-transfer system will be used to 
gather information about each individual's income level. It is still con­
ceivable that that information might be used by courts in various ways 
to equalize income between parties to lawsuits (or to equalize income 
between groups of parties who are likely to be involved in lawsuits). 
Income redistribution through the legal system could be accomplished 
in two general ways. 
First, there could be "class-based" redistributive rules, which seem 
to be what some commentators have in mind when they talk about 
redistributive legal rules generally.59 Examples of these would include 
employment rules that are "pro-worker," property rules that are "pro­
tenant," or product liability rules that are "pro-consumer." The ratio­
nale behind such class-based redistributive rules would be that em­
ployees (vis-a-vis employers), tenants (vis-a-vis landlords), and 
consumers (vis-a-vis product manufacturers) are on average relatively 
poor. In all of these examples, the group being redistributed from is 
in a contractual relationship with the group being redistributed to, but 
that need not always be the case. One also could imagine "pro-pedes­
trian" auto safety rules or "pro-citizen" pollution control rules that 
did not involve contractual relationships.60 The theory behind any 
such rules, again, to the extent they are justified on income redistribu­
tion grounds, would be that one class of parties (employers, landlords, 
manufacturers, or drivers) tends on average to be wealthier or to have 
higher incomes than the class of parties benefiting from the rule. 
An alternative to the class-based approach would be a "case-spe­
cific" income-redistributive legal rule. To see how such an approach 
would work, imagine a tort rule providing that if damages are 
awarded in any tort case they must be adjusted upward or downward 
depending on the relative incomes of the two parties involved in the 
suit.61 Thus, if in a particular driver-pedestrian auto accident case, the 
59 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 124-27. 
60 See id. at 123-24. 
61 It is not always clear whether scholars writing about redistributive legal rules have in 
mind class-based redistributive rules or case-specific redistributive rules. See, e.g., Kaplow 
& Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, note 10, at 669-70. On the one hand, when Kaplow 
and Shaven discuss the issue in general terms, they seem to deal with class-based redistrib­
utive rules. Yet, when providing models and examples, the rules Kaplow and Shavell dis­
cuss seem fairly case-specific, in that each individual subject to the rule is supposed to pay 
(or receive) tort damages in accordance with the difference between his and the other 
party's specific incomes. Id. Sanchirico, too, is somewhat hard to pin down on this point. 
In one place he seems to endorse case-specific redistributive rules. In his view, "specific 
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injuring driver's income turned out to be higher than that of the in­
jured pedestrian, the damages owed by the driver, if she were found 
liable, would be adjusted upward. Alternatively, if the pedestrian 
happened to be richer, the adjustment would go the other way; the 
damages would be reduced by the amount of the redistributive tax. 
Again, if such a rule were adopted, it is our assumption that the tax 
system would still be the primary proxy observer, in the sense that the 
courts, applying a class-based or case-specific income-redistributive 
rule, would use Service-gathered information regarding relative 
incomes.62 
Return now to our second question: Which system-as between le­
gal rules and tax rules-is overall the better income redistributor? As 
the literature on redistributive legal rules has developed, there seems 
to be little disagreement that the tax-and-transfer system should be 
used as one means of redistributing income, for the same reasons that 
it should be used as a proxy observer. The real question is whether 
there should be any income-redistributive role for the legal system. 
As summarized in the Introduction, the now conventional view among 
some economists and most law and economics scholars is that all re­
distribution of income should be done through the tax-and-transfer 
system, and none through the legal system.63 
Commentators have offered three distinct arguments in support of 
this conclusion. First, it has long been argued that income redistribu­
tion through certain types of legal rules is not feasible, because the 
parties affected by the rule will contract around the redistributive as­
pect of the rule.64 A second longstanding argument against income­
redistributive legal rules is that, even to the extent such redistribution 
is feasible, it is too haphazard-it is both underinclusive and overin­
clusive-compared with the same sort of redistribution accomplished 
through the tax-and-transfer system.65 The third and most recent ob­
jection to income-redistributive legal rules, sometimes called the 
double-distortion argument, says that any income redistribution that 
feasibly can be accomplished through the legal system can be accom-
conditioning [of the redistributive legal rules] on the observable economic attributes of the 
particular parties before the court is actually welfare-improving." Sanchirico, Efficiency 
Rationale, note 8, at 1011.  Elsewhere, however, he suggests that class-based rules are what 
he has in mind. For example, his discussion of the use of "multidimensional tax tables," 
discussed below at note 165, might be understood as getting at a sort of class-based redis­
tributive legal rule. Id. at 1027-28. 
62 It is with respect to the case-specific approach, however, that the courts could perform 
a sort of random auditing function. See note 58. 
63 See text accompanying notes 5-8. 
64 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 122-23. 
65 Id. at 125-27; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75; Sanchirico, Effi­
ciency Rationale, note 8, at 1051-56. 
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plished more efficiently through the tax-and-transfer system, because 
the redistributive legal rules inevitably involve two types of distortion 
whereas redistributive tax-and-transfer rules involve only one.66 
In the following Subsections, we address these objections to in­
come-redistributive legal rules. We argue that the legal economists' 
case for the exclusive use of the tax-and-transfer system for redistrib­
uting income and for never using income-redistributive legal rules has 
been overstated in several respects. In addition, we evaluate an argu­
ment that has been made in favor of always using legal rules to redis­
tribute income at least as a supplement to the tax system. We 
conclude that this argument also is overstated. Our tentative overall 
conclusion with respect to income redistribution is that we agree with 
the legal economists' bottom line that the tax system should be the 
primary redistributive policy instrument, although for purely prag­
matic (nontheoretical) reasons. 
B. Evaluation of the Case for Never Using 
Income-Redistributive Legal Rules 
1 .  The Contracting-Around Argument 
A standard argument made by legal economists against using legal 
rules as a tool for redistributing income is that, in a large class of 
cases, redistributive legal rules simply will not work. Specifically, the 
argument is that, with respect to legal rules that govern parties who 
are in contractual relationships with one another, any attempt to re­
distribute income through the legal rule in some sense will be con­
tracted around.67 Thus, although the critics of redistributive legal 
rules will concede that income redistribution is feasible (though no­
noptimal) for legal rules governing strangers, such as drivers and 
pedestrians or polluters and pollutees, they generally agree that redis­
tribution with respect to contract-based legal rules is not feasible, 
whether the contractual relationship in question involves a bilateral 
monopoly, with the two parties bargaining over the surplus, or a com­
petitive market situation, with prices and terms determined by market 
forces.68 In either case, if the policymaker were to use a legal rule to 
redistribute from one group perceived to be relatively wealthy to an­
other group perceived to be relatively poor, the redistributive aspect 
of the rule would be offset. 
The way this contracting-around process would work depends on 
the market setting in which the rule was designed to operate. First, 
66 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 823-24. 
67 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 5, at 122-23. 
68 See, e.g., id. at 122-24. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
178 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: 
consider situations involving bilateral monopoly contractual relation­
ships, for example certain landlord-tenant relationships. If a pro-ten­
ant redistributive rule were introduced into such a setting, the parties 
would simply undo the effects of the rule through ex ante bargaining 
over price or terms or both. The result would be that the joint surplus 
from the contractual relationship would be distributed between the 
parties according to their relative bargaining power.69 And since the 
superior bargaining power often would rest with the wealthier party, it 
is doubtful that the resulting distribution of the contractual surplus 
would be consistent with the redistributive aim of the policymaker. 
Second, consider contractual situations that do not involve bilateral 
monopolies but that instead arise under conditions of market competi­
tion. In such settings parties would not literally contract around the 
redistributive rule; rather, competitive forces in the long run would 
cause prices and terms to adjust in a way that would offset the intent 
of the rule.7° For example, if a special products liability "tax" were 
adopted in order to redistribute from relatively rich manufacturers to 
relatively poor consumers, the long-run outcome would be that the 
prices would rise to offset the effect of the rule.71 For this reason, the 
conventional law and economics version of the contracting-around ar­
gument concludes that "whenever the parties to a dispute are in some 
kind of contractual or market relationship, it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to use the legal system to redistribute income."72 
These simple versions of the contracting-around argument, how­
ever, are at best incomplete. For starters, in bilateral monopoly situa­
tions, although bargaining can undercut the distributional objectives 
of a redistributive legal rule, the design of rules can affect the division 
of the contract surplus. Indeed, some legal rules are designed specifi­
cally to alter the division of the surplus in contractual settings. Con­
sider, for example, the rules enabling the creation of employee unions, 
authorizing collective bargaining, and permitting workers to go on 
strike. The very purpose of such rules is to change the division of the 
contractual surplus and to shift some of the contractual surplus-some 
of the wealth created by employment contracts-from employers to 
employees.73 
69 Id. at 122-23. 
70 Id. at 123. 
1 1  Id.; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 1. 
n Polinsky, note 44, at 123. 
73 We do not suggest, of course, that the rules authorizing collective bargaining are nec­
essarily efficient. Our point here is that such rules are, in an important sense, redistribu­
tive. Sanchirico makes a similar observation. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 
1047. For an analysis of wage data from the early 1900's that shows that employers were 
able to pass on to their employees a significant part of the higher costs of higher post­
accident compensation, but that the size of the wage offset was smaller for union workers, 
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In addition, even in nonbilateral monopoly situations, the argument 
that prices always will rise to offset any redistributive effect of legal 
rules is an oversimplification. To the contrary, some scholars have ar­
gued that whether legal rules can be made to redistribute from, say, 
manufacturers to consumers depends on whether manufacturers are 
able to pass on the entire amount of the cost increase to the consum­
ers. 74 According to this argument, the extent to which manufacturers 
will be able to pass on those costs depends on the relative elasticity of 
demand and supply: The more inelastic the demand for and the more 
elastic the supply of the product, the more manufacturers will be able 
to pass on the costs to consumers. Following this reasoning, if demand 
for the product is elastic and supply inelastic, manufacturers would be 
relatively unable to pass those costs on to consumers. As a result, 
consumers may benefit from the redistributive legal rule because they 
get the full benefit of the rule but bear only part of the costs.75 
Even this argument, however, is oversimplified. As Richard Cras­
well has pointed out, this argument ignores the fact that introducing a 
pro-consumer products liability rule not only would increase manufac­
turers' costs but also would increase consumers' demand for the prod­
uct in question. Once the shift in demand is taken into account, the 
analysis becomes considerably more complex.76 In situations involv­
ing homogeneous consumer preferences regarding a new pro-con­
sumer rule, Craswell shows that consumers will be made better off 
only if the rule is efficient-in the sense that consumers benefit from 
the rule more than it costs manufacturers.77 In a more recent analysis, 
Christine Jolls reached a similar conclusion with respect to "accommo­
dation mandates," which she defines as a "requirement that employ-
see Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of 
Workers' Compensation Laws?, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=226547 
(Dec. 1994). One might hold the view, of course, that rules enabling the organization of 
labor unions and authorizing strikes are inefficient. Whether or not that is so is irrelevant 
to our argument here, since the question we address is not whether redistribution through 
contract-based rules is efficient, but whether it is feasible. 
74 The observation that costs imposed through a contract-based redistributive rule might 
not be fully passed on through the price was first made by Bruce Ackerman in discussing 
housing codes. Ackerman, note 51 ,  at 1105-08. 
75 For a clear summary of this argument, see Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of 
Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 
361, 366-68 (1991 ). 
76 Id. at 368. 
77 Id. at 372. Craswell points out therefore that, under the homogeneous consumer as­
sumption, pro-consumer rules that pass on less than all of the manufacturer's costs to con­
sumers will make consumers worse off. In fact, the best situation for consumers is a rule 
that allows "more than 100 percent" of the costs to be passed on to consumers, in the sense 
that consumers benefit from the rule by more than it costs manufacturers. Id. 
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ers take special steps in response to the distinctive needs of particular, 
identifiable demographic groups of workers."78 
In other words, rules designed to be vertically redistributive in the 
contract-based setting can be so only if they are also efficient. In our 
view, although that conclusion is correct (under the assumptions), it is 
not clear what implications follow from it. One response would be to 
say that, if a pro-consumer or pro-employee rule is efficient, manufac­
turers or employers already will have incentives to adopt it (to maxi­
mize their profits), and we thus do not need a legal rule to force them 
to do so. One of the main points of this Article is to disagree with that 
assertion. Surely it is not the case that concluding that a rule is effi­
cient (that the value to the employee or consumer exceeds the cost to 
the employer or manufacturer) negates the rule's independent value 
as a tool of distributive justice. Much of law and economics scholar­
ship is devoted to analyzing market failures (or cognitive biases) that 
prevent parties from reaching efficient bargains. And if a pro-con­
sumer or pro-employee rule, which for market failure reasons has not 
been adopted, can be supported both on efficiency grounds and distri­
butional grounds, the case for adopting such a rule is clearly strength­
ened.79 As we argue at length in Section IV below, there are a 
number of instances in which a rule can be both efficient and redis­
tributive in a desirable direction. 
Moving beyond the assumption of homogenous consumers, in situa­
tions in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences regarding a 
particular pro-consumer rule, Craswell shows that distributional and 
78 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 231 (2000). The par­
adigmatic accommodation mandate would be the "reasonable accommodations" require­
ment of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Id. at 225. Jolls concludes that, if related 
antidiscrimination law is binding (that is, employers are not allowed to undermine the ac­
commodation mandate by the reducing wages or employment levels of the targeted 
group), then an accommodation mandate will make the targeted group better off only if 
the value of the mandate to the group exceeds its cost to the employer. Id. at 246-51 .  
7 9  To take just one example, economist Jonathon Gruber studied the labor market ef­
fects of introducing mandatory coverage for the expenses of childbirth in employer-pro­
vided health insurance policies. According to traditional economic theory, the 
introduction of such a mandatory, not-bargained-for term in the employment contract 
should cause wages to fall by less than the cost of the benefit, because if wages fall by 
100% of the cost of the benefit, then at least some of the employers would have provided 
the benefit voluntarily. The study found consistently, however, that 100% of the costs 
were shifted to employees through wage reductions and that there was virtually no reduc­
tion in employment. Presumably, although the employees valued the benefit more than its 
cost to the employer, the benefit was not being provided absent the mandate. Jonathon 
Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994); 
see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1506-07 (1998) (discussing Gruber study and 
suggesting a behavioral explanation for lack of market provision of apparently efficient 
term). 
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efficiency concerns no longer necessarily converge and even defining 
what is a pro-consumer rule becomes very complex.80 Depending 
upon various consumer groups' willingness to pay for the product in 
question and for the new pro-consumer rule, it is possible to conceive 
of a situation in which a pro-consumer rule would result in a desirable 
form of "horizontal redistribution" (from one consumer group to an­
other, rather than from manufacturer to consumer) .81 Such a rule 
would be very difficult to design, however, if the redistributive target 
is income inequality among various consumer groups.s2 
In sum, it is wrong to assert that redistribution through contract­
based legal rules is impossible or infeasible. Contract-based income 
redistribution can be accomplished under certain conditions.83 Never­
theless, the difficulties raised by the contracting-around problem are 
real. And as always, we are asking a comparative question: Given 
that in some cases redistributive legal rules to some extent will be con­
tracted around, is not the tax-and-transfer system a superior system of 
redistribution? Although we remain tentative on this point, we con­
clude that the contracting-around argument seriously weakens the 
case for using contract-based legal rules to redistribute vertically, such 
as from manufacturers to consumers or from employers to employees 
in order to reduce income inequality.84 As we argue in Section IV, 
so Craswell, note 75, at 376-77. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 376-85. In Section I I I  we offer several examples of contract-based redistributive 
legal rules that, in fact, do produce a type of horizontal redistribution that is both desirable 
and practical. Those rules, however, focus on nonincome measures of inequality. With 
respect to income inequality, we tend to agree with Craswell that contract-based redistrib­
utive legal rules-whether intended to produce vertical or horizontal income redistribu­
tion-are impractical, when compared with the tax-and-transfer system. 
83 In this Article, we focus on redistribution in the form of cash payments. If we were to 
expand the analysis, however, to consider in kind redistributive transfers, there are exam­
ples of contract-based redistributive rules that would not be fully contracted around. For 
example, if the policymaker were to impose large fixed expenditures on employers or man­
ufacturers designed to benefit relatively poor (or, more generally, less well off) employees 
or consumers, the cost of those fixed expenses could not readily be passed on to employees 
(through lower wages) or to consumers (through higher prices), as those are not marginal 
expenditures. 
84 Sanchirico, in his response to the contracting-around argument, contends that that 
this argument does not provide a reason to prefer the income tax to redistributive, con­
tract-based legal rules, because, among other things, the contracting-around problem is no 
different from the problem of income shifting, which plagues the tax-and-transfer system. 
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1047. Examples of income shifting include situ­
ations in which high-tax individuals shift their income (at least the reporting of it) to low­
tax individuals within their families, thus lowering the household's overall tax burden and 
undermining the intended effect of the progressive rate structure. Id. at 1047 n.113. But 
income shifting of this sort would be just as much a problem for income-redistributive legal 
rules as it is for the direct tax on income. Under either system, special rules would be 
necessary to prevent this sort of tax evasion. Perhaps the more relevant question is 
whether something akin to the contracting-around problem would affect a direct tax on 
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however, when we broaden the analysis to include nonincome mea­
sures of well-being, and begin to consider the possibility of using con­
tract-based legal rules to redistribute horizontally (through cross­
subsidization), the contracting-around argument has little or no 
application. 
2. The Haphazardness Argument 
Commentators also commonly argue that income redistribution 
through the legal system is more haphazard than income redistribu­
tion through the tax system. This haphazardness complaint consists of 
two separate concerns: the problem of inaccuracy and the problem of 
underinclusiveness. 85 
a. The Problem of Inaccuracy 
The problem of inaccuracy is most acute with respect to class-based 
redistributive rules, by which we mean, again, legal rules designed to 
redistribute from a class of potential defendants to a class of potential 
plaintiffs based on a determination that the average income of the 
former class is greater than the average income of the latter. Exam­
ples of class-based redistributive rules might include pro-consumer 
product liability doctrines or pro-tenant property doctrines. There in­
evitably will be some imprecision within the relevant classes. For ex­
ample, pro-pedestrian auto accident tort rules (that is, rules that 
tended to redistribute from drivers to pedestrians) would be a highly 
imprecise redistributive tool. As Polinsky notes, " [i]t may be that 
higher income persons are more likely to be drivers than pedestrians, 
but certainly there are many low-income drivers and high-income 
pedestrians."86 As a result of such inaccuracy, pro-pedestrian rules 
would result in not only redistribution in the right direction (from rich 
drivers to poor pedestrians), but also a great deal of redistribution in 
the wrong direction (from poor drivers to rich pedestrians). 
Not every class-based redistributive rule, though, need be so impre­
cise. Some classes of potential defendants and potential plaintiffs will 
income. Tax policy scholars generally assume that the incidence of direct taxes on individ­
ual income tends not to be shifted through contractual relationships. See, e.g., Slemrod & 
Bakija, note 12, at 71 ("The entire burden of individual income taxes is assumed to fall on 
those families who have the legal liability, with no shifting at all of tax levied on either 
labor or capital income."). The incidence of the corporate income tax is less clear. Id. at 
68 ("Unfortunately, tracing the ultimate incidence of a tax levied on corporations, such as 
the corporation income tax, is a very difficult and controversial matter."). 
ss Polinsky, note 5, at 125-27; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75; 
Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1051-56. 
86 Polinsky, note 5, at 126. 
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correspond more closely with the income classes that are the target of 
redistribution. Some pollution control laws, for example, might be 
targeted at manufacturers (or, even more precisely, at manufacturers 
in certain industries) whose incomes are relatively high. So long as 
the benefits of such targeted redistributive rules either were focused 
on the relatively poor or spread evenly across the citizenry, such 
targeted class-based redistributive rules could be relatively accurate.87 
Critics of class-based redistributive rules, however, argue that no 
matter how carefully the classes of potential defendants and potential 
plaintiffs are drawn, redistributive rules by their nature can never be 
as accurate as the income tax.88 The income tax, after all, is designed 
primarily to separate individuals and firms into classes based on in­
come. The main point of the Code is to provide a system for measur­
ing and taxing the income of individuals and firms so that the amount 
of tax each taxpayer pays is an explicit function (a simple percentage) 
of that taxpayer's income. Thus, the Code, as well as the regulations 
and judicial decisions interpreting it, define in excruciating detail all of 
the items that must be included and that may be left out of the income 
tax base and the tax rates that apply to that base for each individual 
and firm. It is almost impossible to imagine that any class of potential 
defendants or potential plaintiffs could be drawn so narrowly as to 
approximate this level of accuracy of income measurement. 
At this point in the debate, one might argue that the income tax is 
rife with "loopholes," provisions in the Code that permit exclusions or 
deductions for amounts that a "pure" or "ideal" income tax would 
include in the tax base or gaps in enforcement due to poor system 
design or lack of funding. Therefore, the argument goes, the income 
tax is not as accurate as critics of redistributive legal rules would have 
us believe and hence should not be held up as a perfect redistributive 
tool. The implication of this argument is that redistributive rules do 
not fair so badly by comparison. In our view, this response to the 
inaccuracy critique makes an important contribution: It emphasizes 
that the issue in this debate is always one of comparison, of relative 
costs and benefits of alternative redistributive policy instruments. 
Therefore, it is never enough to say simply that redistributive legal 
rules are lacking in some respect, rather they must be lacking relative 
to the tax system equivalent. The accuracy critique of redistributive 
s7 Polinsky makes a similar observation. Id. at 125-27. Of course, there is an enormous 
tax-incidence problem associated with this sort of redistributive rule. Even assuming that 
the owners of capital rather than employees or customers would bear the incidence of such 
a tort tax, many corporate shareholders (even shareholders in polluting manufacturers) are 
middle- or low-income individuals. See id. (discussing a similar problem in the auto acci­
dent context). 
88 See, e.g., id. at 126-27 . 
• 
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legal rules, however, given a fair reading, does contain a comparative 
argument. The claim is not that the income tax is perfect. Rather, the 
claim is that, because the income tax is specifically designed to do di­
rectly and precisely what legal rules can do only indirectly and deriva­
tively, the income tax almost certainly will redistribute more 
accurately than will a class-based redistributive rule. 
To see the force of this point, consider the following question: If 
class-based redistributive rules are to be used, how will the social 
planner (the designer of the rules) determine the accuracy of the clas­
ses in the first place? Presumably, by using some system akin to, or 
identical to, the income tax. That is, the policymaker would need 
some system for actually measuring the income of individuals and 
firms (defining income in some way) in order to be sure that, when 
using a redistributive legal rule, the classes of potential defendants 
and potential plaintiffs provide an acceptably accurate set of redistrib­
utive classes. And whatever income measurement system the poli­
cymaker sets up will be subject to the same sorts of complaints 
(regarding loopholes and the like) levied against the existing income 
tax. Thus, complaints that the existing income tax has too many loop­
holes or that it has large enforcement gaps may be persuasive in argu­
ments concerning tax reform, but they are generally unpersuasive as a 
response to the accuracy critique of class-based redistributive legal 
rules. 
The accuracy critique, however, has less (though not zero) force 
when applied to a case-specific approach to redistributive legal rules. 
To see how a case-specific approach would work, imagine a tort rule 
providing that, if damages are awarded in any tort case, they must be 
adjusted upward or downward depending on the relative incomes of 
the two parties to the suit. Thus, if in a particular driver-pedestrian 
auto accident case the injuring driver's income were greater than the 
injured pedestrian's income, the damages owed by the driver, if she 
were found liable, would be adjusted upward by some percentage of 
the difference. Alternatively, if the pedestrian happened to be richer, 
the adjustment would go the other way; the amount of the redistribu­
tive tax would reduce the damages. Under this approach, the redis­
tributive legal rule would provide the same degree of accuracy as the 
income tax because the same measure of income, even the same tax 
forms, would be used. Thus, to the extent the income tax is inaccurate 
in measuring income, the same inaccuracy would show up in the case­
specific redistributive rule. But there would be no additional inaccu­
racy of the sort inherently found in the class-based redistributive rule. 
In fact, one can imagine a case-specific redistributive approach that 
would be more accurate than the existing income tax, at least with 
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respect to the parties before the court. For example, a court applying 
a case-specific redistributive rule would perform either an auditing 
function (by looking beyond the returns to the parties' underlying 
records) or an income-averaging function (by looking at returns from 
more than one year). Either of those steps, however, would come at 
considerable additional administrative cost, and the question again 
would be: Why would such an auditing or income-averaging function 
be performed more efficiently through the legal system than through 
the tax system? It is at least plausible that there may be some efficien­
cies to having the legal system perform these functions as a supple­
ment to the tax system. After all, the parties are before the court 
anyway and, at least for some types of litigation, already have reasons 
to open their books to the court. But these are empirical questions. 
b. The Problem of Underinclusiveness 
No matter how precisely a redistributive legal rule is drawn, 
whether class-based or case-specific, redistribution through the legal 
system inevitably would leave out some parties who, according to this 
argument, ideally should be included: namely, those who are not in­
volved in litigation. In other words, ignoring the effect of insurance 
markets for the moment, the redistributive capacity of the legal sys­
tem is inherently limited to plaintiffs and defendants or to whoever is 
the subject of the legal rule. Thus, although a targeted redistributive 
tort rule or pollution control rule could redistribute from some rich 
manufacturers to some less-rich consumers, there would be other 
high-income manufacturers untaxed and many low-income individuals 
who do not benefit from this rule.89 Even under the case-specific ap­
proach, redistribution would occur only from the rich to the poor who 
happen to end up in litigation against each other. The income tax, by 
contrast, enables the policymaker to transfer, in theory, from all rich 
within the taxing jurisdiction to all poor within that jurisdiction. Thus, 
the income tax is a more comprehensive-or less underinclusive-re­
distributive policy tool than the legal system is.90 
First, we should point out that the most extreme version of the un­
derinclusiveness argument is wrong. That is, the redistributive reach 
of a redistributive legal rule is not limited to parties who end up in 
litigation. It is a bedrock assumption of the standard economic analy­
sis of tort law that tort doctrine (including any redistributive aspect of 
tort doctrine, such as a special tort tax on the rich) not only affects 
actual tortfeasors and victims but also changes the ex ante incentives 
89 Polinsky, note 5, at 126. 
90 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 823. 
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of all parties who are potential injurers and potential victims (that is, 
everyone who might possibly wind up in litigation governed by a re­
distributive rule ) .91 It is this ex ante incentive effect that often is de­
scribed as the deterrence function of tort law.92 As a result, if a 
special tort tax were imposed on high-income tortfeasors, the ex ante 
effect would be that all high-income potential tortfeasors (those 
within the scope of the rule) would alter their ex ante conduct.93 For 
example, they would make additional investments in accident avoid­
ance, or they would reduce the frequency with which they engage in 
the activity in question. This change in conduct-even if the potential 
injurers never actually end up in court-is a redistributive transfer of 
a sort. That is, only the relatively high-income members of the class of 
potential injurers will be induced to make those additional care-level 
investments or those activity-level reductions; and the resulting reduc­
tion in expected accident costs would benefit both high income and 
low income alike. 
Still, although the most extreme version of the underinclusiveness 
argument is wrong, there is some degree of underinclusiveness. Even 
under the assumptions of the standard deterrence models, the income­
redistributive tort rule just described would reach only high-income 
tortfeasors. Some high-income folks, therefore, would not be in­
cluded within the scope of the redistributive policy.94 With respect to 
this version of the underinclusiveness complaint, there are three 
responses. 
First, Sanchirico has argued that, if policymakers added a redistribu­
tive component to every aspect of the legal system, redistribution 
through the legal system would be no less comprehensive than redis­
tribution through the tax system.95 The legal system, as defined in this 
literature, includes all nontax laws, both private and public. Thus, if 
tort rules, contract rules, property rules, as well as environmental and 
product safety regulations had a redistributive element, the under-in­
clusiveness complaint would weaken somewhat. It would not disap­
pear, however, because, as we discussed in the previous Section, 
redistribution through many legal rules-namely contract-based legal 
91 Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 Bell J. Econ. 120-21 (1982). 
92 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law 
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377 (1994). 
93 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 669. 
94 More precisely, the application of the income-redistributive tort rule would be a func­
tion of not only of one's income but also of the probability of being involved in a tort suit. 
Thus, for example, high-income individuals who face a high probability of suit would face a 
larger tort tax than would high-income individuals who face a low probability of suit. At 
the limit, those high-income individuals who face no risk of tort liability (whoever that 
might be) would not be subject to the probabilistic tort tax at all. 
95 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1052. 
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rules-is at best highly speculative, owing to the contracting-around 
phenomenon. With that qualification, the basic point is sound, if 
somewhat self-evident: The more legal rules that are made redistribu­
tive, the more comprehensive the system of redistributive legal rules 
will be.96 
The second response to the more modest underinclusiveness com­
plaint involves the necessary relationship between legal rules and in­
surance markets. The presence of insurance markets clearly reduces 
the force of the underinclusiveness complaint.97 Insofar as potential 
plaintiffs and potential defendants have insurance coverage for the 
types of losses that can give rise to legal disputes, insurance premiums 
would adjust to reflect any redistributive component inserted in the 
applicable legal rule. 
How precisely this would work would depend on the design of the 
redistributive legal rule. Thus, consider for example a class-based, re­
distributive pollution control law designed to burden relatively rich 
polluting corporations and benefit relatively poor communities. To 
the extent those polluters purchase liability insurance that covers 
them against the cost of such laws, their insurance premiums would 
reflect not only the risk of harm that their conduct poses to the com­
munity but also the additional redistributive tax that the court would 
impose in the event of liability. At the same time, some members of 
the community who benefit under this rule would purchase first-party 
property insurance that covered them against the risk of harm to them 
and to their property caused by environmental pollution. For those 
potential plaintiffs (or beneficiaries of regulation), their first-party in­
surance premiums would go down to reflect the higher amount that 
could be recovered (by them and by their first-party insurers via sub­
rogation suits) from the polluters and the polluters' liability insurers. 
Under this argument, then, the underinclusiveness complaint 
reduces largely (though not entirely) to a problem of underinsurance. 
That is, those individuals and firms who do not own insurance, in a 
sense, would not be included in the system of redistributive rules, un­
less they happened to end up in a lawsuit.98 There are two general 
types of solutions to problems of underinsurance. One is to make in­
surance more attractive by subsidizing it. That would be sort of a tax­
and-transfer approach to dealing with the problem. The other ap-
96 Id. 
97 Polinksy, note 5, at 126 n.83 (observing that the underinclusiveness problem "may not 
be fully applicable" in situations where the potential plaintiffs have first-party insurance 
and potential defendants have liability insurance that would cover the loss in question. 
Thus, he concludes that the point of his underinclusiveness example "would apply only to 
the extent that the insurance coverage is incomplete.") . 
98 See id. 
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proach would make insurance compulsory. If the parties did not 
purchase the coverage, they would not be allowed to engage in some 
activity. For example, the policymaker could require that manufactur­
ers who wish to engage in certain pollution-emitting activities must 
first purchase a certain amount of liability insurance coverage. 
A final response to the underinclusiveness complaint is to dismiss it. 
That is, if one is not arguing for replacing the income tax with a sys­
tem of income-redistributive legal rules, but instead is calling for in­
come-redistributive legal rules only to supplement the more 
comprehensive tax-and-transfer system, the underinclusiveness argu­
ment (by itself) has relatively little force. Put differently, if it could be 
shown that income redistribution on occasion can be done at least as 
efficiently through the legal system as through the tax-and-transfer 
system (that is, it can be shown that the tax-and-transfer system does 
not have a comparative advantage),  it is not clear why underinclusive­
ness should be a concern. 99 
3. The Pareto-Superiority Argument 
a. Kaplow and Shavell 's Contribution to the Redistributive Rules 
Debate: the Double-Distortion Problem 
In an article published in 1994, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell 
make an argument that, on first blush, seems to end the redistributive 
rules debate once and for all, at least with respect to income-redistrib­
utive legal rules. Specifically, Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal 
rules should never be used to redistribute income, irrespective of the 
contracting-around and haphazardness complaints.100 The argument 
has several steps. First, they note that a tax on income or wealth will 
distort work incentives, in the sense that individuals under an income 
tax tend to work less than in a no-tax world. 101 If legal rules are set to 
achieve efficiency only (and therefore are not designed to be redistrib­
utive) ,  the work distortion associated with the income tax will be the 
99 For a similar argument, see Dagan, Takings, note 40, at 788-89 (arguing that avoiding 
certain discrepancies from an ideal distribution does not justify increasing disparities be­
tween the better off and the worse off). 
too Kaplow and Shaven note, however, that the contracting-around and haphazardness 
arguments do provide additional reasons to prefer the tax-and-transfer approach to redis­
tributing income. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5, at 674-75. The basic insight of 
the Kaplow and Shaven arguments was made first in Steven Shaven, A Note on Efficiency 
vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter 
Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 414, 414 (1981), and a similar point 
was made in Aanund Hynand & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives Should 
Affect Taxes But Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scand. J. Econ. 264, 264 (1979). 
101 Kaplow & Shaven, Efficiency in Redistribution, note 10, at 667-68. 
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only distortion.102 By contrast, if instead of using the tax-and�transfer 
system to redistribute income, legal rules are designed to diverge from 
efficiency in a way that provides the desired amount of redistribution, 
there will be two distortions: the same work distortion that would 
occur under an income tax plus the distortion of the activity regulated 
by the (now inefficient) legal rule.103 
Which leads to the final step: Because there is no reason to expect 
that these two distortions offset each other, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that two distortions are worse than one from an economist's 
perspective.104 This part of the Kaplow and Shavell thesis has been 
called the "double distortion argument." 105 In addition, in their more 
formal analysis, Kaplow and Shavell demonstrate that, under certain 
assumptions, it is possible with respect to any income-redistributive 
legal rule to design an alternative legal regime that is independent of 
income and that leaves everyone as well off as under the income-re­
distributive rule, but that also produces additional revenue for the 
government.106 Thus, Kaplow and Shavell argue that there is always a 
Pareto-improving tax-and-transfer alternative to any income-redistrib­
utive legal rule. The implication of this argument is compelling: As a 
matter of theory, any amount of income redistribution-even a single 
dollar-always will be accomplished more efficiently through the tax 
system than through the legal system.101 
A number of scholars have sought to undermine the theoretical or 
empirical importance of the Kaplow and Shavell double-distortion ar­
gument. In the process, this important debate has become confused. 
102 See id. at 668. 
103 Id. at 667-68; Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 823 ("(I]f legal rules disad­
vantage high-income individuals and help low-income individuals, that will tend to discour­
age work effort in the same manner and to the same extent as making the income tax 
system more redistributive. Whether it is the tax collector or the courts that take an addi­
tional 1 percent of rich people's income and give it to the poor, the reward for work by the 
rich is reduced by 1 percent, so the distortion of work effort will be the same."). 
104 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1008. 
10s Id. at 1008. 
106 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 674 ("The conclusion is that adopting the 
efficient legal rule, with an appropriate change in the income tax, leaves all individuals 
equally well off but leaves the government with a surplus. With this additional revenue, 
the government can make each individual better off-for example, by lowering taxes . . .  by 
a fixed amount for each individual or spending the funds on a public good that benefits 
everyone."). 
101 As Kaplow and Shavell put it, "even though the income tax distorts work incentives, 
any regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an efficient legal 
rule and a modified income tax system designed so that every person is made better off." 
Id. at 669 (italics removed from entire sentence). This theoretical point explicitly assumes 
away differential administrative costs. Kaplow and Shavell, however, contend ·also that 
redistributive legal rules are probably more costly to administer than the alternative. Id. at 
675 n.12. 
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In the following Section, we summarize these responses, explain 
where we agree and disagree, and generally try to clear up the 
confusion. 
b. Objections to the Pareto-Superiority Argument 
Two general categories of objections can be raised against Kaplow 
and Shavell's argument. First, objections can be raised from within 
the traditional law and economics framework. That is, even if we 
grant the standard assumptions that individuals are rational and unbi­
ased in their decisionmaking, it can be argued at least that the Pareto­
superiority argument is overstated and perhaps that it is, in some im­
portant ways, wrong.108 A second type of response to Kaplow and 
Shavell's argument comes from outside of the traditional neoclassical 
framework. Specifically, relying on observations from behavioral eco­
nomics and cognitive psychology, some scholars have identified cir­
cumstances in which income redistribution might be done more 
efficiently through the legal system.109 
108 One critique of the double-distortion part of the Pareto-superiority argument raised 
by Sanchirico can be called the fallacy of distortion counting. The argument is that redis­
tributive adjustments to otherwise efficient legal rules will not necessarily produce an over­
all loss of social welfare (as compared with a world in which legal rules are set only to 
achieve efficiency and the tax-and-transfer system is the sole means of redistribution), be­
cause those adjustments may offset some other distortion in the economy. Indeed, 
Sanchirico explicitly invokes the "theory of the second best," by noting that "eliminating 
some distortions is not necessarily welfare-improving in a world in which other distortions 
remain." Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1017 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the 
implication is that Kaplow and Shavell are wrong to regard two distortions as being worse 
than one. As Kaplow and Shavell note in their response, however, there seems to be no 
reason to expect that these two distortions-the regulated-activity distortion and the work­
leisure distortion-will offset each other. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 824 
n.5, 825-27. Sanchirico suggests that the two might be offsetting if, for instance, the regu­
lated-activity distortion amounts to a tax on leisure, which would tend to reduce the work­
leisure distortion. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1018. If that were so, it 
would reduce the distortionary effects of (and might therefore be a useful complement to) 
an income tax. Kaplow and Shavell's response to this argument is to point out that, first, 
taxing leisure to reduce the work distortion associated with an income tax is entirely con­
sistent with their framework and that, second, the better approach would be to use the tax 
system rather than the legal system to impose a tax on leisure. Kaplow & Shaven, Legal 
Rules, note 10, at 824 n.5. Indeed, a tax on leisure activities (or on goods that tend to be 
used in leisure activities) has long been recognized as an efficient, counter-distortionary 
source of tax revenue, in comparison 
.
with the income tax. 
109 Another type of criticism of the double-distortion argument denounces the naive 
political theory implied by such a regime. See, e.g., Scott Shapiro & Edward F. Mcclennen, 
Law-and-Economics from a Philosophical Perspective, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics and the Law 460, 463 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter New Palgrave 
Dictionary]. We address that argument briefly in the conclusion. See text accompanying 
notes 281-83. 
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i. The Internal Critique 
Our internal critique of the Pareto superiority argument involves 
three steps.11° First, we argue that income-redistributive legal rules 
probably would not produce a double-distortion in precisely the way 
that Kaplow and Shavell suggest in their paradigmatic example of a 
"tort tax." Second, following Sanchirico, we note that Kaplow and 
Shavell's model depends importantly on the unrealistic assumption of 
homogenous taxpayers. Third, we argue that, under the more realistic 
assumption of heterogeneous taxpayers, designing a Pareto-superior 
tax-and-transfer alternative to a tort tax would be administratively im­
possible. We summarize these three points briefly here.1 11 
In their tort-tax example, Kaplow and Shavell argue that "using le­
gal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives fully as much 
as the income tax system-because the distortion is caused by the redis­
tribution itself-and also creates inefficiencies in the activities regu­
lated by the legal rules."112 For example, if a rule were introduced 
making wealthy tort defendants pay an extra "tort tax," not only 
would wealthy potential tortfeasors take excessive levels of care (ow­
ing to the rule's inefficiency), they also would reduce their work effort 
by precisely the same amount as they would under a direct income tax 
where the legal rule was set to achieve efficiency only. We disagree. 
Under an income-redistributive tort rule, wealthy potential tortfeasors 
could reduce their overall income tax (as well as their overall tort lia­
bility) either by changing their work effort or by changing their en­
gagement in the regulated activity or both. (Thus, in a sense, the 
income-redistributive tort rule gives wealthy potential tortfeasors two 
degrees of freedom, whereas the income-independent regime gives 
them only one.) And it is an empirical question whether, with the 
introduction of an income-redistributive tort regime, there would be 
more, less, or the same amount of care-level investments.1 13 
Kaplow and Shavell presumably would respond that, even if the 
preceding argument were true (even if the introduction of a tort tax 
would not necessarily result in rich potential tortfeasors taking exces­
sive care), whatever combination of changes in work activity and care-
1 10 In our version of the internal critique, we draw heavily on a similar critique offered 
by Chris Sanchirico. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8; Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10. 
1 1 1  For a fuller development of this argument, see generally Ronen Avraham, David 
Fortus & Kyle D. Logue, Revisiting the Role of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income 
Redistribution (Univ. of Mich. Law & Economics Working Paper #02-004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=31300 (May 31, 2002). 
1 12 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal System, note 5, at 667-68. 
1 13 It is worth emphasizing that nothing in Kaplow and Shavell's analysis contradicts our 
conclusion in the main text. It is just their paradigmatic example (which we suspect many 
people conceive as the intuition behind the theory) that we find misleading. 
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level investments occurred, it would be possible to construct a tax­
and-transfer regime (along with an efficient, income-independent tort 
rule) that would leave everyone better off and would produce more 
tax revenue. 
As Sanchirico points out in his critique of the double-distortion ar­
gument, the way that Kaplow and Shavell construct such a regime is to 
assume that all individuals are identical in every way (they are homo­
geneous) except for differences in income.1 14 This assumption is not 
merely for simplicity; it is an assumption that drives the results.1 15 If 
we allow for the possibility that individuals are heterogeneous at given 
levels of income, however, Kaplow and Shavell's model does not 
work. That is, under their model, it becomes impossible to construct a 
general Pareto efficient tax-and-transfer regime, by which we mean a 
Pareto efficient regime that applies the same tax function to all people 
at the same level of income. 
Working under the more realistic assumption of heterogeneous in­
dividuals, it nevertheless may be possible in theory to construct a tax­
and-transfer regime that has a tailored tax function that indeed would 
leave every individual exactly as well-off as she was under the income­
redistributive tort regime. The information burden that such an ap­
proach would place on the policymaker and on the taxing authority, 
however, would be heavy. 
Consider the tort tax again. If we imagine that individuals differ 
from one another not only with respect to work effort and earning 
power but also with respect to how much they invest in accident 
avoidance, how much harm they have caused, and how accident prone 
they are (which seem like reasonable assumptions), the policy planner 
who wanted to implement a redistribute tax-and-transfer regime that 
was Pareto superior to the redistributive-legal rule alternative would 
need to have a great deal of information-information that the tax 
authorities are not in the best position to gather, such as the individ­
ual's cost of care, harm suffered, or net expected damage payments.1 16  
Moreover, using a legal rule to do the same amount of redistribution 
potentially would be feasible.1 17 Given these informational demands, 
1 14 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1056-69. 
1 15 Id. 
1 16 In Kaplow and Shavell's model of a tax-and-transfer alternative to an income-redis­
tributive legal rule, they seem to say that the tax authority-that is, whoever is "construct­
ing" the tax regime-would need such information. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 
5, at 678 ("Note that . . .  the new income tax . . .  is constructed by beginning with the initial 
income tax . . .  , adding total accident costs under the initial, inefficient regime and sub­
tracting total accident costs under the efficient regime. The former total (under the ineffi­
cient rule) is the first term in large brackets: the cost of care, harm suffered, and expected 
damage payments, minus expected damage awards received."). 
1 17 See Avraham, Fortus & Logue, note 111 .  
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the claim that there always will be a tax-and-transfer alternative to the 
income-redistributive tort rule that will be Pareto efficient seems, at 
the least, overstated. 
Our internal critique of the Pareto-superiority argument, of course, 
does not demonstrate that the legal system is a better income redis­
tributor than the tax system is. Rather, it merely calls into question 
the Pareto argument as an independent justification for always prefer­
ring the tax-and-transfer system as the best policy instrument for re­
distributing income. We ultimately conclude that the tax-and-transfer 
system probably is better than the legal system overall as a means of 
systematically reducing income inequality, but we base our conclusion 
on the fact that the tax system clearly seems to be the better proxy 
observer when it comes to income and, as redistributor, the tax system 
seems less susceptible to the contracting-around and haphazardness 
problems. These conclusions assume that individuals are rational and 
unbiased in their decisionmaking. As the following Section demon­
strates, if that assumption is relaxed, the case for the exclusive use of 
the tax system for income redistribution is weaker. 
ii. The Behavioralist Critique 
As just mentioned, one of the key assumptions of the double-distor­
tion argument is that individual taxpayers in their work-leisure deci­
sions would respond to an income tax implemented indirectly through 
the tort system in the same way that they would to an income tax that 
is implemented directly through the tax system.11 8 Thus, the work dis­
incentive would be the same under either regime. The behavioral eco­
nomics critique calls that assumption into question in a very different 
way than the neo-classical economic tradition: by pointing out two 
well-known quirks in human cognition that suggest that the work-lei­
sure distortion caused by a income-redistributive legal rule might be 
smaller than the work-leisure distortion caused by a direct income tax 
(accompanied by an efficient legal rule).1 19 
The most complete statement of the behavioralist critique appears 
in an article by Christine Jolls.120 Jolls first observes that redistribu­
tion through a legal rule, such as an income-adjusted tort rule, has a 
probabilistic element (or element of uncertainty) that is not present 
1 1s See text accompanying note 112. 
1 19 As becomes clear as the argument progresses, the behavioralist critique is inconsis· 
tent with our two-degrees-of-freedom argument in the previous Section. See text accom­
panying notes 1 11-17. 
120 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36. Jolls explicitly restricts her analysis to tort 
rules that operate between strangers. Id. at 1657. Mark Kelman has made some of the 
same points made by Jolls. Kelman, note 39. 
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when redistribution is accomplished through a direct tax.12 1  The prob­
abilistic element has to do with whether the tort tax will apply at all. 
Observe that under a direct income tax an individual who earns in­
come above a given amount during a particular taxable period can be 
sure of incurring a given, determinate tax liability.122 Under the in­
come-adjusted tort rule, however, even if the individual knows the 
amount of income she will have in a particular year as well as the 
amount of tax on that income, she does not know whether the tax will 
apply to her, because there will be no tax liability unless the individual 
is involved in an accident for which she is held liable.123 
Although the probabilistic character of redistributive legal rules has 
been a source of criticism from traditional legal economists (the hap­
hazardness argument is in a sense a critique of the probabilistic aspect 
of a redistributive legal rule), it is quite useful from the cognitive per­
spective. The basis of the argument is this: When faced with condi­
tions of uncertainty, people often make decisions that are not 
predicted by the standard rational-actor models of traditional eco­
nomics. Instead, as cognitive psychologists have documented for de­
cades, people in such situations often exhibit various cognitive 
heuristics and biases, which behavioral economists argue should be 
taken into account in the economic analysis of law. Jolls makes use of 
two such cognitive quirks to argue that the economic analysis of redis­
tributive legal rules is more complicated than the conventional view 
(associated with Kaplow and Shavell) would suggest. 
The first cognitive bias that Jolls explores is the well-documented 
finding that individuals facing a very small likelihood of a loss tend to 
behave optimistically; that is, they tend to underestimate the likeli­
hood that low-probability bad things will happen to them, especially 
bad things over which they have some control.124 Jolls' argument rests 
on the claim that the same tendency may apply to probabilistic taxes 
121 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1658-63. 
122 Id. at 1656. There is of course some uncertainty inherent in the enforcement of the 
income tax, and as Sanchirico argues, there may be uncertainty regarding how much in­
come a person is likely to earn in a given taxable year. But those same uncertainties would 
be present under a redistributive rule as well. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 
1053. What is significant is that, with a redistributive legal rule, there is an additional 
uncertainty that is not present with an income tax regime: the uncertainty as to whether an 
event will occur giving rise to a redistributive transfer through legal rules. 
123 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1658-63. 
124. Id. Thus, "most people think that their probability of a bad outcome is far less than 
others' probability [of the same sort of bad outcome], although of course this cannot be 
true for more than half the population." Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, note 79, at 1524; see also 
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psych. 806, 818 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility 
to Health Problems: Conclusions From a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. Behav. Med. 
481, 494-96 (1987). 
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implemented indirectly through legal rules. 125 If we assume, for ex­
ample, that an individual's likelihood of being subject to a tort tax in 
any given year is small (because her likelihood of being in an accident 
that causes damages for which she is held liable is small), we should 
expect that the individual would behave as if such a tax had a lower 
probability of occurring than is objectively so. By contrast, taxes im­
posed directly through the tax system are less probabilistic than the 
tort tax and hence would produce less of an optimism-bias effect. If 
one grants all of these assumptions, assumptions that Jolls herself ad­
mits must be verified empirically, the conclusion is intriguing: An in­
come-adjusted tort rule would be less distortive of work incentives 
than a direct income tax.126 
Consider Jolls' example illustrating this point.127 Assume that the 
policymaker wants to impose an additional $10,000 annual tax on each 
"high-income" individual.128 There are two approaches to achieving 
that result: the direct income tax and the income-adjusted tort rule. 
Under the former, the policymaker imposes a new tax of $10,000 di­
rectly on the high-income individuals and only on high-income indi­
viduals. Under the equivalent tort-tax approach, the policymaker 
determines that, given that the actual likelihood of a high-income per­
son having to make a payout in a tort case is 2%, the amount of the 
income adjustment to the tort damages would need to be $500,000. 
The great majority of individuals believe themselves to be better than average 
drivers, more likely than average to live past 80, less likely than average to be 
harmed by products they use. [This is because] . . .  the risk looks very small 
from the perspective of each individual's experience. Consider automobile 
driving: [d]espite driving too fast, tailgating, etc., poor drivers typically go trip 
after trip without mishap. This personal experience demonstrates to them 
their exceptional skill and safety. Moreover, their indirect experience via the 
news media shows them that when accidents happen, they happen to others. 
Given such misleading experience, individuals may feel quite justified in refus­
ing to take protective actions such as wearing seat belts. 
Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhof & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Understanding 
Perceived Risk, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 470 (Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
12s Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1662 ("People will tend to underestimate the 
probability that they will be hit with liability under a redistributive legal rules; therefore, 
their perceived cost of the rule will be lower. As a result, their work incentives will tend to 
suffer a lesser degree of distortion than under a tax yielding the same amount of revenue 
for the government."). Note, however, "that the role of overoptimism is likely to vary 
significantly with the context. In a case in which the threat of being found liable is highly 
salient, individuals may tend to overestimate the likelihood of being sanctioned." Jolls, 
Sunstein & Thaler, note 79, at 1525 (emphasis omitted). 
126 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663. 
121 Id. at 1655-56. 
12s Jolls has in mind the use of a class-based redistributive rule, though she does not use 
that specific terminology. Id. at 1670. Below we suggest some problems with the use of a 
class-based rule to create a probabilistic income tax. See text accompanying notes 135-36. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
196 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: 
Hence, the expected value of this tort tax for a particular year is 
$10,000, which is equivalent in expected value terms to the annual di­
rect tax. 
But here is the trick: If the high-income individual perceives the 
likelihood of the tort rule applying to her-the likelihood of being in 
an accident and then being found legally responsible-to be, say, 1 % 
instead of 2%,  the perceived expected value of the tort tax would be 
only $5,000. The perceived expected cost of the direct income tax, 
however, would be $10,000 because there is no optimism bias. The 
implication of this observation for the work incentives of the high­
income individual is that, by raising the additional $10,000 from the 
high-income individual through a tort tax rather than a direct income 
tax, the work distortion is cut in half. Put more generally, if individu­
als underestimate the likelihood of low-probability, uncertain bad 
things happening to them (such as tort suits), then a redistributive le­
gal rule may produce a smaller work disincentive than a similarly re­
distributive income tax would.129 
This observation is potentially important for the debate over the 
appropriate use of income-redistributive legal rules. In fact, we think 
the implications of the optimism bias may be more significant than 
even Jolls suggests (again, ignoring liability insurance for now). If this 
bias does apply to redistributive legal rules such as income-adjusted 
tort rules, then not only would the work distortion be reduced, but the 
second distortion (the regulated-activity distortion) would be reduced 
as well. That is, if the tax that distorts the regulated-activity decisions 
(how much or how carefully to engage in the regulated activity) were 
underestimated systematically, the distortionary effect of that tax on 
regulated activity also would be less. This would be true even if, in 
response to the optimism bias, the legal rule were adjusted upward to 
achieve optimal regulated-activity conduct.130 
Indeed, if the optimism bias were to apply to individuals' percep­
tions of the likelihood of being affected by legal rules generally (and, 
as Jolls assumes, not to the likelihood of being affected by the tax 
system),131 and if this optimism bias were sufficiently large, such a 
conclusion would provide an argument for favoring income-redistribu­
tive legal rules over the income tax-and-transfer system.132 To empha­
size this theoretical point, imagine that individuals actually behaved as 
129 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1663. 
130 As Jolls notes, " [i]f potential tortfeasors underestimate the probability of liability, 
the efficient (meaning optimal-deterrence-achieving) legal rule would be more generous to 
tort victims than the efficient legal rule without underestimation of probabilities would 
be." Id. at 1662 n.38. 
1 31 Id. at 1656. 
132 See id. at 1663. 
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if the likelihood of their being held liable in tort were zero. In such a 
scenario, legal rules would provide the perfect tool for income redis­
tribution (again, putting aside the haphazardness complaint). There 
would be no distortion whatsoever-no distortion of work decisions 
or of regulated activity. 133 A redistributive legal rule would be the 
perfect lump sum tax. With the income tax, however, there always 
would be at least some work-leisure distortion.134 
There is one problem, however, with Jolls' use of the optimism bias 
to construct a probabilistic (or lump sum) defense of an income-redis­
tributive legal rule. Jolls leaves unspecified how the high-income sta­
tus would be determined under such a rule. She does suggest that 
what she has in mind is what we call a class-based redistributive 
rule.135 There are problems with a class-based approach, however. 
First, if she has in mind corporations as a class of defendants, it is less 
clear that optimism bias would apply.136 Second, if she has in mind a 
class of rich individuals as the target of her probabilistic tax, it is un­
clear how a class-based redistributive rule would be designed to target 
such a group. Of course, a case-specific approach, as we describe 
above, would allow such targeting of high-income individuals.137 
In addition to the optimism bias, Jolls considers the implications of 
the psychological phenomenon known as "mental accounting." As 
Jolls puts the point, " [t]he idea behind 'mental accounting' is that peo­
ple do not always view a dollar spent in the same way; it may matter 
from which 'account' the dollar is coming. Money is not fungible in 
the way that standard economics assumes."138 What this idea says 
about income-redistributive legal rules, is this: Income-redistributive 
dollars paid through the tax system are perceived as a tax on income, 
whereas income-redistributive dollars paid through the tort system 
(the proverbial tort tax) are perceived simply as extra tort damages. 
Or, as Jolls notes, the tort tax may be viewed as "expenditures out of 
income (rather than direct charges against income);" and the former 
may cause less of a work distortion than the latter.139 Thus, according 
1 33 Note, however, that the larger the optimism bias, the lower the deterrent effect of 
tort law. Under the assumptions just stated, tort law would have no deterrent effect. 
1 34 Let us be clear on this. We do not mean to suggest repealing the income tax and 
doing all income redistribution through the legal system. We use this extreme example 
only to make the point that the optimism bias, to the extent it would apply differentially 
(more to redistributive rules than to redistributive taxes), is a potentially very important 
phenomenon for redistributive policy. 
135 Id. at 1620. 
136 For an analysis of cognitive biases in firms, see generally Donald Langevoort, The 
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797 (2001). 
137 See text accompanying note 128. 
138 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1669. 
1 39 Id. at 1670. This phenomenon has been demonstrated in a number of con' ·xts. 
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to the mental accounting story, whereas income redistribution accom­
plished through the tax system produces a relatively large work distor­
tion and no regulated-activity distortiOn, income redistribution 
through the legal system would produce a relatively small work distor­
tion as well as a regulated-activity distortion. Hence, the relevant em­
pirical question for the policymaker would be to determine whether 
the reduced work distortion under a redistributive legal rule would 
more than offset the regulated-activity distortion.140 
To summarize, the behavioralist critique raises some questions 
about the real-world significance of the double-distortion argument.141 
Because of the effect of the optimism bias (on both the work distor­
tion and the regulated-activity distortion) and the mental accounting 
effect (on the work distortion), income redistribution through the le­
gal system may be no less distortive overall than·inc9me redistribution 
through a tax-and-transfer system. We agree with that conclusion. 
We also agree, however, with Jolls' qualification of her conclusion, 
which says that there must be additional empirical work to determine 
the ultimate significance of these theoretical observations.142 It is well 
known that behavioral findings are not always qualitatively robust and 
are often not quantitatively robust.143 Thus, what is needed is addi­
tional research on the extent to which the optimism bias applies to 
140 It is interesting to note that Jolls' mental accounting argument expressly depends on 
the assumption that the redistributive legal rule in question will be a class-based redistribu­
tive rule, one that is designed to redistribute from a class of potential defendants (or plain­
tiffs) to a class of potential plaintiffs (or defendants) · based on a determination that the 
average income of the former class is greater than the average income of the latter. Jolls, 
Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1670. With a class-based redistributive rule, there is a 
disconnection between an individual's income and her tax liability that would not exist 
with a direct tax on income. This distance between cause and effect may explain why 
people would place indirect taxes into a different mental account and thus, in making their 
work decisions, simply ignore them. Jolls also notes, however, that if legal rules are "ex­
plicitly conditioned" on the income of the parties (what we call a case-specific redistribu­
tive rule), this disconnection would disappear or diminish, and the mental accounting point 
would be inapplicable or Jess powerful. Id. at 1670. Jolls observes that "such rules have 
commanded little support among commentators." Id. This is true in one sense, but not in 
another. See note 61 (discussing assumptions made by Ka plow and Sha veil and Sanchirico 
concerning use of class-based rules). 
141 Note that Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge the potential significance of cognitive 
biases, but do not explore the issue. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal System, note 5, at 671 n.5. 
142 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 1672-73. 
· · 
143 For example, Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer, and Eric Talley found that the endow­
ment effect does not exist in some contexts involving agency relationships. Jennifer Arlen, 
Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Rela­
tionships, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276110 (July 16, 
2001). Moreover, even the endowment effect, which is usually thought to be robust, .ap­
pears in different magnitudes in different contexts. For example, it is larger when public 
goods are involved. See, e.g., John K. Horowitz and Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of 
WTA/WTP Studies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
257336 (Feb. 11 ,  2001). 
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perceptions of the likelihood that legal rules will apply to them. In 
addition, however, there needs to be further research into how the 
presence of insurance would affect the analysis. 
The preceding analysis ignored the effects of insurance. As it turns 
out, introducing insurance in the story would facilitate the redistribu­
tive capacity of legal rules but would also exacerbate the regulated­
activity and work-leisure distortions. To see this point, imagine that 
everyone has complete and perfectly risk-adjusted liability insurance 
as well as first-party insurance (life, health, disability, and property). 
As is well known among tort and insurance scholars, if liability insur­
ance premiums adjusted perfectly to reflect each insured's individual 
expected costs at all times, those premiums would facilitate the deter­
rence effect of tort law, by causing insureds to fully internalize all of 
the external costs associated with their actions. Insured potential in­
jurers would be induced to take efficient care in avoiding accidents, 
because failing to do. so �ould cost them more in increased insurance 
premiums than would investing in accident avoidance. Likewise, per­
fectly-adjusting, first-party premiums prevent moral hazard on the vic­
tim side as well, inducing individuals to take cost-effective measures to 
reduce their own expected costs. 
Although perfectly-adjusting insurance premiums are efficiency-en­
hancing with respect to the deterrence portion of the legal rule, they 
would be efficiency-reducing with respect to the redistributive portion 
of that rule. That is, to the extent premium increases represent purely 
an increase in insured's expected implicit tort-tax liability, those pre­
mium adjustments would produce both the regulated-activity distor­
tion and the work-leisure distortion that Kaplow and Shavell have in 
mind. Thus, reconsider Jolls' example discussed above, in which there 
was a $500,000 tax imposed on rich tort defendants who are held lia­
ble, whereas no tort tax is imposed on the nonrich. 144 If we introduce 
perfectly risk-adju!'ted liability insurance for this potential redistribu­
tive damage award, the premium (again assuming a 2 % probability of 
loss) for coverage for the risk of being forced to pay that tort tax 
would be set at $10,000. Again, that would be the insurance premium 
to cover only the redistributive tort tax. 
A corollary assumption is that, if the probability of the liability 
rule's applying were to change over time (say, it went from 2% to 
2.5 % ), the insurance premium would change instantly to reflect that 
fact; likewise, if the individual's income changed (hence causing a 
change in the ex post tort tax from $500,000 to something else), the 
insurance premiums would change accordingly. Because we are as­
suming perfectly risk-adjusting premiums, the accuracy of the redis-
144 See text accompanying notes 127-28. 
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tributive transfer also would be perfect, in the following sense: The 
rich and only the rich would pay the higher premium/tax; everyone 
else would pay the lower amount, which does not contain the tort tax. 
In effect, the insurance companies would serve as a sort of private IRS 
(in fact, insurance companies would compete to serve as the private 
IRS), and they would have the responsibility of identifying the high 
income and the low income, separating them into separate pools, and 
collecting the higher premiums (that is, taxes) from the former and 
the lower premiums from the latter. By assumption, the accuracy of 
the redistribution would be close to perfect. 
At the same time, and for the same reasons, with perfectly risk- and 
income-adjusted premiums, both the regulated-activity and work-lei­
sure distortions would be present even under the assumptions of the 
behavioralist critique. Under the behavioralist argument, the individ­
uals in our example would perceive the expected tort tax to be only 
$5,000 (.01 x $500,000) rather than $10,000 (.02 x $500,000) , which is 
the unbiased assessment. But that bias was attributed to the probabil­
istic nature of the tort tax. When the tax is made certain through the 
insurance premium (which is, in fact, the whole purpose of insurance),  
the optimism bias presumably would disappear, removing one of the 
behavioralist justifications for preferring redistributive legal rule to re­
distributive taxes.14s 
The next question is whether the mental accounting effect likewise 
would also disappear. Maybe, maybe not. The answer probably de­
pends on how insurance companies design their premium statements. 
If, under the income-adjusted tort regime, insurers included a separate 
line for the income tax portion of the premium, that practice certainly 
would make dollars paid for the tort tax look a lot more like the dol­
lars paid for the direct income tax.146 
145 Jolls acknowledges that the presence of insurance may undermine the optimism-bias 
argument in favor of redistributive legal rules. Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36, at 
1665. She notes, however, that "[b]ecause insurance almost always involves some combi­
nation of deductibles, copayments, and experience rating (to mitigate problems of moral 
hazard), even with insurance there will be some uncertainty about the degree to which a 
redistributive legal rule will affect a given individual. . . .  " Id. at 1663 (emphasis omitted). 
Deductibles, copayments, and experience rating are rough substitutes for perfectly risk­
adjusted premiums. Thus, Jolls is saying that to the extent that insurance is not perfectly 
risk-adjusted, there will remain some uncertainty and hence some room for the optimism 
bias to work. This conclusion, however, significantly weakens Jolls' main point about the 
use of income-redistributive legal rules as probabilistic taxes. 
1 46 Jolls acknowledges this point in her discussion of the mental accounting effect: "Of 
course, the degree to which a redistributive legal rule or tax is viewed as a direct charge 
against income, and hence a direct disincentive to work, may be influenced by the way in 
which it is presented. If W-2 forms listed expected tort obligations under a redistributive 
legal rule, then the costs of the rule might be more likely to be charged directly against 
income. This would make redistributive legal rules more like taxes." Id. at 1671. 
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Although we would not expect insurance premiums to be perfectly 
or even nearly perfectly adjusted to reflect individual insureds' differ­
ing risk characteristics (which are relatively difficult to observe), we 
assume that insurers would do a reasonably good job of adjusting their 
premiums to reflect differences in insureds' income levels. First, mar­
ket competition would encourage insurers to income-adjust their pre­
miums (just as it encourages them to risk-adjust their premiums), in 
order to keep the middle- and low-income customers from self-insur­
ing. Second, insurers would be able to determine an individual's in­
come level, at least his annual income, at a relatively low cost. They 
simply could insist on seeing the individual's W-2 form or several 
months of pay stubs. In fact, it seems likely that income-adjusted in­
surance premiums would be less costly administratively than risk-ad­
justed premiums. If we are right about this, then we can conclude that 
the presence of insurance generally would increase the accuracy and 
the breadth of the income-redistributive legal rule, but also would in­
crease the distortions caused by the redistributive element of the 
rules.147 
C. Examining the Case for Always (Though Not Exclusively) Using 
Legal Rules to Redistribute Income 
In a pair of recent articles, Sanchirico, in addition to attacking 
Kaplow and Shavell's case for never using legal rules to redistribute 
income, offers a series of arguments in support of the conclusion that 
legal rules should be used to redistribute income.148 In one respect, 
147 If insurers are not able to discriminate among insureds on the basis of income (or if, 
for some reason, they were forbidden by law from doing so), then the use of income­
redistributive legal rules could lead to wildly regressive results. Consider the extreme case 
in which, despite the differential income effect of the tort tax, all insureds, irrespective of 
income, are required by law to be charged the same premium for liability insurance. In 
effect, everyone's premium would equal the average expected loss of the pool plus the 
average tax liability, and everyone would pay the same premium. The effect of these as­
sumptions would be to produce a regressive tort tax. That is, income would be shifted to 
the rich from the nonrich. In our example, the rich should pay a tort tax in their insurance 
premiums of $10,000 (because, if they were held liable, which is a 2% probability, the 
insurance company would have to pay out an extra $500,000 in damages) and the nonrich 
should pay no such additional premium. With nonadjusting liability insurance, however, 
both the rich and the nonrich would pay a $5,000 tort tax adjustment (assuming equal 
numbers of rich and nonrich in the insurance pool). Thus, not only would the rich be 
shifting the $500,000 ex post tax to the insurance pool, they would be benefiting from a 
financing arrangement that, in effect, would impose a regressive tax structure on the mem­
bers of the insurance pool. 
148 In another part of his analysis, Sanchirico also points out that there are other proxies 
for ability besides income-such as accident proneness-and that adjustments to legal 
rules on the basis of those nonincome proxies will not produce the double distortion prob­
lem. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1060. That, in our view, is Sanchirico's 
most important contribution to the debate regarding redistributive legal rules, and we 
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Sanchirico's position is the mirror image of Kaplow and Shavell's po­
sition: Whereas Kaplow and Shavell argue that legal rules should 
never be income-redistributive, Sanchirico seems to argue that his 
analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, would lead to the result that 
legal rules always should be income-redistributive (if income is deter­
mined to be the dominant measure of well-being), although he quali­
fies this conclusion.149 
We conclude that both claims are overstated. Instead, our view is 
that whether legal rules should ever be income-redistributive (that is, 
whether legal rules should ever be used to reduce income inequality) 
depends entirely on whether there are circumstances in which the le­
gal system has a comparative advantage either at observing income or 
redistributing with respect to income. And the comparative advan­
tage issue, in our view, ends up turning almost entirely on the con­
tracting-around and haphazardness arguments. In this Section, we 
explain why we are unpersuaded by Sanchirico's arguments in favor of 
income-redistributive legal rules. 
The first of Sanchirico's arguments is what he calls the "optimal-tax 
argument for equity informed legal rules."150 At its core, the optimal­
tax argument rejects Kaplow and Shavell's premise that all redistribu­
tive adjustments to efficient legal rules necessarily produce a regu­
lated-activity distortion. Recall Kaplow and Shavell's argument that, 
as soon as a legal rule departs from the efficient design, it produces 
inefficiency with respect to the conduct regulated by the rule. To take 
the torts example, if we alter the liability rule or the damages calcula­
tion to make the law redistributive even slightly (if, for purely redis­
tributive reasons, we move even slightly in the direction of strict 
liability when negligence is the efficient rule, or we raise damages 
even one dollar above the efficient level), there will be a distortion 
with respect to investments in accident avoidance. In this example, 
too much care will be taken to avoid a particular type of accident. It is 
this regulated-conduct distortion that, in Kaplow and Shavell's view, 
always will tip the scale in favor of using the tax system to reduce 
income inequality, since the work-leisure distortion always will be pre-
build on that insight in the next Section. In this Section, however, we focus on Sanchirico's 
arguments in support of income-adjusted legal rules. 
149 See, e.g., id. at 1019 ("No claim is being made that the optimal-tax analysis provided 
in this Part proves definitively that policymakers should always set legal rules with equity 
in mind. The purely economic arguments in this Part do not address all relevant considera­
tions. What is claimed-definitively-is this: The kind of analysis provided here, which 
forms the most prominent argument for pure efficiency in law, not only fails to support the 
claim that legal rules should never be redistributive, but leads to the more than opposite 
conclusion that redistributive goals should always inform legal rules.") (footnote omitted). 
He also qualifies this assertion at a later point in the article. Id. at 1026 n.56. 
1so Id. at 1018. 
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sent in precisely the same degree with respect to any sort of income 
redistribution.151 
Sanchirico's response to this observation is clever, if somewhat 
complex. Relying on basic assumptions commonly made by 
microeconomic theorists, he argues that any initial adjustments away 
from an efficient legal rule in fact will not produce inefficiency.152 The 
reason has to do with the assumption that the social welfare function 
that is being maximized is smoothly sloping, that is, it has no kinks or 
jumps but is instead "continuous." Under this assumption, at the 
point at which a rule is set to "maximize" efficiency, any small depar­
tures from that efficient rule in either direction will not cause a loss of 
utility, because the curve is by definition flat (that is, with a slope of 
zero) at the point of maximization.1 53 
Although Sanchirico cannot specify how large this flat range of the 
curve will be, and thus how far the legal rule can depart from the 
efficient rule before distortion would set in, he admits that range may 
be small, perhaps "infinitesimal. "154 The conclusion Sanchirico de­
rives from this is that, if the redistribution-minded policymaker were 
to limit herself to only a single redistributive policy instrument, she 
essentially would be wasting resources. Loading all of the redistribu­
tive work onto one redistributive system increases the likelihood that 
the flat range on the social welfare curve will be exceeded, at which 
point distortions (of the regulated-conduct variety) would occur. In­
stead, the policymaker should spread the redistributive work among 
all the available redistributive tools so as to get the full benefit of the 
perhaps small (but nonzero) distortion-free redistributive capacity 
available in each redistributive tool. As Sanchirico puts the point, 
policymakers should spread the redistributive work around "because 
every tool is initially perfectly redistributional, and no tool remains 
perfect once employed."1 55 
This argument is valid, as far as it goes. But its empirical signifi­
cance is doubtful. Again, the key assumption in the argument is that 
of a smoothly continuous social utility function, an assumption that 
Sanchirico admits his analysis depends on and that he admits has no 
basis in empirical fact. The assumption may be convenient for model­
ing purposes, and it may even be an accurate picture of the world in 
some contexts, but it seems a thin reed on which to hang such an im-
151 But see text accompanying notes 108-47 (criticizing this latter assumption). 
152 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 10, at 1023-24 ("Thus, on the margin, move­
ments away from the efficient legal rule have no impact on total utility, but-if we move in 
the right direction-a beneficial impact on inequality."). 
153 Id. at 1022. 
154 Id. at 1024. 
1 55 Id. at 1022. 
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portant argument.156 Moreover, even if the assumption of a kinkless 
utility function does hold, the range of distortion-free redistributive 
adjustments-the flat portion of the curve-may be, as Sanchirico ad­
mits, "infinitesimal."157 If that were so, then Sanchirico's point here 
most likely would be small as well.158 
In what appears to be a second, separate defense of income-redis­
tributive legal rules, Sanchirico builds on the idea that the ultimate 
target of a welfarist redistributive policy should be individual well-be­
ing, 159 but that well-being is itself unobservable. Because well-being is 
unobservable, the redistribution-minded policymaker must focus on 
proxies or outward manifestations of the inner state of well-being.160 
Income is one such proxy (and indisputably an important one) but not 
the only one. On Sanchirico's list of other proxies are the familiar 
ones of wealth and consumption.161 In addition, however, he adds the 
proxy of "damages caused in accidents"162 as a proxy for "accident­
proneness." And the more of these proxies the policymaker takes 
into account, the more accurate the redistribution will be with respect 
to the true underlying target-differences in well-being.163 
All of this makes sense if one is working within a traditional 
welfarist framework.164 From this insight, however, Sanchirico seems 
to conclude that both the legal system and the tax system should be 
designed to take into account every possible proxy for well-being.165 
156 See id. at 1023, n.51, 1026 n.56. 
157 Id. at 1023. 
1 58 More precisely, for his argument to have any real-world significance, the point of 
maximization would have to be (coincidentally) at a point where even a minute amount of 
redistribution was valued extraordinarily highly by society. The likelihood of such a coinci­
dence seems remote. 
1 59 Id. at 1022. 
160 Id. at 1020. 
161 Id. at 1027. 
162 Id. at 1027. Sanchirico also mentions contractual activity, property owned, harm 
caused, and the like. Id. at 1009. 
163 Id. at 1009. 
164 Recall that we generally have not adopted the welfarist framework for this Article, 
nor any other specific political theory. Rather, we adopted an independence assumption, 
which suggests that a redistribution-minded policymaker will make independent redistribu­
tive decisions with respect to different types of inequality. See note 31. We do not think 
that our conclusions hinge on this assumption. See discussion at text accompanying notes 
259-72. 
165 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1021-26. In fact, Sanchirico characterizes 
the ideal redistributive policy instrument to be a sort of "multidimensional tax table" under 
which each "individual's tax on each attribute [would be] a function of the levels of the 
individual's other attributes. Taxes can thus be cross-dependent. Income tax rates, for in­
stance, can be based on wealth, just as damages might depend on the individual's income 
or wealth." Id. at 1028. As Sanchirico goes on to point out, we do in fact make adjust­
ments to the existing income tax in order to take account of differences in consumption 
decisions that matter to us on distributional grounds. Id. at 1030. 
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We do not see how this follows.166 Moreover, even this conclusion 
does not explain why legal rules in particular should be used as a re­
distributive policy instrument. Rather, it provides only a justification 
for taking into account as many proxies for well-being as possible, 
whatever redistributive instruments happen to be used. That is to say, 
the cross-dependency goal could be achieved entirely through the tax­
and-transfer regime, such as through a multidimensional tax table. 
There is nothing in this analysis that identifies legal rules as being par­
ticularly well-suited for such a function. 
What seems to be Sanchirico's strongest argument for redistributing 
through legal rules is a sort of diminishing returns-to-scale story. He 
seems to be arguing that, even if the tax-and-transfer system is gener­
ally the preferred redistributor with respect to income, at some point 
(after some amount of income redistribution already has been accom­
plished through the tax-and-transfer system) there are diminishing re­
turns to doing additional redistribution through that system. At that 
point, if policymakers wish to further increase the amount of overall 
income redistribution, they should not do so through the tax-and­
transfer system (which is, in some sense, overloaded) but should do 
the additional redistribution through a different system, namely, the 
legal system. Thus, he seems to be arguing that the more redistribu­
tion with respect to a particular proxy is done through a given policy 
instrument, the less effective that instrument becomes with respect to 
that proxy; hence, we need to spread the income redistribution 
around, using the tax system a little, the legal system a little, and so 
on. We might call this a capacity-constraint justification for spreading 
the redistributive work around. 
Although in theory this argument could be right, it seems unlikely. 
The argument assumes that there are diminishing returns to scale in 
redistributing income through the tax system and that, over some rele­
vant range of income redistribution, the legal system on the margin 
would be more efficient than the tax-and-transfer system as a system 
of redistribution. These assumptions strike us as highly unlikely. Al­
though there is no empirical evidence that we know of that would 
permit us to answer the question definitively, it is our intuition that, 
when it comes to administrative costs, there are probably increasing 
returns to scale, not decreasing returns to scale, in using the tax sys­
tem to redistribute income. In other words, we suspect that over the 
166 For example, under our approach, all of the relevant redistributive proxies would be 
taken into account, but the mechanism would be different. Instead of adjusting all policy 
instruments on the basis of every proxy for well-being, we would use the redistributive 
policy instrument that best suited each proxy. Overall, from an ex ante perspective, taking 
into account the redistributive aspect of the legal system and the tax system, the result 
would be the same: a focus on inequality of well-being. 
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relevant range of redistribution, the tax-and-transfer system would ex­
hibit increasing marginal redistributive capacity rather than decreas­
ing capacity. 
To make this point more clearly, imagine a situation in which the 
tax system already does some amount of income redistribution. Then 
the policymaker decides that a greater degree of income redistribution 
is desirable. In our view, it would make most sense to use the tax 
system for this additional redistribution as well. For reasons discussed 
above, the tax-and-transfer system has a comparative advantage in ob­
serving income as well as in redistributing income. We believe this 
advantage remains for the whole range of the relevant income redis­
tribution space. In any event, there certainly is no obvious reason to 
suppose that, if the tax system becomes stretched to capacity as a sys­
tem of income redistribution, the most efficient means of adding addi­
tional redistributive capacity to the overall system would be a new 
redistributive role to the legal system, which is not designed primarily 
with income redistribution in mind. It seems to us that a more effi­
cient response would be to add more capacity to the income tax sys­
tem rather than to call on the unused income-redistributive capacity 
of the legal system. 
An important part of our framework that Sanchirico's analysis over­
looks is that the various redistributive policy instruments may have 
different comparative advantages. In particular, even if equality of 
well-being is the overarching target of the redistribution-minded poli­
cymaker, such that the focus of redistributive policy is on "proxies for 
well-being," it is still the case that various government policy instru­
ments are not equally well-suited to redistribution with respect to all 
aspects of well-being. Thus, putting our framework in welfarist terms, 
the policymaker should ask, with respect to each proxy for well-being, 
which policy instrument is the better proxy observer and which is the 
better redistributor with respect to that proxy. 
It may be, as we argue in the next Section, that the legal system has 
a comparative advantage at observing certain characteristics that cor­
relate with well-being, such as whether or not an individual is accident 
prone or whether or not an individual has experienced nonphysical 
pain and suffering. In such cases, the legal system should be used at 
least to observe the relevant proxy. Then the question becomes 
whether that information should be used in the legal system or in the 
tax-and-transfer system to make the tax-and-transfer system cross­
dependent. 
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IV. REDISTRIBUTION WITH RESPECT TO NoNINCOME INEQUALITY 
Among those who favor some sort of redistribution, there is little 
disagreement that large inequalities of income or wealth present an 
appropriate occasion for redistributive transfers. But, as discussed 
above, income is not the only proxy for well-being. Therefore, income 
inequality should not be the only target of an egalitarian or even a 
welfarist redistributive policy. Moreover, putting the welfarist frame­
work to one side, a case can be made that there are other types of 
inequality that a redistribution-minded policymaker would (and 
should) care about, independent of income inequality.167 
For example, even if income were distributed equally across society 
(or if all income differences were considered the result of pure choice, 
rather than a mix of choice and endowment), our intuition suggests 
that redistribution still would be considered appropriate for large dif­
ferences in nonincome dimensions of well-being that are attributable 
to brute luck.168 Thus, for example, in an equal-income society, we 
might tax those who do not have severe disabilities in order to make 
cash or in kind transfers to those who do: That is, the presence of a 
severe disability, by itself, would be considered sufficient grounds for 
a redistributive transfer. The same might be said of inequality of edu­
cation or healthcare.169 
Under our comparative-advantage framework, if policymakers can 
identify nonincome measures of inequality that society cares about, 
they should ask the same questions that were asked above about in­
come redistribution: Which system is the better observer of this char­
acteristic or type of inequality? And which system is the better 
redistributor with respect to it? Broadening the redistributive analysis 
this way makes it clear that the standard categories-tax rules versus 
legal rules-are inadequate to capture fully the various policy options. 
For example, it is unclear into which category an unfunded mandate 
such as the Americans With Disabilities Act would fall. The Social 
Security or Medicare systems also are not easily categorized. In this 
Section, we focus on a set of examples that, at least on first blush, 
seem to fall under the rubric of legal rules. Even in these cases, how­
ever, the distinctions become blurred. These are legal rules that have 
the following interesting qualities: They tend to promote a plausible 
vision of distributive justice (that is, they redistribute from those who 
167 We discussed this independence assumption in the introduction, note 31, and we re­
turn to it in the text accompanying notes 259-72. 
168 See note 27. 
169 Rawls, note 9, might call some of these characteristics "primary goods," and Dwor­
kin, Law's Empire, note 9, might call them "resources." For our purposes, the terminology 
is not important. What is important is that there are types of inequality, independent of 
income, that might justify some sort of redistributive policy. 
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are better endowed to those who are less well endowed),  and they do 
so in a way that is arguably more efficient than a pure tax-and-transfer 
alternative. Our analysis, of course, does not depend on the absence 
of a tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution, but only is made 
more compelling by it. Thus, we do not reject a priori legal rules that 
fulfill society's redistributive goals but are inefficient. 
Our claim in this Section is that, with respect to some types of ine­
quality, the legal system should play an important redistributive role, 
either because the legal system is better at observing the relevant type 
of inequality or because the legal system is the more efficient redis­
tributor or both. Here again, however, one of the most important ob­
servations of our analysis is that, at the margins, these categories-tax 
rules and legal rules-begin to break down. The question thus be­
comes, more generally, what institution or combination of institutions 
is best suited to achieve the type of redistribution that is desired. 
A. Redistributing Through Insurance Law 
1 .  The Problem of Disease-Related Genes 
A potentially important source of nonincome-based inequality in­
volves disease-related genes, that is, genetic characteristics that sub­
stantially increase an individual's likelihood of contracting a 
devastatingly costly, incapacitating, excruciatingly painful, and per­
haps fatal disease. Such genetic characteristics correlate with higher­
than-average lifetime health costs, shorter-than-average life spans, 
and presumably lower-than-average psychic income or noneconomic 
well-being. Moreover, at least with respect to some such diseases, an 
individual's genetic makeup is the sole determinant of whether the 
disease will be contracted. Therefore, whether or not an individual 
has such a disease gene is an important measure of inequality of well­
being, the sort of inequality that likely would motivate a redistribu­
tion-minded policymaker to engage in compulsory redistribution.17° 
For diseases that are entirely the result of genetic inheritance and 
thus are unaffected by an individual's choices or by her environment 
(which we call "genetically-determined diseases"), the case for com­
pulsory redistribution is especially strong. In fact, it is difficult to con-
110 As one prominent contemporary political philosopher and medical ethicist put it, 
even philosophers who believe that differences among individuals in terms of ability or 
talent do not present distributive justice concerns, "only the strictest libertarians treat 
health status differences merely as 'unfortunate' variations and believe that there is no 
social obligation to correct for the relative advantages and disadvantages caused by disease 
and disability." Norman Daniels, The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just 
Health Care in Justice and the Human Genome Project 110, 1 16-17 (1994) (citing H. Tris­
tam Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (1986)). 
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ceive of a better example of bad brute luck.171 Thus, with genetically­
determined diseases, the only questions for the redistribution-minded 
policymaker are how much redistribution is appropriate and what is 
the best tool for doing the job. The first question we again leave un­
answered. It is the second question that is the main focus of this Sec­
tion, and we conclude that there are a number of reasons to prefer 
redistributing through the legal rules to redistributing through tax­
and-transfer rules. The most difficult question will be what to do, as a 
matter of redistributive policy, about what we call "multi-factorial" 
diseases: Diseases that are caused partly by an individual's genetic 
makeup and caused partly by the individual's informed, voluntary 
choices, such as cancer or heart disease. 
2. The Easy Cases: Genetically-Determined Diseases 
Before we take up the hard cases, however, we begin with the easy 
ones. Assume that some high-cost diseases are determined entirely by 
an individual's genetic make-up. With respect to such diseases, in 
other words, the individual's behavior-her choices regarding how 
much or what to eat or whether to exercise or where to live-will have 
no effect on her likelihood of getting the disease or how severe the 
symptoms will be. Huntington's Disease is a good example. It is a 
horrible neurological disease caused by a defect in a single gene. 
For those who have the defective gene, once the symptoms begin to 
appear (between the ages of 35 and 45) ,  their health grows steadily 
worse, causing them to incur enormous healthcare costs over a period 
of 15 or so years and ultimately leaving them unable to care for them­
selves. Moreover, the nightmare ends with the patient suffering an 
inevitably premature and painful death.172 There is no known cure for 
Huntington's Disease, and those with the defective gene can do noth­
ing to reduce (or increase) their likelihood of contracting the disease. 
With such purely genetically-determined diseases, there is an obvious 
argument under our framework for transferring money from those 
who do not have the gene to those who do.173 
111 An equally strong case for redistribution, however, can be made with respect to dis­
eases (or any source of higher-than-average expected lifetime costs) that are caused en­
tirely by environmental or social circumstances that are beyond an individual's control. 
172 Gwen Terrenoire, Huntington's Disease and the Ethics of Genetic Prediction, 18 J. 
Med. Ethics 79, 79 (1992) (describing the disease). 
173 But see Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old 
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1994) [hereinafter Genetic Discrimi­
nation] ("no wealth transfer to victims of Huntington's Disease could ever hope to equal­
ize their positions in life."). 
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a. Choosing the Optimal Redistributive Policy Instrument 
The next important question, then, for the redistribution-minded 
policymaker is what redistributive policy instrument is best suited to 
reduce this type of inequality. Again, the framework of this Article 
suggests a comparison of the two general approaches-legal rules and 
tax-and-transfer rules-to determine which has a comparative advan­
tage at redistributing with respect to this source of inequality. The 
legal-rule approach, for example, might entail a nondisrimination 
norm. It might prohibit insurers from taking the Huntington gene 
into account in their underwriting processes-that is, the processes by 
which insurers determine whether and on what terms to insure a par­
ticular individual. Similarly, the nondiscrimination rule might prohibit 
employers from using such information in their decisions concerning 
whether to allow particular employees to participate in employer-pro­
vided health, disability, or life insurance plans.1 74 Put more generally, 
insurers and employers would be prohibited from discriminating on 
the basis of genetic information. For example, they might be prohib­
ited from requiring applicants to submit to genetic testing, or they 
might be forbidden to condition insurance coverage or employee ben­
efits on the provision of genetic information. 
The tax-and-transfer approach, by contrast, would entail no nondis­
crimination principle. To the contrary, it explicitly would allow insur­
ers and employers to use genetic information in the underwriting 
process, which would exacerbate the inequalities presented by the 
presence of genetically-determined diseases, as those with Hunting­
ton's Disease, for example, would find themselves wholly unable to 
find affordable health insurance. Then, under the tax-and-transfer re-
174 The concept of underwriting primarily is associated with the sale of individual insur­
ance policies, that is, policies sold by an insurer to cover the risk of a particular individual 
person or business. And it is in the underwriting process for individual health, disability, 
and life insurance policies that insurers would take into account specific genetic informa­
tion about individual risk characteristics. Insurers, however, also sell insurance policies to 
groups, such as in the most common case of employer-provided group health, disability, or 
life insurance. Sometimes employer-provided group insurance actually is insured with an 
insurance company (that is, the employer shifts its employees' health risks to an insurer for 
a premium), and sometimes it is self-insured by the employer. Either way, with group 
insurance, the insurer or employer-qua-insurer has less of a need for individualized risk 
information than in the case of individual insurance, because there is less of an adverse 
selection problem. In fact, group insurers for the most part do not seek genetic informa­
tion from their insureds, but instead insure everyone in the group on largely the same 
terms. Thus, as we point out below, with respect to group insurance, there already is redis­
tribution from the genetically better off to the less well off. As we argue, however, this sort 
of cross-subsidization may not remain stable if science progresses to the point where insur­
ers (including group insurers) with a low-cost genetic test, definitively can determine that 
particular individuals have a much higher-than-average likelihood of contracting certain 
high-cost diseases. 
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distributive approach, either a tax-financed subsidy would be paid to 
those who have the disease-related gene or the government itself 
would become the insurer (or healthcare provider) of such 
individuals. 
A definitive determination of which approach would be optimal 
(which would strike the best balance between efficiency and distribu­
tional concerns) would require a considerable amount of empirical ev­
idence. We argue, however, that the case for some version of the 
redistributive-rule approach in this setting is stronger than the critics 
of such antidiscrimination insurance rules have recognized.1 75 In addi­
tion we point out that those who have been most strident in their calls 
for legal rules prohibiting insurers and employers from using genetic 
information on distributive-justice grounds largely have failed to rec­
ognize that the key issue is not one of fairness per se, but one of com­
parative institutional advantage. 
To understand the efficiency and distributive tradeoffs presented by 
the use of nondiscrimination rules, we first review some basic princi­
ples of insurance economics in order to understand why insurance 
companies have an economic incentive to use genetic information and 
to see the efficiency benefits of allowing them to do so. First, consider 
the insurance concept of risk classification. Insurers have an eco­
nomic incentive to classify or segregate individuals into relatively nar­
row risk pools. Put differently, it is in the nature of a competitive 
insurance market that insurance companies will be induced to charge 
each individual insured a premium that approximates that insured's 
expected costs. Economists sometimes (and insurance companies fre­
quently) refer to such premiums as "actuarially fair" premiums. If an 
insurer fails to price its policies actuarially fairly, other insurers will 
compete away the first insurer's business. And here's the kicker: Ge­
netic information about individual insureds has the potential to enable 
insurers to make accurate and low-cost estimates of those insureds' 
expected costs and hence to facilitate more accurate pricing of individ­
ual policies. 
Second, genetic information can help insurers combat the well­
known insurance problem of adverse selection.176 Adverse selection 
is the tendency for relatively high-risk individuals to purchase insur­
ance. It occurs when insurers cannot distinguish high-risk from low-
175 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong With 
Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1468 (2001)  (arguing that genetic infor­
mation, if available to both the insurer and the insured, would increase the overall effi­
ciency of group insurance markets). 
176 In the case of multi-factorial diseases, genetic information also may help insurers 
overcome the other principal problem facing insurance markets: moral hazard. We discuss 
this issue at text accompanying note 182. 
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risk individuals and so must charge the same premium to all. High­
risk individuals (who know they are relatively high-risk) select into 
insurance pools to benefit from the cross-subsidization, causing premi­
ums for everyone to rise eventually. This process can result in low­
risk individuals reducing their level of coverage or dropping out of 
insurance markets altogether, which produces an overall sacrifice of 
social welfare given that low-risk individuals are assumed to be risk 
averse and would prefer to be insured. 
Thus, from the perspective of the insurance company, it is entirely 
fair and appropriate for insurers to charge premiums that approximate 
expected costs as closely as possible. In fact, in state court regulatory 
disputes over whether a given insurance company's rates are unfairly 
discriminatory, insurance companies make precisely that argument, 
arguing essentially that fair insurance premiums in the regulatory con­
text should be interpreted to mean only actuarially fair premiums.177 
The parties on the other side of those ratemaking disputes, however, 
typically argue, precisely for the brute luck/endowment sorts of rea­
sons mentioned in the Introduction,178 that the state law fairness re­
quirement should prevent insurers from taking into account some 
factors that bear on an individual's expected costs. And precisely that 
argument has been made with respect to genetic information. As one 
commentator put the point: "Since one cannot choose one's genetic 
make-up, arguably there should be no duty to pay more for insurance 
because of a poor genetic make-up."179 
In our view the debate about whether fairness or distributive justice 
requires insurers to take genetic information into account or to ignore 
genetic information somewhat misses the point. At least in the case of 
purely genetically-determined diseases, few would dispute that fair­
ness or distributive-justice concerns call for something to be done 
about the unequal allocation of the costs of those diseases in an unreg­
ulated insurance market. But the question, again, is what is the best 
approach. Which institution-the legal system or the tax-and-transfer 
system-has the comparative advantage in doing this sort of redistri­
bution? The proponents of restrictions on insurers' use of genetic 
testing do not grapple with the fact that the important debate is not 
really about whether to redistribute with respect to such measures of 
111 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984), 
excerpted and discussed in Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation: Cases 
and Materials 125-35 (3d ed. 2000). 
178 See text accompanying notes 1-40. 
179 Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Di­
lemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L.J. 503, 563 (1996). In other parts 
of his article, Holmes explicitly invokes Rawls as a justification for imposing such limita­
tions on insurance companies. Id. at 577. 
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well-being, but how best to do it.180 And to answer that question, we 
return to the two questions we posed above with respect to income 
inequality: Which institution (the legal system or the tax-and-transfer 
system) is the best proxy observer with respect to disease-related 
genes? And which system is the best redistributor with respect to 
those genetic differences? 
b. Exploiting the Benefits of the "Invisible Redistributive Hand" of 
the Market 
As to the best-proxy-observer question, there is a sense in which the 
legal system has a distinct advantage over the tax-and-transfer system, 
an advantage unaddressed in the debates concerning insurers' use 
(and proposals to restrict their use) of genetic information. This ad­
vantage is inherent in the redistributive legal rule in question: A rule 
that prohibits insurers from using genetic information in their under­
writing processes does not actually require that the relevant proxy be 
observed at all. The whole idea, in fact, is to prevent the proxy from 
being observed. 
Of course, there would be administrative costs associated with en­
forcing the nonobservation rule; the policymaker would have to deter­
mine how much to spend on enforcement and what penalties to 
impose on noncompliant insurers. But there would be no expense 
tso Most proponents of restrictions on insurers' use of genetic information fail to address 
the issue as one of comparative institutional advantage. They frame the question instead 
as whether justice or fairness principles requires such restrictions or not, rather than what 
is the best institutional approach if justice requires redistribution from the better off to the 
worse off. See, e.g., Daniels, note 170, at 132 ("[A]Ithough [with genetic information] we 
may better predict which individuals are prone to certain diseases, and thus which individu­
als are worse insurance risks, justice requires that we not use this information in ways that 
make it more difficult for such people to obtain appropriate health care."). Even in one of 
the most comprehensive treatments of the genetic discrimination/insurance underwriting 
question, the author explicitly deemphasizes the comparative institutional question. 
Holmes, note 179 (surveying arguments for and against allowing insurers to use genetic 
testing in the underwriting process, but explicitly deemphasizing the comparative nature of 
the analysis). Holmes gives almost no attention to the tax-and-transfer alternative and 
how it would fare against the redistributive-rule approach, which is the exclusive focus of 
his article. The one exception is an early footnote in his article, in which he notes that 
Richard Epstein has suggested a tax-and-transfer alternative approach, but then concludes 
that "a public taxation solution would not constitute ' insurance' and issues of underwriting 
health risks using genetic information would be irrelevant." Holmes, note 179, at 507-08 
n.5. The footnote goes on to summarize briefly how public healthcare programs such as 
Medicare and Medicaid interact with private health insurance, but it never explains why 
Epstein's tax-and-transfer alternative proposal is "irrelevant." The lack of emphasis on the 
comparative nature of the insurance/discrimination question is typical among scholars writ­
ing on the subject. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actu­
arially Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 355 
(1997); Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One 
Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 835 (1986). 
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necessary to determine which individuals have the gene and which do 
not. Under the tax-and-transfer alternative, however, the taxing au­
thority would have to adopt some means of determining those individ­
uals with the relevant gene. 
In addition to being the better proxy observer, the redistributive­
rule/antidiscrimination approach has advantages when it comes to de­
termining the amount of the redistributive transfer. (In terms of our 
framework, this can be understood as a version of the better redis­
tributor question.) Under the tax-and-transfer approach, the poli­
cymaker would need to determine up front the precise difference 
between the expected lifetime health costs of those individuals who 
have the gene and the expected lifetime costs of those without the 
gene so that the amount of the tax-and-transfer payments could be set 
accordingly. Gathering such information is costly, and there is little 
reason to believe that the tax collector would be able to do this on its 
own. By contrast, under the antidiscrimination approach (where in­
surers are simply forbidden from discriminating on the basis of genet­
ics), the amount of the redistributive transfer, in effect, would be 
determined by market forces via a sort of "invisible redistributive 
hand." While insurers would need to determine how much to charge 
everyone in the insurance pool (again, by law, being forced to charge 
the same amount to those who have the disease gene and to those who 
do not), they would not have to determine the precise portion of pre­
miums attributable to the genetic difference. 
Thus, over time, as insureds who have the gene begin to experience 
health-related expenses and receive health-related benefits, those 
costs naturally would be spread over the entire insurance pool, result­
ing in cross-subsidizing transfers from those without the disease gene 
to those with it. And the amount of the cross-subsidization attributa­
ble to the antidiscrimination rule automatically would reflect the dif­
ferences in health-related costs among members of the insurance pool 
that are attributable to the morally arbitrary genetic characteristic. As 
a result, it would not be necessary for insurers or for the policymaker 
to make a separate, ex ante calculation of the appropriate amount of 
the redistributive transfer; cross-subsidization within the insurance 
pool and competition among insurers would produce something ap­
proximating the right amount of redistributive transfer.181 
181 Perhaps the most plausible tax-and-transfer alternative to our redistributive-rule/an­
tidiscrimination approach would be to use the insurance industry's comparative advantage 
at determining insured losses. Thus, if insurers were allowed to use genetic information 
and as a result created separate risk pools· for those with the gene and for those without it, 
they would develop (as a result of competition over time) a relatively accurate measure of 
the relevant difference in economic well-being between the two groups attributable to the 
disease gene. (That is, if the only difference between two insurance pools is that one con-
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c. Limitations and Objections 
This redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination approach, of course, has 
important limitations. For example, the invisible hand redistributive 
transfer just described responds only to differences in lifetime health­
care costs. It does nothing to respond to the noneconomic, psychic 
costs of Huntington's Disease, which a tax system could address. In 
addition the redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination approach presents 
special costs. First, we should assume that, as scientists identify more 
disease-causing genes, individuals would desire (and would get) access 
to that information about themselves. As a result, if insurers are not 
allowed access to that same information, adverse selection in the indi­
vidual insurance market would occur. Individuals who discover that 
they have the disease gene would leap at the chance to buy what 
would be a heavily cross-subsidized insurance policy. 
This phenomenon in turn would cause premiums to rise, and low­
risk insureds would tend to reduce coverage or drop out of insurance 
pools altogether, a result that would be nonoptimal from an efficiency 
perspective. How serious the adverse selection problem would be in 
the individual insurance market, however, would depend on a number 
of factors: what percentage of the population had the gene, how large 
the health costs associated with the gene were, and how large the par­
ticular insurance pools happened to be. If the gene were present in 
relatively few individuals, the adverse selection effect would be small, 
especially in larger insurance pools. 
Adverse selection is much less of a problem with group insurance, 
which is the form that most health and disability insurance (and a con-
sists of individuals with a particular disease gene, the resulting differences in Joss experi­
ence between the two pools will be a natural measure of the differences in economic well­
being) differences attributable solely to the gene. And this information conceivably could 
be shared with the taxing-and-transferring authority, which would use it to determine the 
appropriate redistributive transfer. In essence, we would be privatizing the calculation of 
the appropriate redistributive transfer, which makes sense, given that determining the rela­
tive costs presented by different groups of individuals, this is what insurers do best. It is 
what keeps actuaries off the streets. In any event, if such a sharing arrangement could be 
made administratively feasible, we agree that it represents a plausible alternative to a non­
discrimination legal-rule approach. In fact, it might be even fairer because it spreads the 
costs among the entire population and not a specific insurance pool. If that is the ultimate 
conclusion (that is, the insurance market is used to gather the relevant information and the 
tax system is used to do the actual redistribution), then inequalities with respect to disease­
related genes would be one of those areas in which the optimal redistributive scheme is a 
mixed one-one system for proxy observing, the other for the actual redistributing. 
Another alternative would be to allow private insurers to refuse to insure individuals 
who have particular disease-related genes and then to have the government insure those 
individuals. That would eliminate the need for the government to determine ex ante the 
difference in expected costs associated with the genes. It generally is believed, however, 
that the government is not typically as good as the private insurance industry at dealing 
with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
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siderable amount of life insurance) takes these days. With group in­
surance, the insurer relies less on traditional insurance underwriting 
practices (such as the use of health history questionnaires, blood tests, 
medical exams, and the like) and relies more on the fact that most 
insurance groups are relatively diverse in terms of their health-risk 
profiles. This is because an individual's decision to join a group, such 
as to become employed with a particular company, is a multi-faceted 
decision. And whether an individual has discovered that she has a 
particular medical condition would be only one of many factors bear­
ing on the decision to take a particular job. By contrast, in the indi­
vidual insurance market, an individual's decision to buy a health, 
disability, or life insurance policy would be hugely affected by that 
individual's perception of her own relatively poor health status. 182 
Underwriting practices and group insurance, therefore, are alterna­
tive, though not mutually exclusive, responses to the problem of ad­
verse selection.183 If adverse selection is, despite all of this, 
considered a serious problem, the final, though perhaps drastic, solu­
tion would be to make the purchase of insurance compulsory.184 
A second problem with the redistributive-rule/antidiscrimination 
approach involves the concern that such an approach would tend to 
reallocate the extra costs associated with genetically-determined dis­
eases in an arbitrary manner. For example, how those costs would be 
reallocated might depend upon whether individuals with the relevant 
gene have a tendency to work in particular industries or live in partic­
ular geographic regions of the country. If those individuals tend to 
gravitate towards certain jobs or certain areas, their gene-related costs 
would be borne primarily by the other members of insurance pools in 
those industries and parts of the country. 185 Such an allocation is con­
sidered more arbitrary than, for example, allocating those extra costs 
182 In fact, if health and disability insurers did nothing to prevent adverse selection (for 
example, if there were no medical exams required of applicants, and there were no pre­
existing conditions limitations on benefits), everyone could just go uninsured until they 
became ill, and only then buy insurance. That is adverse selection in the extreme and 
would render insurance markets unworkable. 
183 Indeed, to the extent health, disability, and life insurance currently are provided 
through group plans that do not discriminate on the basis of genetics (as is the case for 
most of the health insurance market), cross-subsidization from individuals that are better 
off genetically to those that are less well off already occurs without any government inter­
vention. As we discuss below, cross-subsidization within group insurance pools is per­
ceived to be a problem only for relatively small groups. 
184 Adverse selection is a problem only if individuals have a choice of when and how 
much insurance to purchase. If regulatory policy takes that choice away from them ad­
verse selection ceases to be a problem. 
185 Epstein, Genetic Discrimination, note 173, at 21 ("If workers with genetic defects 
tend to gravitate towards certain industries, professions, or geographic regions, then how­
ever neutral the anti-discrimination approach appears on its face, it will be heavily dispro­
portionate in its impact."). 
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across everyone in society, which a national tax-and-transfer approach 
in theory would be able to accomplish. In other words, although 
spreading the gene-related additional costs across the members of a 
particular insurance risk pool is an improvement over leaving those 
costs to the individuals themselves, it would be better still to spread 
those costs over the largest possible pool-all taxpayers in the United 
States.186 
That complaint has some obvious merit. Whether the benefit of the 
additional cost-spreading would be worth the administrative cost of 
doing so and whether a straight tax-and-transfer approach would be 
the best means of additional cost-spreading are open questions. 
Again, there is the question of how big this problem really would be. 
If the amount of the additional insurance premium paid by the subsi­
dizing member of the insurance pool under such a rule were relatively 
small on a per person basis, little would be gained by implementing a 
more comprehensive tax-and-transfer approach. The prevalence and 
sustainability of group insurance markets for health-related costs, 
which already produces cross-subsidization of the sort we advocate, 
suggests that the arbitrary reallocation problem may be relatively mi­
nor. 187 More significant may be the problem of the uninsured. That 
is, to the extent that individuals lack health insurance, they obviously 
would not participate in-and could not contribute to or benefit 
from-the antidiscrimination approach. The solution to this problem 
may be greater subsidies for health insurance, perhaps coupled with 
mandatory coverage. 
186 Epstein relies on a version of this point to argue in favor of a tax-and-transfer alter­
native to the problem of genetically-determined diseases. Id. at 20-21. He also argues that 
the tax-and-transfer approach is better because it produces an "overt subsidy" rather than 
a "covert subsidy" and because it presents a smaller risk of causing an explosion in health­
care costs than does the redistributive-rule approach. Id. The tax-and-transfer approach is 
not, however, Epstein's first choice. If he thought it were politically feasible, he would 
prefer what he calls "benign nonintervention," by which he means that the government 
should do nothing, a position that is entirely consistent with Epstein's libertarian philoso­
phy. Id. at 20. For libertarians, distributive justice is a concept that should motivate volun­
tary charitable giving, not compulsory government redistribution. 
187 We should not expect, however, that the trend toward group insurance (which typi­
cally does not use genetic information) would make the genetic discrimination issue moot. 
If individual health, disability, and life insurers are allowed to use genetic testing in their 
underwriting practices in a way that dramatically reduces their costs of identifying the rela­
tively low-risk individuals, they eventually will begin to steal the relatively low-risk in­
sureds away from group insurance pools, because they will be able to charge the low-risk 
members of the pool a relatively low premium. If that were to continue, group insurers 
might be forced to use genetic information as well. Thus, to some extent, the viability of 
the group insurance market depends on whether individual insurers are allowed to use 
genetic information. If there is to be an antidiscrimination rule, it must be imposed both 
on individual insurers and on group insurers. 
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Thus, the ultimate solution to the arbitrary reallocation problem 
might be to facilitate the creation of relatively large, statewide, per­
haps nationwide reinsurance pools-pools large and diverse enough 
to eliminate the concern about the costs of genetic diseases being real­
located insufficiently broadly. This could be done through govern­
ment-subsidized or compulsory reinsurance programs.188 In fact, one 
of the most prominent and widely supported proposals in recent years 
for dealing with the problem of high health care costs borne by small 
insurance groups (groups that do not have the large numbers over 
which to spread the high costs attributable to individual group mem­
bers who have particular diseases or conditions) involves the use of 
larger reinsurance groups that, through market mechanisms, could 
perform more efficiently the same sort of function that the tax-and­
transfer system might accomplish.189 
3. The Hard Cases: Multi-Factorial Diseases 
If purely genetically-determined diseases present the strongest case 
for redistribution (and, we argue, a strong case for redistribution 
through a legal rule), the case is somewhat weaker, or at least more 
complicated, for multi-factorial diseases, those that are in part attribu­
table to genes but also are affected by the individual's behavior. 
Those diseases (such as lung cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hyperten­
sion, and the like) represent the great bulk of health-related costs. 
The likelihood of contracting such a disease is greater for those with a 
particular gene than for those without the gene; however, their likeli­
hood of contracting the disease also is (or may be) affected by other 
t 88 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Financing for Health Coverage: What Can 
Reinsurance Accomplish?, 29 Inquiry 158, 163-70 (1992) (discussing subsidized and 
mandatory reinsurance programs); Holmes, note 179, at 661 ("A federal act could establish 
tax incentives for the states to mandate pools that offer comprehensive health insurance to 
all citizens, thereby fairly apportioning the social responsibility of providing health insur­
ance to the uninsurable citizens.") (footnote omitted}. 
189 For example, during the health care reform debates of the early 1990's, the Health 
Insurance Association of America and the National Association of Insurance Commission­
ers together drafted model legislation addressed directly to this problem. See Mark A. 
Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, 11 Health Affairs 108, 
108 (1992). The proposal included a number of provisions, including a commitment to 
provide health insurance to all willing purchasers at a reasonable price. Id. at 1 10. One of 
the most important provisions, though, was the proposed system through which small­
group insurers could spread the costs of "high-risk cases" over a larger reinsurance pool. 
Id. at 112 ("For commercial insurers, reinsurance is the most critical component of their 
reform proposals, for it provides a private market mechanism for the equitable distribution 
of high-risk cases."). The insurance industry argued that not only would reinsurance allow 
for a more equitable distribution of the high-risk cases but also that it would reduce the 
incentive of insurers to engage in surreptitious attempts to screen out risks that they do not 
want to insure. Id. at 115. 
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factors such as environment and behavior. In other words, unlike with 
purely genetically-determined diseases, with multi-factorial diseases 
individual choice makes a difference. 
It is common knowledge, for example, that if one refrains from 
smoking, adopts a low-fat diet that includes plenty of vegetables, 
fruits, and whole grains, and gets regular aerobic exercise, one can 
reduce one's risk of contracting cancer, heart disease, and hyperten­
sion, which are perennially among the leading causes of mortality and 
illness in the United States.190 By precisely how much one can reduce 
one's risk of getting these diseases through lifestyle choices, however, 
remains unclear. In any event, because of the choice element inherent 
in these diseases, there are both efficiency and distributional argu­
ments that cut against trying to redistribute from those who do not 
have the genes to those who do, which means there are efficiency and 
distributional arguments for allowing insurers to use such genetic in­
formation in their underwriting decisions. 
a. Ef iciency and Distributional Tradeoffs 
On the efficiency side, the question again is whether the use of such 
information by insurers would enhance their ability to combat adverse 
selection and moral hazard. As discussed above, adverse selection can 
be reduced by allowing insurers to use the genetic information in­
sureds' have access to. As with genetically-determined diseases, insur­
ers could charge higher premiums or refuse to insure those who have 
a cancer-related gene as well. In addition, if an insurer were to learn 
that an individual applicant had a particular multi-factorial cancer 
gene, the insurer then could reduce the moral hazard effect of insur­
ance by offering the applicant a special premium discount (potentially 
above what is offered to the average insured) if she would agree to 
take certain steps to reduce her risk of contracting that particular can­
cer. Or the insurer might offer a special premium discount if the indi­
vidual would agree to a higher-than-average deductible.1 91 
190 Frank B. Hu & Walter C. Willett, Optimal Diets for Prevention of Coronary Heart 
Disease, 288 JAMA 2569, 2575 (2002) (concluding that diets that include nonhydrogenated 
unsaturated fats, whole grains, fruits and vegetables together with regular physical activity, 
avoidance of smoking may prevent the majority of cardiovascular diseases); Tim Byers, 
Marion Nestle, Anne McTiernan, Colleen Doyle, Alexis Currie-Williams, Ted Gansler & 
Michael Thun, Am. Cancer Soc'y 2001 Nutrition and Physical Activity Guidelines Advi­
sory Comm., American Cancer Society Guidelines on Nutrition and Physical Activity for 
Cancer Prevention: Reducing the Risk of Cancer With Healthy Food Choices and Physical 
Activity, 52 Cancer J. for Clinicians 92 (2002) (recommending diet rich in fruits and vegeta­
bles, exercise and no smoking to prevent cancer). 
191 Whether as a practical matter an insurance company can do much to affect an indi­
vidual's incentives to avoid cancer or heart disease or other life-threatening and debilitat­
ing conditions is an empirical question. If an individual learns that she has a cancer gene 
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Although the efficiency concerns seem to cut in one direction (that 
is, in favor of allowing insurers to use multi-factorial genetic informa­
tion), the direction in which the distributive-justice arguments cut is 
less clear and may be in the opposite direction. As we have assumed 
throughout, the redistribution-minded policymaker should aim to re­
distribute in a way that reduces endowment-related inequality and, to 
the extent possible, in a way that has no effect on choice-related mea­
sures of well-being.192 
The difficulty is that a multi-factorial disease presents a blended 
case. To some extent choice matters. An individual can choose 
whether to eat right, whether to exercise regularly, and, at some level, 
whether to smoke or whether to live next to a waste treatment facility. 
Insofar as choice plays a role, the redistribution-minded policymaker 
presumably should allow insurers to make distinctions-to charge dif­
ferent premiums and to offer different amounts or types of cover­
age-between individuals who have such genes and those who do not. 
To the extent that genes play the major causal role, however, there 
remains a distributive-justice argument for limiting insurers' use of the 
information. How these competing concerns balance out depends on 
the circumstances of each disease. In cases where the gene plays the 
predominant causal role, perhaps the policymaker should forbid its 
use by insurers, and in cases where behavior and not the gene is the 
main causal factor, allow it. 
Alternatively, the policymaker could allow insurers to use the ge­
netic criterion but only to a limited extent. For example, insurers 
could charge those with the disease gene 20% of the increased ex­
pected costs associated with that gene. Such insurance pricing 
"bands" are also a common part of healthcare-financing reform pro-
and her doctor tells her she can reduce her risk of getting the disease by changing her diet 
and exercising more, one wonders whether there would be any additional incentive effect if 
her insurer also offered a premium discount if she followed the doctor's advice. Perhaps. 
Because the harmful effects of one's current consumption choices often do not manifest 
themselves until much later in life, some individuals may (myopically) ignore or underesti­
mate those risks whereas, because individuals see and feel premium discounts in the here 
and now, they may have a somewhat greater effect. In any event, even insofar as insurance 
premiums can influence individuals to engage in less risky behavior, insurers always will 
face the problem of monitoring and enforcing the insured's compliance with the restric­
tions. For example, verifying representations by insurance applicants that they are non­
smokers is a costly enterprise. 
1 92 In each of these cases, of course, there is some element of involuntariness or brute 
luck as well. Some individuals, because of the circumstances into which they were born, 
have little choice about what to eat or how much to exercise. This fact applies most obvi­
ously (though certainly not exclusively) to children, who often have little say in such mat­
ters. There are also voluntariness questions with respect to smoking, given the well­
documented addictive qualities of nicotine and given the fact that most long-term smokers 
begin smoking as children. 
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posals.193 This middling approach has something in common with the 
approach we currently take with respect to income inequality. Recall 
that income inequality too is a blended concept, in the sense that it 
arises partly because of individual choice and partly because of indi­
vidual endowment. So what do we do? We redistribute in such a way 
as to reduce but not eliminate income inequality. The same justifica­
tion might be given for a limited use of insurance pricing bands. Pre­
cisely what those bands should look like is worthy of further study, but 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
b. Implications of the Framework Beyond Disease-Related Genes 
Before leaving the topic of insurance underwriting, this Section con­
siders a few other implications of our framework. First, note that our 
analysis applies to genetic information whatever its source-and not 
only to information from specific types of genetic tests. That is, if it is 
possible to determine that an individual has a particular genetically­
determined disease, such as Huntington's Disease, without the use of 
a specific genetic test (for example, by asking whether the individual's 
parents had the disease), our framework would suggest disallowing 
insurers' use of that sort of question as well.194 It is not the genetic 
tests themselves that concern us; it is the insurers' use of the genetic 
information, whatever its source.195 
1 93 E.g., Hall, note 189, at 1 10. 
1 94 Assuming, of course, that the policymaker has determined that the adverse selection 
problem does not overwhelm the benefits of such a redistributive rule. 
195 Epstein, too, thinks there should be no difference between the two sources of infor­
mation; he thinks, however, that insurers should be allowed to take everything into ac­
count. Epstein, Genetic Discrimination, note 173, at 1 1-12 ("When an individual has 
knowledge that he is at risk of incapacitation, perhaps from family history, then full disclo­
sure should be the norm. When the individual knows to a certainty that he is a carrier of 
the trait, from a reliable genetic test, the same is true. The principle does not change; all 
that changes is the information that must be disclosed."). Some states, such as New Jersey, 
protect all genetic information whether derived from family history or laboratory tests. 
E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:30-12{e) (West Supp. 2002). Other states, such as Georgia, pro­
tect genetic information only if it is a result of laboratory tests. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 33-
54-2, -4 (1996). Insurance company officials have criticized the New Jersey approach on 
the grounds that it prohibits insurers from relying on sources of information that have been 
part of the underwriting process for decades. Small Business Access to Health Care Insur­
ance: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 107th Cong. 95 (2002) (testi­
mony of Mary Nell Lehnhard, Senior Vice President for Policy and Representation at Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield Association). The Georgia approach, however, leads to odd results. For 
example, if a couple goes to have laboratory tests done and discovers that they are both 
carriers of cystic fibrosis, Georgia law prohibits insurers from using this information for 
underwriting purposes. In contrast, if this couple were to have a child with cystic fibrosis, 
insurers could safely infer that both parents carry this gene and can make use of this infor­
mation for medical underwriting. 
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Second, the framework of this Article has implications for (though 
it does not fully answer) the controversial questions concerning 
whether insurers should be able to use factors such as gender, race, 
and age in the underwriting process. All of those traits generally are 
considered aspects of a person's endowment, in the sense that a per­
son generally cannot choose her gender, race, or age. Gender and 
race are genetically determined, and age is determined by date of 
birth. In addition, insurers often claim that various factors that affect 
insurable losses-lifetime healthcare costs, life expectancy, or even 
automobile collision expenses-correlate with gender, race, or age.196 
Thus, because these characteristics are relatively easily observable, in­
surers want to use them in the insurance-underwriting process.197 
Assuming for the sake of argument that insurers are correct about 
the correlation issue, the question for the policymaker from the per­
spective of our framework is to determine the extent to which the 
differences in correlated expected costs are themselves endowment­
related or are choice-related. Take gender, for example. It is fairly 
uncontroversial that men and women on average pose different risks 
for insurers.198 Women on average live longer than men and at every 
age (again, on average) have a lower risk of dying.199 Insurers would 
like to charge women less for a given amount of life insurance than 
they charge men, but more for a given annuity. This makes economic 
sense, given that life insurance in its purest form is simply coverage 
against the risk of premature death (with respect to which risk women 
fair better than men), and annuities are essentially insurance coverage 
against the risk of outliving one's resources (with respect to which 
risk, from a purely economic perspective, men fair better than women, 
all else equal). The question for the policymaker is to what extent 
these differences between men and women are attributable to their 
respective endowments (genes, environment, social circumstances) 
and to what extent they are attributable to informed, voluntary 
choices. If the differences are purely endowment-related, insurers, 
should not be allowed to use gender in their insurance underwriting 
decisions. If it is purely choice-related, however, insurers should be 
allowed to use gender. 
1 96 Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law 102-09 (2d ed. 1996). 
1 97 Race is obviously not as easy to observe as gender. And the definition of various 
racial categories can be contested. Still, to the extent race is observable and correlates with 
expected costs, insurers, in the absence of legal prohibitions, presumably would be inter­
ested in using classifications in the underwriting process. 
1 98 Jerry, note 196, at 102 ("The statistical evidence is undeniable: men, on average, 
pose different risks for insurers than do women, on average."). 
199 Id. 
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If we assume that the differences are purely endowment-related, 
note that the effect of the prohibition would be to produce a transfer 
from women to men in life insurance pools and from men to women in 
annuity pools. That result is entirely consistent with our framework. 
Obviously, if we assume that all individuals would rather live their 
"expected" life span than die prematurely, a relatively low risk of pre­
mature death is a good thing; it makes a person relatively well off. 
Likewise, a relatively high likelihood of premature death is a bad 
thing. If we view the life insurance purchase from the perspective of 
the insured's dependents, the same conclusions hold: All else equal, 
the dependents are better off if the insured lives his or her expected 
life span. Along this dimension of well-being, then women on average 
are better off than men. And assuming this difference in well-being is 
purely endowment-related, a well-tailored approach to reducing that 
inequality would be to use a redistributive legal rule that prevents in­
surers from charging men more than women for life insurance and 
hence forces women to cross-subsidize men.2oo 
With respect, however, to the question of being able to provide for 
oneself and one's dependents via investment income, longevity (nor­
mally considered a good thing) is counterintuitively a negative. Put 
differently, whereas longevity in the life insurance market makes one 
better off, longevity in the annuity market makes one less well off. 
Along this dimension of economic well-being, then, men are better off 
than women. Here again, the cross-subsidizing transfer (from men to 
women) produced by forbidding the use of gender in annuity sales 
provides a relatively efficient system for reducing that particular ine­
quality of well-being. 
This justification for gender-blind insurance and annuity ratemak­
ing is very different from previous justifications. For example, some 
commentators discussing gender rating have characterized the ques­
tion as turning on whether an individual or a group perspective is 
taken.201 From a group perspective, under this view, allowing insurers 
to use gender is not "discriminatory" but "fair."202 Indeed, preventing 
an insurer from using gender would be discriminatory or unfair to wo­
men (in the case of life insurance) and men (in the case of annui­
ties ) .203 As a group, women and men should get back roughly what 
they put into insurance pools. If, however, one sees the question as an 
200 Again, as a result of the invisible redistributive hand of the competitive insurance 
market, the amount of the transfer would tend to be equal to the amount of the difference 
in economic well-being along this particular dimension. 
201 E.g., Jerry, note 196, at 106. Others may favor allowing insurers to use gender if it 
benefits traditionally disadvantaged classes, but not if it works in the other direction. 
202 Id. at 104-05. 
203 See id. 
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issue of fairness to the individual man or woman applying for a partic­
ular insurance policy, allowing insurers to discriminate seems unfair. 
That is, it seems unfair on some level that an individual woman who is 
no different from a man in any respect other than her gender should 
pay more for a given annuity than a man would.204 From the perspec­
tive of our comparative-institutional-advantage framework, however, 
whether we choose the group or the individual perspective is irrele­
vant. Either way, there is an important difference in well-being be­
tween men and women: life expectancy or risk of death. And 
continuing with our assumption that this difference is purely the result 
(or at least largely the result) of differing endowments, there is a 
sound argument for redistribution. 
An alternative view might say that whether insurers should be al­
lowed to use gender in the underwriting process should be determined 
by whether, in the particular case, gender rating helps or hurts wo­
men. On this view, in the case of health and disability insurance 
(where women of a certain age pose higher average expected medical 
costs than do men of the same age due to women's potential maternity 
costs),205 gender rating should not be allowed. For automobile insur­
ance, however, since women on average have lower auto-accident ex­
penses than men, 206 insurers under this view not only should be 
allowed to use gender in setting premiums but should be required to. 
The idea is that, because women are less well off overall economically 
than men are, we should use the regulation of the insurance-under­
writing process only to redistribute in a way that helps women.207 
This conclusion is inconsistent with our comparative-institutional­
advantage approach. Our framework would suggest that, if women 
are less well-off than men along certain dimensions, we should choose 
the redistributive policy instrument best tailored to redress that partic­
ular inequality. Thus, if income inequality is the problem, the income 
tax-and-transfer system probably should be used. If the differences 
have to do with employment opportunities, employment-discrimina­
tion law may be the best-tailored approach. If, however, women are 
better off on average than men in some respect (such as, apparently, 
longevity), then that inequity also should be addressed, and again 
204 See id. 
205 Id. at 102. 
206 Id. 
201 This is consistent with Sanchirico's view. That is, as we understand Sanchirico, if it 
were determined that women were less well off overall than men, then every redistributive 
policy tool should be used to redress that overall asymmetry, irrespective of comparative 
institutional advantage. Presumably, in Sanchirico's world, women would get discounts at 
the supermarkets, when purchasing domestic airline flights, and the like. See Sanchirico, 
Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1009, 1018-31; see also text accompanying notes 163-65. 
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through the institution with a comparative advantage for dealing with 
that sort of specific inequity. In a perfect world, then, where the redis­
tribution-minded policymaker responds to all inequalities using the 
best observers and redistributors with respect to each type of inequal­
ity, the result should be the same as in the perfect welfarist approach. 
If we determined, however, that women have lower auto-accident ex­
penses because they drive more safely for reasons that are choice­
based, our framework would allow gender to be taken into account in 
auto insurance ratemaking. 
Precisely the same sort of arguments could be made with respect to 
other risks that correlate with gender or age or race. If the differences 
in correlated risks are attributable purely to differences in genes, envi­
ronment, or social circumstances, insurers' use of those criteria in the 
underwriting process should be limited or forbidden. If, however, 
there is some element of choice that contributes to these differences in 
risks, the analysis, as usual, is considerably more complicated, and a 
judgment must be made as to how much of the difference must be 
explained by pure endowment for the nondiscrimination rule to kick 
in. The same was true, recall, with multi-factorial diseases and, for 
that matter, with income.208 Thus, the fact that younger people tend 
20s There are also separate, equally compelling reasons for forbidding discrimination by 
insurers on the basis of characteristics such as gender, race, or age. First, the policymaker 
may determine that insurers tend to get the correlation question wrong in the first place, 
that insurers wrongly assume (without adequate statistical foundation) that gender, race, 
or age correlates with relatively high expected costs. Although competition in the insur­
ance market would tend to punish such mistakes, such market corrections are certainly no 
guarantee that gender, race, and age stereotypes will play no role in the insurance under­
writing process. In addition, whatever the statistical insurance data reveal, it may well be 
that allowing insurers to discriminate on the basis of such characteristics perpetuates or 
reinforces invidious stereotypes and, on that basis alone, should be prohibited. Under cur­
rent law in this country, for example, the use of race in insurance underwriting is strictly 
forbidden in any circumstance, no matter what type of insurance. Kenneth S. Abraham, 
Distributing Risk 92-95 {1986); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to 
Be left to the Actuaries, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 349, 360-70 (1985). This uniform prohibition 
either could stem from a general consensus that the differences in insurable risks posed by 
blacks are entirely a function of endowment factors {primarily social and environmental 
circumstances stemming from hundreds of years of racism) or it could derive from a view 
that allowing insurers to discriminate on the basis of race, in and of itself, would contribute 
to invidious racial stereotypes. It is interesting that, by contrast, some states permit gender 
to be used for certain types of insurance underwriting. E.g., Telles v. Comm'r of Ins., 574 
N.E.2d 359, 362 (Mass. 1991) (holding that insurance commissioner lacks authority to pro­
hibit "fair discrimination" where it is undisputed that men have higher mortality rates); 
State Dep't of Ins. v. Ins. Services Office, 434 So.2d 908 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding 
that insurance department could not prohibit automobile insurers from discrimination 
based on gender so long as it is fair and not based solely on gender). In other states, 
insurers are required to gender-rate certain types of insurance. E.g., Cal. Ins. Code 
§ 790.03(f) {West 1993) (ordinary life insurance and individual annuities). Some states, 
however, prohibit gender rating. E.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 431 :lOC-207 (1993) (auto insur­
ance); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175E, § 4{d) (West 1998) (auto insurance); N.C. Gen. Stat 
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to have higher auto-accident expenses than older people may be 
something that society would want to consider an issue of choice; that 
is, it may be that young drivers simply choose to drive more recklessly. 
If that were so, a redistributive rule forbidding age-rating in auto in­
surance would be inappropriate. No redistribution would be called 
for in that context; and hence insurers should be allowed to charge 
higher auto insurance premiums to young men. 
4. Summary 
We argued in this Section that, in the field of insurance law (which 
encompasses among other things the rules governing private insur­
ance contracts) , it may be possible to identify important sources of 
inequality-for example, inequality of lifetime expected health 
costs-that can be traced entirely or primarily to differences in genetic 
makeup. Such sources of inequality present a plausible case for redis­
tribution from the better off to the less well off. Certainly, under our 
assumption of a policymaker interested in reducing brute luck-based 
inequality of well-being, redistribution on the basis of genetically-de­
termined diseases presents a fairly compelling case, and some redistri­
bution on the basis of unequal distribution of multi-factorial diseases 
also seems defensible-at least as defensible as income redistribution. 
More significant for the purposes of this Article, differential health 
status (especially but not only to the extent genetically-related) 
presents a situation in which a particular type of redistributive legal 
rule-a nondiscrimination rule-which produces intra-pool cross-sub­
sidization, may be the most efficient means of effecting such redistrib­
utive transfers.209 
This argument has implications not only for the laws governing pri­
vate insurance contracts but also for the design of social insurance 
programs. Take, for example, the Medicare program. As currently 
designed Medicare produces a large amount of cross-subsidization 
from the healthy to the sick. This occurs because Medicare coverage 
is funded either through payroll taxes, which obviously make no dis­
tinctions among individuals based on health risks, or through non-
§ 58-3-25 (West 2000) (auto insurance); see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 500.2027(c) 
(West 1998) (no gender rating unless based on sound actuarial principles); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 49-2-309 (2001) (no rating for insurance based solely on gender). 
209 In fact, one might argue that the amount of redistribution from those without disease 
genes to those with them via insurance cross-subsidization would be wholly inadequate. 
For example, a good case could be made that the endowment-based difference in well­
being between a person with the Huntington's gene and the person without it, all else 
equal, is greater than the difference in their actuarial insurance premiums. Therefore, us­
ing the insurance system as the tool of redistribution should be thought of as a starting 
point. 
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risk-adjusted premiums paid by participants.210 Either way, given that 
the payouts from the system come in the form of medical care (which 
obviously will be disproportionately valuable to the less healthy indi­
viduals, all else equal), the system results in a large transfer from the 
healthy to the sick. Thus, something like the nondiscrimination norm 
discussed above has long applied to publicly-provided social insur­
ance.21 1 We do not argue here that such a norm is necessarily a good 
idea in the social insurance context. Our point is only that, if the poli­
cymaker were to decide that redistribution based on unequal health 
status were desirable, applying a nondiscrimination norm to a social 
insurance arrangement would likely be more efficient than the pure 
tax-and-transfer alternative, which presumably would entail some ef­
fort to assess a tax on healthy individuals and to make a transfer to 
unhealthy individuals. The nondiscrimination norm applied to a social 
insurance arrangement eliminates the need for the calculation.212 
B. Redistribution Through Tort Law 
The field of tort law contains a couple of especially compelling cases 
for our comparative-advantage framework for choosing the optimal 
redistributive policy instrument. In the following examples, a good 
case can be made that the legal system is at least the better proxy 
observer and is perhaps the better redistributor as well. The first ex­
ample involves the sometimes controversial tort law doctrine that al­
lows damages in personal injury lawsuits for nonpecuniary or 
noneconomic harms-sometimes called "pain-and-suffering dam­
ages." In this Section we argue that pain-and-suffering damages in 
210 Medicare covers those aged 65 or older. It consists of "Part A" coverage for certain 
hospital-related expenses (such as inpatient care and skilled nursing home care) and "Part 
B" coverage for certain other medical expenses. Payroll taxes fund Part A and premiums 
paid by participants as well as general tax revenues fund Part B. Daniel Shaviro, Who 
Should Pay for Medicare? 21-39 (August 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Tax 
Law Review). 
21 1 Likewise, Social Security benefits-which include retirement benefits, some disabil­
ity insurance coverage, as well as life insurance-are funded entirely through payroll taxes, 
which, again, are not risk-adjusted. Thus, the system produces transfers from the short­
lived to the long-lived (insofar as Social Security provides benefits akin to private annui­
ties) and from the long-lived to the (families of the) short-lived (insofar as Social Security 
provides benefits akin to life insurance). 
212 A nondiscrimination norm rather than a tax-and-transfer approach also has draw­
backs. For example, it is more difficult under such an approach for the policymaker to 
keep track of the total amount spent on redistribution. This fact will be a concern, how­
ever, only if the policymaker wants to take some of those "extra" dollars in Medicare taxes 
or premiums paid by the healthy individuals and spend it on something other than redistri­
bution to the unhealthy-such as on tanks or roads. Imposing a tax on healthy individuals 
to fund a general public good (one whose benefits are enjoyed roughly equally by all tax­
payers) seems more than a bit odd. It would seem to make more sense instead to use a 
more general tax base such as income or consumption or wealth. 
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tort law can be defended entirely on distributive justice grounds, that 
is, as a transfer from the better off (the class of individuals who have 
not suffered a pain-and-suffering loss) to the class of individuals who 
have suffered from such a loss. 
The second example is drawn from the existing redistributive rules 
literature, and it presents the question of how tort law should take 
account of the differences in individuals' inherent abilities to avoid 
accidents. For example, the disabled and the aged may be inherently 
less able to avoid accidents. If so, that fact should be taken into ac­
count in tort law for redistributive purposes, and it is a type of redistri­
bution for which the tort system obviously seems better suited than 
the tax-and-transfer system. 
1 .  The Problem of Nonpecuniary Losses 
a.  Nonpecuniary Losses as a Question of Distributive Justice 
One source of inequality of well-being that society might care about 
is pain-and-suffering or nonpecuniary losses that arise out of personal 
injuries.21 3  The tort literature has provided two types of justifications 
for pain-and-suffering damages. The first involves the theory of cor­
rective justice, which holds that pain-and-suffering damages are "a 
means of punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those 
who had been wronged."214 The second type of justification is based 
in efficiency. More specifically, law and economics tort scholars have 
justified pain-and-suffering damages on deterrence grounds, arguing 
that optimal deterrence requires that potential injurers bear the full 
social costs of their conduct, including the nonpecuniary costs.215 In 
addition, some law and economics scholars have argued in favor of 
pain-and-suffering damages on insurance grounds.216 The insurance 
justification builds on the claim that rational, informed individuals in a 
hypothetical insurance contract would prefer to receive some or even 
213 We use the terms "pain-and-suffering damages" and "nonpecuniary losses" inter­
changeably to include all of the various categories of nonpecuniary costs recognized by 
courts and the torts literature. For example, those terms comprise "noneconomic losses," 
"loss of consortium," "hedonic damages," "emotional distress," "mental anguish," "psychic 
damages," and "emotional losses," to name the most conspicuous ones. 
214 Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345 (Cal. 1961). 
21s William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 186-
87 {1987); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 133-34 {1987); cf. Samuel 
A. Rea, Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35, 39 (1982) 
(nonpecuniary losses taken into account for calculation of optimal damages). 
216 It sometimes is said that the two efficiency goals of products liability law are deter­
rence (giving optimal incentives to avoid cost-justifiably preventable accidents) and insur­
ance (providing insurance to risk-averse parties for the unprevented accidents). See, e.g., 
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 {1990). 
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full coverage for their pain-and-suffering losses.217 Other law and ec­
onomics scholars, however, while not disputing the deterrence ratio­
nale, have argued that the insurance argument, taken alone, cuts the 
other way. That is, they argue that rational individuals would not con­
tract to receive such damages.218 Thus, the debate among legal econo­
mists regarding pain-and-suffering damages boils down to a sort of 
empirical question: Would rational individuals in fact demand pain­
and-suffering insurance? 
This Section provides a third justification for pain-and-suffering 
damages. Pain-and-suffering damages can be justified purely as a 
form of redistribution from the better off to the less well off. Based 
on the framework set forth in this Article, the redistribution-minded 
policymaker must answer two general questions with respect to non­
pecuniary-loss inequality. First, is the inequality between those who 
have suffered nonpecuniary losses and those who have not the type of 
inequality that society cares to redress? Second, if the answer is yes, 
what is the best redistributive policy instrument or combination of in­
struments for dealing with this inequality? 
Again, we do not have the answer to the first question. As in the 
case of genetic endowment or income, whether nonpecuniary-loss ine­
quality is something that matters to people is a question for voters or 
politicians or maybe philosophers to answer. It seems uncontroversial 
that there is a large disparity or inequality in well-being between those 
individuals who have sincerely experienced severe nonpecuniary 
losses as a result of a personal injury and those who have not suffered 
such losses. Nonpecuniary losses are just as real as pecuniary losses. 
That conclusion is supported by the fact that, from a deterrence per­
spective, the nonpecuniary costs of accidents are uncontroversially 
considered to be of equal status with pecuniary costs.219 Both types of 
costs must be internalized in order to achieve efficient deterrence. 
And at least in cases in which the injured plaintiff is not contributorily 
negligent, the existence of "inequality" with respect to the distribution 
211 E.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: 
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1914-17 (1995) (conclud­
ing that consumers are likely to demand some level of pain-and-suffering insurance and 
therefore that tort law should provide some level of pain-and-suffering damages); Patricia 
M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 517, 533 (1984) (arguing that serious pain-and-suffering injuries should be 
awarded on the basis of predetermined schedules). 
21s E.g., John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damages Payments for 
Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. Legal Stud. 371 ,  373, 402-03 (1992); Robert Cooter, Towards a 
Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 Va. L. Rev. 383, 392-94 (1989); George L. Priest, 
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1546-47, 1553 
(1987). 
21 9 See Landes & Posner, note 215, at 186. 
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of nonpecuniary losses seems clearly unjust. But whether it is the sort 
of distributive injustice that requires a remedy is a question for the 
policymaker. 220 
b. The Better-Observer/Better-Redistributor Questions 
As to the comparative-institutional-advantage question, the key is­
sue is the problem of observability. For nonpecuniary losses to be 
considered real and hence a legitimate justification for compulsory re­
distribution, there needs to be some way of verifying that claims of 
nonpecuniary loss are sincere, not made up or exaggerated. Indeed, it 
is the task of verifying and measuring claims of nonpecuniary losses 
that distinguishes the redistributive role the tax-and-transfer system 
might play and the redistributive role the legal system (particularly, 
the tort system) might play. 
Again, if the tax-and-transfer system is to play a major role in redis­
tributing with respect to pain-and-suffering losses, policymakers 
would need to develop fairly precise and reliable proxies for nonpecu­
niary well-being that are easily observable, by which we mean difficult 
to falsify or exaggerate. If such proxies can be identified, the tax-and­
transfer system offers the advantage of comprehensiveness-in the 
sense of taking into account the nonpecuniary well-being of everyone 
in society and not just those who happen to be affected by the tort 
system. If, however, the only plausible way of identifying, verifying, 
and measuring relative nonpecuniary well-being is to do a case-by­
case factual analysis, the legal system naturally has a comparative ad­
vantage, although the scope of redistribution through the tort system 
(that is, the number of individuals in society who would be affected by 
this sort of redistribution) would be smaller.221 
220 One possible way to answer this question would be to observe the market and see 
whether there is a demand for pain-and-suffering damages. We reject this option below. 
See text accompanying notes 224-36. 
221 As with all redistribution through the tort system, some will argue that such redistri­
bution, when compared with redistribution through the tax-and-transfer system, is haphaz­
ard in the sense of being underinclusive. Whereas the tort system applies only to those 
individuals who happen to be involved in accidents for which some third party can be held 
legally liable, the tax-and-transfer system can apply to everyone who suffers a similar non­
pecuniary loss, though not caused by someone else's tortuous conduct. Our response to 
this sort of argument is simple: If individuals came equipped with reliable hectometers that 
the policymaker could use to make precise nonpecuniary well-being comparisons among 
individuals, then the more comprehensive tax-and-transfer approach would be all that we 
need. Such hedometers do not exist, however. All we have are proxies for the underlying 
psychological state of well-being. And, as argued in the text, if there are easily observable 
and reliable proxies that reveal this underlying state, the tax-and-transfer system can do a 
good job of redistributing with respect to those proxies. But if we want to redistribute in a 
more targeted, precise way, the legal system is superior. Just as the tax system is designed 
to do mass redistribution with respect to easily observable proxies for well-being, the legal 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
2003] REDISTRIBUTING OPTIMALLY 231 
What redistributive role might the legal system play here? The as­
tute reader at this point should be able to predict where the analysis 
will go: If the tax-and-transfer system were limited to redistributing 
with respect to easily observable and measurable proxies for nonpecu­
niary well-being, the legal system-especially the tort system-could 
be used to perform a more modest though more precise redistributive 
function. The courts in a personal-injury tort suit could consider evi­
dence of various sorts, including direct testimony from the plaintiff, 
regarding the sincerity and severity of the plaintiff's pain-and-suffer­
ing losses. Then the jury can make a determination as to whether, in 
this particular case, the individual has experienced nonpecuniary 
losses that should be compensated and can make a plausible estimate 
of how large those losses are. 
This is what courts and juries have done in tort cases for years, 
though presumably for deterrence and corrective justice reasons 
rather than for distributive justice reasons. Considering these inde­
pendent (nondistributive justice) rationales for pain-and-suffering 
damages in tort law, one reasonably might ask what is the point of 
offering an alternative distributive justice rationale. 
For one thing, even if the other rationales for pain-and-suffering 
damages were found to be unpersuasive, the distributive justice argu­
ment would apply. For example, even if it were shown that imposing 
nonpecuniary losses on tortfeasors did not have the effect of optimiz­
ing potential injurers' ex ante incentives to avoid accidents (perhaps 
because of some cognitive bias on the part of potential injurers), re­
quiring tortfeasors to pay such damages would still increase overall 
social welfare because of the distributive justice benefits of shifting 
resources from the nonpecuniarily better off to the nonpecuniarily less 
well off. Moreover, even if the other rationales for pain-and-suffering 
tort damages are considered persuasive, introducing an independent 
distributive justice rationale may make a difference. 
Pain-and-suffering damages have been under assault for a number 
of years. Many scholars and policymakers have called for abolishing 
or severely curtailing such damages.222 A number of states have 
passed laws doing just that.223 Our point is that the distributional ad­
vantage of pain-and-suffering damages-shifting resources from the 
system was made (in part) to do less comprehensive but more precise redistribution with 
respect to less easily observed characteristics. 
222 E.g., Calfee & Rubin, note 218, at 371 ; Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553, 1587-90; 
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 Yale 
L.J. 353, 362-67 (1988). 
223 For a list of states that have limited the scope or magnitude of pain-and-suffering 
damages, see Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 Tex L. Rev. 1567, 1567-68 nn.1-2 {1997). 
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better off to the less well off-provides an additional justification (an­
other weight in the balance) in favor of continuing to include pain­
and-suffering damages as a part of standard tort recovery, or, in some 
states, reversing the trend toward capping or eliminating pain-and-suf­
fering damages. This conclusion does not mean, however, that a redis­
tribution-minded policymaker should not place limits on pain-and­
suffering damages. It may turn out that the observability problem is 
so acute that such limits are necessary, both for deterrence and distri­
butional reasons. Such a decision, however, should take into account 
not only the deterrence but also the distributional benefits of a case­
by-case subjective pain-and-suffering analysis. 
c. The Lack-of-Consumer-Demand Objection 
One objection to our distributive-justice defense of pain-and-suffer­
ing damages involves the claim, made by Ronald Dworkin, that ra­
tional and informed individuals who are placed in some hypothetical 
ex ante bargain (akin to a Rawlsian "original position") would not 
want to purchase insurance for nonpecuniary losses.224 In a similar 
vein some law and economics scholars have gone so far as to claim 
that, if we look at the real world insurance market, we learn that indi­
vidual consumers in fact do not "demand" insurance for nonpecuniary 
losses.225 This empirical claim is important because, if one adopts a 
"consumer sovereignty" notion of what constitutes society's prefer­
ences with respect to nonpecuniary losses, the absence of market-pro­
vided insurance for such losses suggests consumers do not value such 
insurance. Therefore, the argument goes, society should not compel 
the purchase of nonpecuniary-loss insurance in the form of pain-and­
suffering tort damages.226 
Our first response to this argument is simple: It strikes us as inap­
propriate to look to market evidence of existing consumer demand as 
a way of making judgments about redistributive policy. This is be­
cause all existing markets (including insurance markets) allocate re­
sources according to individuals' willingness to pay. And individuals' 
224 The original position and the veil of ignorance are terms that refer to a hypothetical 
state of the world in which people make basic decisions about the structure of society 
without knowing their own exact position in the world. These terms most frequently are 
associated with Rawls, note 9, at 17-22, although it was the economics Nobel Laureate 
John Harsanyi who first suggested something like the original position as a tool for making 
just societal decisions. John C. Harsanyi, Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium 
in Games and Social Situations 48-51 (1977). Dworkin also has used a version of this tool 
to construct a theory of justice. Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 18, at 344. 
225 Cooter, note 218, at 392-94; Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553; Schwartz, note 222, at 
362-67. 
226 Priest, note 218, at 1546-47, 1553; Schwartz, note 222, at 362-67. 
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willingness to pay obviously is a function of their wealth. Therefore, 
markets necessarily systematically discriminate against the poor. In­
deed, that fact is what creates the need for a redistributive policy in 
the first place. 227 
This insight, of course, was not lost on Dworkin. His insurance­
based theory of justice includes an assumption that, before asking the 
hypothetical insurance question, all individuals are given the same be­
ginning material endowment.228 Thus, Dworkin too recognizes that 
absent this initial egalitarian position, market outcomes cannot be 
used to set distributional policy. 
But even if markets are seen as good indicators of a just allocation 
of resources, there are a number of other responses to the lack-of­
consumer-demand objection that have been offered in the torts and 
insurance literatures. First, some argue that in fact there are numer­
ous examples of real world insurance for nonpecuniary losses, sug­
gesting that there is indeed some "consumer demand" for such 
insurance.229 Second, others point out that in areas where we do not 
see a demand for pain-and-suffering insurance it is because there are 
market impediments to consumers' demand. For example, consider 
the problem of imperfectly informed consumers.230 Some have ar­
gued that this problem is especially troublesome with respect to non­
pecuniary losses inasmuch as "there are an infinite variety of accidents 
that might occur, and each could lead to an infinite variety of nonpe­
cuniary losses requiring an infinite variety of compensation levels."231 
In addition, one could argue that noninjured consumers lack the infor­
mation and the mental capability to perceive the post-injury state of 
the world and make correct (especially non pecuniary) insurance 
decisions. 232 
Third, one also can argue that there are "supply-side" rather than 
"demand-side" impediments to a market for nonpecuniary-loss insur­
ance. That is, the lack of certain types of nonpecuniary-loss insurance 
221 This is true in our second-best real world in which poor individuals face substantial 
liquidity constraints and, therefore, cannot take out loans at competitive interest rates to 
express their preferences through purchasing decisions. 
228 Dworkin, Equality of Resources, note 18, at 289. 
229 For example, Croley and Hanson argue that accident insurance (which provides.cov­
erage for death, dismemberment, and various other injuries) constitutes a form of pure 
pain-and-suffering insurance, given that all of the pecuniary elements of those losses tend 
already to be covered under other types of policies, such as life insurance and health insur­
ance policies. Croley & Hanson, note 217, at 1885-92. 
230 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Commercial Transactions 207 (2d ed. 1991) 
("Consumers are relatively uninformed about the probability of defects and their potential 
costs."). 
231 Croley & Hanson, note 217, at 1846. 
232 Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency and the Kingdom of the Ill: A 
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 Va. L. Rev. 91, 1 1 1-16 (1993). 
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can be explained as the result of various supply-side market failures. 
For example, consider the problP,m of asymmetric information, which 
can cause both ex ante and ex post moral hazard problems. That pain 
and suffering is difficult to observe and verify, of course, is exactly 
what makes it noncontractible.233 Asymmetric information also leads 
to adverse selection. Individuals who happen to know that they are 
more likely than average to suffer nonpecuniary losses would find in­
surance for such losses a relatively good deal, forcing premiums up­
ward as such high-risk individuals adversely select into the insurance 
pools. Unfortunately, nonpecuniary adverse selection would be 
harder for insurers to combat through risk classification than some 
other types of adverse selection, precisely because nonpecuniary 
losses are so difficult (perhaps impossible) to observe ex ante. 
In sum, for many of the same reasons that the tax-and-transfer sys­
tem cannot respond to individualized pain-and-suffering claims, the 
private insurance market has difficulty offering insurance coverage for 
such claims.234 A conventional conclusion in the law and economics 
literature is that where there are market failures there is a need for 
government intervention.235 This conclusion about the private insur­
ance market failures is important to our argument, because it provides 
a response to those who might argue that the best instrument for deal­
ing with nonpecuniary losses is not the legal system or the tax-and­
transfer system but the first-party insurance system.236 In fact, either 
233 One way to overcome the impediments caused by the ex post moral hazard problem 
is to market insurance coverage with scheduled coverage amounts. 
234 In some instances, however, when the moral hazard and adverse selection impedi­
ments are diminished, the market does seem to be able to provide pain-and-suffering cov­
erage, again suggesting a certain level of consumer demand for such insurance. For 
example, Croley and Hanson argue that flight insurance is a form of pain-and-suffering 
insurance (because it is redundant of existing life insurance policies) that the market can 
offer because the moral hazard and adverse selection problems are minimal. Croley & 
Hanson, note 217, at 1892-93. 
235 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shaven, Fairness II, note 1, at 15-38. 
236 To this point in our argument, we have talked about the legal system and the tax-and­
transfer system as the only available policy instruments for achieving distributive justice 
goals. Where, however, the source of inequality among individuals is some sudden, ran­
dom event that occurs after birth (such as an accidental injury or an unexpected illness), 
welfarists scholars often will argue that no compulsory government redistribution is called 
for. Rather, such inequalities are dealt with best through the institution of insurance, 
where individuals decide for themselves whether, in effect, to use the insurance mechanism 
to redistribute from their noninjured or healthy selves to their injured or sick selves. Thus, 
for accidental losses, Dworkin's insurance analogy ceases to be an analogy; it is the real 
thing. And whether the government has any role to play here will be analyzed not in terms 
of distributive justice but in terms of which institution or set of institutions, public and 
private, provides the optimal form of insurance for a given type of risk. Thus, one way of 
understanding our distributive justice rationale for pain-and-suffering damages is as a 
reconceptualization of the efficient-insurance rationale. That is, we argue that the tort 
system (working together with liability insurance and first-party insurance system) is the 
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the tax-and-transfer system or the private insurance market might be 
able to deal with nonpecuniary losses in circumstances in which there 
is an easily observable proxy for nonpecuniary well-being that is relia­
ble and difficult to exaggerate or falsify. An example of such a proxy 
might be blindness or some other obvious handicap. If, however, the 
policymaker decides in addition that some individualized case-by-case 
redistribution with respect to nonpecuniary well-being is also desira­
ble, the legal system or something very much like it would seem to be 
the only available instrument. 
2. The Probl,em of the "Accident Prone" 
In their debate over the proper role of redistributive legal rules, 
Sanchirico, as well as Kaplow and Shavell, discuss the example of the 
"accident prone," those individuals who, as the result of natural or 
innate inability, are especially incapable of avoiding harm-causing ac­
cidents. Sanchirico has argued that accident proneness is, in effect, 
another measure of ability to pay, which in turn is a proxy for well­
being and thus should be taken into account in any redistributive pol­
icy.237 Kaplow and Shavell implicitly agree, although they question 
the use of the proxy when it would call for redistribution from the 
poor non-accident prone to the rich accident prone.238 We return to 
that debate shortly. For now, we assume that large inequalities with 
respect to accident proneness are a matter of redistributive concern. 
In the abstract the accident prone may not seem to be a very sympa­
thetic lot. Who can get excited about a redistributive policy that seeks 
to benefit the klutzes of the world, even if their klutziness is beyond 
their control? Fair enough. Society may decide that accident prone­
ness should fall into that large category of sources of low well-being 
(such as being physically ugly or lacking a winning personality) that do 
not warrant a redistributive transfer. That conclusion, however, is not 
forgone. The accident prone, at least some accident prone, may be 
considered worthy of some sort of redistributive transfer. For exam­
ple, consider individuals who are blind or wheelchair-bound or other­
wise disabled or who are elderly and thus whose physical reflexes have 
slowed with age. All of such individuals arguably might be substan­
tially more accident prone, all else equal, than is the norm. Observe 
that for this reason, for the purposes of this Article, one can treat the 
blindness, disability, and the like, as an independent source for egali-
optimal form of insurance for certain types of pain-and-suffering damages, namely, those 
that are difficult to observe and that require a detailed factual inquiry of the sort that 
courts have a comparative advantage in doing. 
237 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1060-64. 
238 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 828-29. 
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tarian concern, and not necessarily as a proxy for accident proneness 
or low welfare. 
Granting this premise, the question then becomes how should soci­
ety go about redistributing in favor of the accident prone. Again, we 
ask the same questions as before: Which system is the better observer 
with respect to accident proneness and which the better redis­
tributors? This is an example of a source of inequality with respect to 
which the legal system almost certainly has a comparative advantage 
over the tax system. This comparative advantage can be seen in two 
different approaches to redistributing from the less accident prone to 
the more accident prone. 
a. The Across-the-Board Damage Adjustment 
One approach, suggested by Sanchirico, would be to make an 
across-the-board adjustment to the damages paid by tort defendants 
to tort plaintiffs.239 If the tort damage adjustment were used to redis­
tribute solely with respect to accident proneness, presumably the ad­
justment would be downward, below the efficient level of damages, 
that is, below the level necessary to provide optimal deterrence.240 
Such an adjustment would tend to redistribute in favor of the acci­
dent-prone as a class, because accident-prone individuals are, by defi­
nition, inherently more likely than the average person to be injurers in 
an accident that gives rise to a tort claim and thus are more likely to 
benefit from the downward adjustment. The benefit of this approach 
is that, by using the existing tort system and by making an across-the­
board adjustment to damages, no special expense would have to be 
incurred to identify who is accident-prone and who is not. A simple 
downward adjustment in tort damages below the efficient level auto­
matically would redistribute to the accident prone.241 
As Sanchirico points out, such a redistributive rule would not be 
perfect. Its imperfections, however, are no different in kind or degree 
from the imperfections that can be found with any redistributive pol­
icy instrument, including the income tax. For example, determining 
precisely how much of an across-the-board, accident-proneness ad­
justment should be made to tort damages would not be easy. It would 
require an analysis of how much worse off than the average person 
239 Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10, passim. 
240 Id. at 804. As discussed more fully below, Sanchirico (wrongly, in our opinion) 
seems to back off from the view that tort damages should be adjusted to alleviate accident­
proneness inequality. Rather, he takes the position that, if income turns out in some sense 
to be the "dominant" measure of well-being, then tort damages should be income-adjusted 
rather than accident proneness-adjusted. 
241 Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 828-29. 
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the accident-prone person tends to be. But that sort of analysis is no 
different from the sort of analysis necessary to determine how much 
income redistribution would be appropriate.242 
One also might argue that Sanchirico's accident-proneness adjust­
ment would involve a large degree of imprecision. Some of those who 
would benefit from the adjustment would not be accident-prone but 
would have caused the accident and become tort defendants because 
of their own choices, such as the choice not to invest in accident avoid­
ance. But again, there is always this sort of imprecision when using 
any proxy for well-being. Although the idealized version of welfarist 
redistribution would be entirely endowment-sensitive and choice-in­
sensitive, that ideal is impossible whenever we redistribute on the ba­
sis of proxies for well-being (which is always).243 
b. The Subjective Due Care Standard 
There is a second approach to redistributing with respect to acci­
dent proneness through the legal system that in theory would not in­
volve a regulated-activity distortion; indeed it would not involve any 
distortion. This alternative, however, has a somewhat narrower appli­
cation than does the across-the-board proposal. It would apply only 
to tort settings in which negligence is the efficient liability rule. To see 
this alternative, recall that the tort system, from an economic perspec­
tive, exists primarily to serve the function of minimizing the costs of 
accidents, including the costs of avoiding accidents.244 According to 
the standard economic analysis of liability rules, for certain classes of 
cases the optimal liability rule is a negligence rule, a rule that holds 
the injurer liable only if she failed to take "due care" in avoiding the 
accident.245 If the courts define the negligence standard efficiently 
and apply it properly, it will give potential injurers the incentive to 
invest efficiently in accident avoidance-that is, it will give them an 
242 Sanchirico, Taxes, note 10, at 808-10. 
243 That is certainly true with respect to income redistribution. Some high income indi­
viduals are rich primarily because of their superior natural endowment or because of luck 
more generally (for example, inheritance); others are rich primarily (or at least to a greater 
degree) because of their choices to work hard and apply their relatively modest gifts. Nev­
ertheless, we do not hesitate to use income as a redistributive proxy for well-being. 
244 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 26-31 (1970). 
245 The negligence rule is capable of optimizing the potential victim's care and activity 
levels and the potential injurer's care level, whereas a strict liability rule is capable of opti­
mizing the injurer's care level and activity level and the victim's care level. Thus, except in 
certain cases, neither rule can optimize the activity levels of both parties. The standard 
conclusion is that the choice between a negligence and a strict liability rule, from an eco­
nomic perspective, should turn on which activity level is more important to regulate. E.g., 
Shavell, note 215, at 29. A negligence standard will be optimal when the victim's activity 
level is the most important. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review 
238 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56: 
incentive to invest in care up to the point at which the next dollar 
invested in care equals the gains in accident cost reduction. 
One important part of defining the efficient negligence standard is 
the potential injurer's "cost of taking care," that is, what it costs a 
potential injurer to take the care-level steps necessary to avoid a par­
ticular type of accident.246 As it turns out, if a particular individual's 
cost of taking care is lower than average, the optimal level of care for 
that person would be higher than for others, because it is efficient (it 
saves resources) to ask more from that person in the way of invest­
ments in care. Likewise, if a particular individual has a higher-than­
average cost of taking care, the optimal care-level standard would be 
lower. Hence, "it may be desirable for a young, able-bodied [low­
cost-of-care] person to clear a sidewalk of ice, but undesirable for an 
elderly [high-cost-of-care] individual to do so."247 
Ideally, therefore, from a deterrence perspective, if it costs a court 
nothing to gather information concerning each individual's particular 
costs of care, the negligence standard would be finely tuned in each 
case to fit the individual circumstance of each tort defendant.248 Thus, 
as Shavell illustrates, " [i]f courts can distinguish the young and able­
bodied person who can readily clear a sidewalk of ice from the elderly 
person who cannot, the first but not the second should be found negli­
gent for failing to clear ice. "249 This subjectively defined due care 
standard is understood to be desirable on efficiency grounds. 
This concept of "cost of care" is similar to what the redistributive­
rules literature means by accident proneness. Both concepts apply to 
something like an individual's ability to avoid accidents. Therefore, it 
can be shown that the ideally efficient negligence regime also would 
provide an ideally targeted redistributive mechanism. Under the sub­
jective due care regime, more is expected from high-ability people 
than from average- or low-ability people. In addition, there is no 
double-distortion problem: There is no work-leisure distortion, be­
cause the redistribution is not income-based; that is, reducing work 
effort has no effect on one's likelihood of being held liable in tort. 
And there is no regulated-activity distortion. To the contrary, as the 
example from Shavell made clear, this type of subjective care-level 
standard enhances rather than detracts from efficiency. Indeed, it is 
essential to achieving optimal care levels under a negligence regime. 
246 Shavell, note 215, at 73 ("The socially optimal level of care of a party will generally 
depend on his cost of taking care . . . .  "). 
247 Id. at 74. 
248 Landes & Posner, note 215, at 123 ("If the costs to the courts of informing them­
selves about an individual's ability to avoid accidents were zero, they would set a different 
due care level for each individual in every accident case."). 
249 Shavell, note 215, at 74. 
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Where might such a rule come into play? Consider the run-of-the­
mill negligence case, for example, the residential slip-and-fall case of 
Shavell's hypothetical. Should the elderly or disabled be held to the 
same level of care in maintaining the safety of their sidewalks, or 
other aspects of their homes, as other individuals? Or should the eld­
erly or disabled individual who attempts to assist someone who is 
drowning or choking be held to the same standard as those who are 
younger or, in a relevant respect, more able to assist in such situa­
tions? From an efficiency perspective (according to the standard anal­
ysis), a rule that imposed such a burden on the less able (or more 
accident-prone) would be inefficient, inasmuch as, on the margin, it 
would induce individuals to invest super-optimally in accident avoid­
ance-perhaps shoveling snow to the point of inducing a heart attack 
or perhaps discouraging them from ever even attempting the Good 
Samaritan role. What is more, there are distributive justice reasons 
for the same conclusion: Imposing the same duty of accident preven­
tion on all individuals irrespective of their innate ability to avoid acci­
dents is arguably inconsistent with widely shared notions of 
distributive justice. It would be like a head tax, without the lump sum 
efficiency benefits. 
It is interesting that existing tort law in this country already seems 
to be responding to this observation. As all first-year law students 
learn, according to the general rule in most jurisdictions, tort defend­
ants are held to the standard of an average man or woman placed in 
the particular accident situation.250 Such a rule invovles relatively lit­
tle redistribution. There are, however, a number of exceptions. For 
example, the care-level burden placed on the blind, the lame, or the 
infirm is sometimes less than on the average person;251 whereas rela­
tively more sometimes is expected of those with special strength, size, 
knowledge, or skill. In cases involving children, courts typically take 
into account the level of intelligence, strength, and maturity of a rea­
sonable child.252 Likewise, historically there have been tort cases in 
which old age was taken into account as well.253 
250 E.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (2002). 
251 E.g., Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1970) (mental delusions); 
Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen, 338 P.2d 743 (Wash. 1959) (blindness). 
252 E.g., Restatement (Second} of Torts § 283(a) (2002). 
253 E.p., Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 69 N.W. 900 (Minn. 1897); Roberts v. Ring, 
173 N.W. 437 (Minn. 1919}; Daniels v. Evans, 224 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1966). In general, how­
ever, if a high-cost-of-care (accident-prone) person is engaged in certain extremely risky 
activities, such as driving a speedboat, no discount is given. The general due care standard 
applies in such cases. See, e.g., Dellivo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961). Apply­
ing the general reasonable person standard to accident-prone individuals in such cases is 
akin to applying strict liability, which makes sense because these are cases in which strict 
liability-and its optimizing effects on injurer activity levels-is called for. 
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In addition to using such rough proxies for accident proneness 
(which is a type of class-based redistributive rule), the redistribution­
minded policymaker might decide to take the next step. That is, if it 
turns out that society were really serious about redressing accident­
proneness inequality per se (and were willing to spend money to do 
it) , courts hearing negligence cases in each case could attempt a more 
thorough and subjective analysis of the accident proneness of the par­
ticular tort defendant. 
Such an individualized accident-proneness analysis (a type of case­
specific redistributive rule) would entail additional administrative 
costs, as commentators have recognized when discussing the efficiency 
(deterrence) benefits of such an analysis.254 And at some point, of 
course, the costs of further precision would outweigh the benefits. In 
fact, some of the same legal economists who have described the deter­
rence benefits of a subjective negligence standard have concluded that 
a truly subjective analysis would not be cost effective.255 Even if the 
costs of additional precision would at some point exceed the benefits, 
it certainly is not clear where that point is or whether we are anywhere 
near that point now. Moreover, once the distributional benefits of a 
rule are taken into account, it may be that the question of the opti­
mally subjective reasonable person standard should be revisited. 
In sum, our argument is this: The additional precision that would 
come from an individualized subjective negligence analysis not only 
would produce efficiency gains (as traditional economic analysis has 
long recognized) but also would produce distributional gains that pre­
viously have not been recognized.256 A similar sort of argument ap-
254 E.g., Landes & Posner, note 215, at 123-31. 
255 Id. at 124. 
256 A potential critique of this suggestion takes the following form: What about activity 
levels? Requiring disabled or elderly potential injurers only to act as a reasonable disabled 
or elderly person would act (taking their higher costs of care into account) would have the 
effect of inducing such high-cost-of-care individuals to engage in excessive levels of acci­
dent-causing behaviors. The most extreme example involves the blind driver. Should a 
blind person be held only to the driving standards of a reasonable blind driver? This is, of 
course, absurd. But recall the premise of this analysis: It applies only in situations in which 
the negligence standard is the appropriate liability rule, that is, when the injurers' activity 
levels are not the key deterrence variable. Obviously, the key deterrence variable for blind 
drivers is the injurer's activity level: Blind people, at least under current automotive tech­
nology, should not be driving at all. Indeed, it is illegal for them to drive. (Recall the eye 
test from when you last renewed your license.) 
But take a less extreme example, which presents a harder case: elderly drivers. The 
elderly can get a driver's license. Although some might argue that this is a bad idea, it is 
still the law, even though people above a certain age almost certainly have slower reflexes, 
poorer vision and, in extreme cases, somewhat impaired judgment. Nevertheless, society 
has determined that the sort of personal mobility that accompanies the right to drive is so 
important that elderly individuals must not be systematically deprived of it. Given that 
background rule, what should the due care standard be for elderly drivers? Arguably, it 
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plies to efforts to fine tune the progressivity of the income tax. That 
is, it is well known that, if, in an effort to increase the distributional 
"fairness" of the income tax, we adopt an system that has a steeply 
progressive rate structure consisting of numerous tax brackets on dif­
ferent levels of income, we also will increase the administrative costs 
of complying with and enforcing the tax laws. We also increase the 
precision with which we can achieve our distributional goal of allocat­
ing tax liability on the basis of ability to pay. Thus, there is a tradeoff 
between accuracy and administrative cost. Where the line is drawn 
depends in part on how much accuracy means to us, that is, how much 
value accuracy receives in the social welfare function. The same goes 
for the question of redistributive legal rules: How much we are willing 
to pay (in the form of lost efficiency or greater administrative costs) to 
fine tune a redistributive rule depends on, among other things, how 
much we care about the type of inequality in question. 
How would the presence of insurance affect the application of these 
two tort-based efforts to achieve distributional fairness with respect to 
accident proneness? Under Sanchirico's across-the-board damage ad­
justment, the insurance system would facilitate the redistributive func­
tion, assuming insurance companies can do a reasonably good job of 
risk-adjusting their premiums. Assume for the moment that everyone 
has full liability insurance, and assume that insurance premiums are 
perfectly risk-adjusted so that each individual's insurance premiums 
always represent that person's expected losses. In that scenario the 
adoption of an across-the-board downward adjustment in tort dam­
ages, compared with a world without such a rule, would tend to re­
duce the liability insurance premiums of those who present a 
relatively high risk of causing an accident (a class in which the acci­
dent prone would be overrepresented) and would leave unchanged 
the premiums of the non-accident prone. 
should be a reasonable elderly driver standard, for the reasons already discussed. Such a 
rule would be efficient, from a care-level perspective, and it would be distributively just 
(again, if we wish to cause a transfer from the less accident prone to the more accident 
prone). The point is that, with respect to some types of activities and potential injurers, the 
activity-level question may be dealt with best through licensing or other types of direct 
regulation, leaving the care-level regulation (and redistribution) to the tort law. 
All of this is not to say that it would be inconsistent with distributive justice for society, 
in some situations, to impose activity-level limits on various classes of individuals. For 
example, one could imagine a regime in which some classes of individuals were allowed to 
drive only in emergency situations, that is, situations in which society has determined that 
the benefits exceed the costs. Even then, the question about defining the appropriate due 
care standard would arise: With respect to the specific situations in which the activity itself 
is deemed to be cost-justified, should the potential injurer be held to a subjective or objec­
tive standard? Excessive administrative costs may suggest the latter, but efficient deter­
rence and distributive justice would cut in favor of the former. 
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Thus, the accident prone, relative to the non-accident prone, would 
be made better off. To the extent insurance premiums are not risk­
adjusted at all, however, the desirable redistributive effect of the ad­
justment-from the non-accident prone to the accident prone-would 
be reduced. Everyone's liability insurance premiums would drop, re­
gardless of whether they were accident prone or not. Simultaneously, 
everyone's first-party insurance premiums would increase by roughly 
the same amount as a result of the across-the-board downward adjust­
ment in tort damages to make up for the reduction in the amount that 
first-party insurers could expect to get in subrogation suits against 
tortfeasors. 257 
In the real world then, assuming the existence of less-than-full and 
imperfectly-adjusting liability and first-party insurance, the redistribu­
tive consequences of an across-the-board downward adjustment in 
tort damages would depend on who tends to have which type of insur­
ance and the relative degree of risk adjustment one sees in various 
types of liability and first-party insurance. 
c. Coordinating the Tort System With the Tax System 
We return now to the comparative institutional advantage question: 
Could the tax-and-transfer system redistribute with respect to acci­
dent proneness more efficiently than the tort system? If there are reli­
able measures of accident proneness that are also easily observable, 
the tax-and-transfer system may have an important redistributive role 
to play. For example, if it could be shown that disabled individuals or 
elderly individuals are more accident-prone (that is, have higher costs 
of care) than the average person, a transfer might be made directly to 
the disabled and the elderly, or they might be given a special tax de­
duction or credit, to redress this inequality.258 
'257 This conclusion assumes that the subrogation system works well, in the sense that 
first-party insurers generally are able to recover all of their payouts to insureds that are 
caused by the tortious conduct of third parties and that they (the first-party insurers) are 
able to predict these recoveries in advance in the calculation of the premiums they charge. 
zss Kaplow and Shaven suggest something along these lines: 
The importance of unobservability of klutziness is reinforced by considering a 
different case: people who are blind. Because the blind can be identified, it is 
possible to assist them directly, by lowering their income taxes or otherwise. 
Only if we could not tell who was blind would we need to resort to indirect 
(less well targeted and less efficient) means of assisting them, such as adjusting 
legal rules. 
Kaplow & Shaven, Legal Rules, note 10, at 829 n.18. Thus, Kaplow and Shaven argue that, 
where the relevant nonincome proxy for well-being is difficult to observe, we may want to 
use redistributive legal rules because the legal system is the better proxy observer, even 
though some inefficiency may result. Our argument in this Section is that, at least in some 
cases, the legal system can be used to redistribute with respect to nonincome proxies for 
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Such an approach presumably would not produce a regulated-activ­
ity distortion, as tort rules could be set solely to achieve efficiency.259 
The tax-and-transfer approach, however, would entail some loss of 
precision at least as compared to the individualized subjective reason­
able person standard, depending on how accurate and targeted the 
accident-proneness proxies turn out to be. If, in contrast, there are no 
reliable measures of accident proneness that are also easily observa­
ble, tort law should play the major distributive role.260 
d. The Existing Debate Over Accident Proneness: Highlighting Our 
Independence Assumption 
Redistributing with respect to accident proneness has become a 
central point of contention in the debate between Sanchirico, on the 
one hand, and Kaplow and Shavell, on the other. Both Kaplow and 
Shavell and Sanchirico are working from within the traditional 
welfarist framework. Thus, for them, accident proneness is relevant­
not as a measure of an independent source of inequality-but as a 
proxy for well-being, which, for the welfarist, is the one, true target of 
redistributive (or any) policymaking. They disagree, however, as to 
how the welfarist redistributor should approach accident proneness. 
On the one hand, Sanchirico regards accident proneness as a sort of 
nonincome measure of individual ability to pay.261 Under Sanchirico's 
conception of accident proneness, then, those individuals who have 
the innate characteristics that make them relatively more "able" to 
produce income also will likely have characteristics that make them 
more able to avoid accidents. Hence, Sanchirico initially proposed the 
across-the-board downward adjustment in tort damages.262 
Whether accident proneness is a good proxy for ability to produce 
income, however, is an open question. Obviously, some of the traits 
that facilitate income generation also will facilitate some level of acci­
dent avoidance, but there will be differences as well. For example, it 
might well be that those with the greatest ability to generate income, 
because they have mental capacities that are most highly valued in the 
marketplace, would not be those with the greatest ability to avoid ac-
well-being in ways that do not necessarily produce inefficiency but may actually enhance 
efficiency. 
259 Moreover, such an approach arguably would be less haphazard than the tort-based 
alternatives; that is, it could apply to all accident-prone individuals and not just to those 
who happen to be involved in tort suits. 
260 See Subsection IV.B.l .b. 
261 See note 237 and accompanying text. 
262 See discussion in Subsection IV.B.2.a. 
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cidents, which arguably might require physical skills and reflexes that 
are less well remunerated in the rriarket.263 
This possibility leads to Kaplow and Shavell's main criticism of 
Sanchirico's accident-proneness analysis: They argue that redistrib­
uting from the less accident prone to the more accident prone can just 
as likely involve redistribution from the income poor to the income 
rich as the reverse.264 The result depends on whether accident prone­
ness correlates positively or negatively with income, a question that 
Kaplow and Shavell admit can be answered only with additional em­
pirical research. 
Nevertheless, building on Sanchirico's example of a hypothetical 
world involving rich (though accident-prone) yacht owners and poor 
(though non-accident-prone) boat owners, Kaplow and Shavell sug­
gest a plausible story in which accident proneness (or, to use their 
term, "klutziness") might correlate positively with ability to earn. In 
that case, Sanchirico's accident proneness-based redistributive rule 
would involve lowering tort damages paid by the income-rich yacht 
owners. Kaplow and Shavell suggest that this result is counterintuitive 
at best.265 
Interestingly, Sanchirico seems to agree that such a result is 
counterintuitive, even perverse.266 In response, however, he insists 
that Kaplow and Shavell's yacht-boat analysis reflects a misunder­
standing of his argument. His position, properly understood, is that 
redistributive policy should focus on making transfers from the better 
off to the less well off "overall;" and, if it happens that income (and 
not accident proneness) is considered the "dominant" measure of 
overall well-being in our society, we should adjust legal rules not on 
the basis of accident proneness but on the basis of relative income.267 
Thus, if it turns out that yacht owners, though more accident-prone 
than boaters, are relatively income rich (and, again, income is the 
dominant measure of overall well-being), then tort damage awards 
against yacht owners should be adjusted upwards. The rich yacht 
owners would then be subsidizing everyone else. Sanchirico seems to 
be arguing, then, that Kaplow and Shavell's yacht-boat example in 
which the rich subsidize the poor is a red herring. If it is income ine-
263 Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, note 10, at 831-32. 
264 Id. at 829-32. 
265 Id. at 829-30. 
266 Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, note 8, at 1034-35. 
267 Id. at 1035 ("[I)f income were the dominant indicator of overall well-being, being 
income-poor would be closely identified with being less well-off overall, and, accordingly, 
the proper equity adjustment to all legal rules would tend to help the poor."). 
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quality that we care about, legal rules can be made income­
redistributive.268 
Therefore, both Kaplow and Shavell and Sanchirico suggest that re­
distribution from the less accident prone to the more accident prone 
would be unacceptable (or at least highly questionable) if it meant 
transferring from the income poor to the income rich. This conclusion 
derives from their welfarist approach and from their assumption that 
income is a more important measure of well-being than accident 
proneness is. That is, the redistribution-minded welfarist policymaker 
cares only about the unobservable characteristic of well-being; thus, 
income inequality and accident-proneness inequality are only proxies 
for inequalities of well-being. And if income is the more important 
proxy for well-being than accident proneness (that is, if rich but 
clumsy yacht owners tend to be better off overall than poor but nim­
ble boat owners), then the welfarist redistributive policy would call for 
transfers from the high income to the low income (from yacht owners 
to boat owners), whatever transfer mechanism is used, although the 
transfer might be somewhat smaller than if the accident proneness 
proxy cut the other way. 
We reach a different conclusion. First, we assume that different 
types of inequality can matter to a policymaker independent of other 
types of inequality. This is what we call our "independence assump­
tion."269 Thus, when we say that if the redistribution-minded poli­
cymaker or society in general decides to do something to reduce the 
inequality of X (be it accident proneness or pain-and-suffering losses 
or genetically-caused diseases or any other source of brute luck-based 
inequality of well-being), what we mean is that the policymaker has 
determined that that source of inequality is problematic, not as a 
proxy for well-being, but in and of itself. 
Therefore, if we assume: (1) that accident-proneness inequality is a 
type of inequality that society cares about (a question on which we 
take no position); (2) that the tax system is best suited for dealing with 
income inequality; and (3) that the legal system is the superior redis­
tributive policy instrument with respect to accident-proneness ine­
quality, then there would nothing perverse or absurd about a 
redistributive tort rule that resulted in transfers from the less accident 
prone to the more accident prone, even if it meant transferring from 
the income poor to the income rich. 
This conclusion follows from our comparative-institutional-advan­
tage framework. Income inequalities that exist between the accident 
268 See Section IIl.C for a discussion of Sanchirico's defense of income-adjusted legal 
rules. 
269 See note 31 and accompanying text (introducing our independence assumption). 
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prone and the non-accident prone should be dealt with largely 
through the tax system (with potentially some modest role for legal 
rules, if the random-taxation argument holds up). Which system 
should be used to deal with accident proneness inequality is a separate 
question, a question to which the relative incomes of the accident 
prone versus the non-accident prone are irrelevant. 
Although our comparative-advantage argument is strongest if we 
make the independence assumption (described above), it is not neces­
sarily dependent on it. That is, our argument can be made from 
within the traditional welfarist framework as well. Under the welfarist 
framework, the only thing that should matter to the redistributive 
policymaker is the single concept of inequality of well-being and what 
the various proxies for well-being say about that type of inequality. 
This assumption, however, does not necessarily mean that every policy 
instrument should be adjusted with respect to every proxy for well­
being. It still could be the case that the best approach is to have each 
policy instrument focus on the proxy for well-being for which that in­
strument has a comparative advantage at either observing or redistrib­
uting or both. 
Thus, for example, redistribution with respect to the income proxy 
could be achieved solely through the tax-and-transfer system (if that 
system is deemed to have the comparative advantage with respect to 
that proxy); redistribution with respect to accident proneness could be 
achieved solely through the legal system; and so on-with no reason 
for each tool to address each and every proxy. The result would be 
that the overall redistributive system (including both tax rules and le­
gal rules) would respond to differences in overall well-being as accu­
rately as possible. 
To see this point, contrast two hypothetical welfarist redistributive 
regimes. To simplify, assume that the only two proxies for well-being 
that the policymaker has are income and accident proneness, both of 
which can be expressed in terms of dollars, and that the only tools for 
redistribution are the income tax and the tort system. Imagine further 
that there are only two people in this hypothetical society, whose total 
well-being is the sum of the dollar value of the two proxies mentioned 
above. It is this total well-being the policymaker wants to fully equal­
ize through the redistributive system. Assume that individual A has 
$90 of income whereas individual B has only $10 of income. Assume 
also that A has $5 and B has $25 worth of innate accident-avoiding 
capacity. Thus, initially A's overall well-being is $95 (measured in 
terms of money) and B's overall well-being is $35. In each case, the 
dollar figure represents the individual's relative well-being as mea­
sured by that proxy. Under these assumptions, the ultimate goal for 
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the welfarist redistributor is to have A somehow transfer $30 to B. 
That would leave A and B each with $65 of total well-being, as mea­
sured by the combination of these two proxies as valued in dollars. 
But how to do this? One way would be to have the income tax 
system do all the work, effecting an income tax transfer from A to E­
via deductions, credits, or whatever-of $30. This result seems consis­
tent with the Kaplow and Shavell model, although they do not take a 
firm position on how best to deal with accident proneness. Alterna­
tively, the policymaker might use the tax system to transfer $40 from 
A to B, equalizing "dollars of income," and then have the tort system 
transfer $10 from B to A, equalizing "dollars of accident-avoidance 
ability." This approach is closer to what we have in mind. 
The question is which is the better approach. First, observe that 
both approaches result in the equalization of overall well-being, as 
measured by these two proxies. In this example, we assumed that all 
of the information about which party had which level of each proxy 
was known by everyone and there were no inefficiencies associated 
with the transfers. In fact, however, information is costly, and, in our 
view, the tax system is better at gathering information about income, 
whereas the tort system is better at gathering information about acci­
dent proneness. Thus, if we decide to use the tax system to do all of 
the redistributing (for example, because of the haphazardness prob­
lem),270 we at least should use the legal system to gather the relevant 
information about accident proneness. In addition, we argue that 
there are efficiency reasons to redistribute through the legal system 
with respect to accident proneness-enhancements in deterrence­
that would not exist if accident-proneness redistribution were done 
through the tax system. 
Where does this leave Sanchirico's preferred option, which would 
call for adjusting both tools-taxes and torts-for differences in both 
proxies-income and accident proneness? Under either of the ideal­
ized regimes mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is not clear what 
the benefit would be of making both tools redistributive with respect 
to both proxies. If the income tax system can completely equalize 
with respect to income (that is, completely eliminate income differ­
ences) and accident proneness (the first situation above), there is no 
inequality left for the tort system to address. 
If, however, one were persuaded by our comparative-advantage ar­
gument that income inequality can be handled best by the tax system, 
and the accident proneness inequality by the tort system, and the sec­
ond approach from the example above was taken, all of the inequality 
again would be eliminated. Under neither of those scenarios (Kaplow 
210 See Subsection IIl.B.2. 
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and Shavell's and ours) does it seem to be necessary also to adjust the 
income tax for accident-proneness inequality or the tort system for 
income inequality. (Both A and B already have $50 total; what redis­
tribution is left to be done?) 
Sanchirico's world, of course, is one of incomplete information in 
which the different redistributive tools "statistically sample" individu­
als' different characteristics. As we argued above, however, there is 
no obvious reason why every redistributive tool should sample with 
respect to every proxy rather than have the income tax system sample 
for information on income and the tort system sample for information 
on accident proneness. If, however, Sanchirico is right in his empirical 
claim that there is some capacity constraint on the amount of income 
redistribution the tax system can do (say, the amount of information 
the tax authority is able to gather justifies a redistribution from A to B 
of only $20), or if a behavioralist-probabilistic tax story could be 
told,271 then there would be an argument for using the tort system (as 
well as the tax system) to redistribute to reduce the income inequal­
ity.272 But not otherwise. 
C. Revisiting Old Objections 
As we described above, there are a number of arguments that have 
been used to support the traditional view-that income-based redistri­
bution should be limited entirely to the tax-and-transfer system. 
Those included the contracting-around argument, the haphazardness 
argument, and the double-distortion argument. In our view, at least 
the first of those two arguments, though often overstated, does tend to 
support relying primarily on the tax-and-transfer system to reduce in­
come inequality. An important question for our framework, then, is 
whether the same is true for other types of inequality. In particular, 
we focus here on the sorts of inequality that our examples involve: 
inequality due to differing disease-related genetic endowments, ine­
quality of pain and suffering from personal injuries, and inequality 
with respect to ability to avoid accidents. 
1 .  The Contracting-Around Argument Revisited 
Previously we summarized what has come to be one of the most 
important criticisms of using legal rules to redistribute income: the 
argument that redistribution through legal rules is not feasible-it 
cannot be done-in settings in which the parties (those being redis-
211 See generally Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36. 
272 See text accompanying notes 119-47. 
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tributed to and from) are in contractual relationships with one an­
other.273 In such settings, the argument goes, market forces would 
tend to undercut the redistributive effect of the rule. For example, a 
rule designed to redistribute "vertically" from manufacturers to con­
sumers, on the theory that the former are richer than the latter, would 
run into problems of the following sort. Holding consumer demand 
constant, part of the redistributive effect would be reduced when the 
price of the products rises in response to the redistributive rule. And 
because consumer demand for the product would rise as well, it would 
be very difficult for the policymaker to design a rule that redistributes 
vertically in a way that makes consumers better off.274 As a result, 
income redistribution through contract-based legal rules is extremely 
difficult, albeit not impossible.21s 
One of the most interesting findings of our analysis is that, with 
respect to some nonincome measures of inequality, it is possible to 
design a contract-based legal rule that redistributes "horizontally" in a 
way that the contracting-around problem does not affect. Perhaps the 
best example is the class of insurance law rules that prohibit various 
types of discrimination in the underwriting process. For example, a 
rule forbidding insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic 
information-such as on the basis of whether or not an insured has 
the Huntington gene-clearly is a contract-based legal rule. But the 
effect is not to redistribute vertically from insurer to insured; rather, it 
is to redistribute horizontally from one class of insureds (those with­
out the Huntington gene) to another class of insureds (those who do 
have the gene) . This is a type of redistribution through "pooling" or 
"cross-subsidization." With that sort of redistribution, there is no 
market force that will push those two classes of parties to contract 
around this result.276 
The example of pain-and-suffering damages, at least in the products 
liability context, provides another case in point. A rule requiring 
product manufacturers to pay pain-and-suffering damages to individu­
als who are injured by the manufacturer's products can be viewed as a 
contract-based redistributive rule. Obviously, consumers are in some 
sort of a contractual relationship with manufacturers. But the redistri-
213 See discussion in Subsection 111.B.1. 
274 This conclusion assumes that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their pref­
erences for the redistributive rule. 
275 See text accompanying notes 68-83. 
276 While it is true that competitive forces will give insurers an incentive, in a sense, to 
evade this result by finding other proxies that are not prohibited by law, the law ideally 
should respond by prohibiting all such additional proxies as well (to the extent they re­
present brute luck-based measures of differences in well-being) . This is another example 
of the distinction between the contracting-around problem and the income-shifting prob­
lem discussed above. 
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bution accomplished by such a rule, at minimum, occurs horizontally. 
That is, as product prices rise to reflect what is in effect an insurance 
premium being charged for pain-and-suffering losses, all consumers 
contribute equally. Once the accidents occur, however, it is only those 
who have suffered the nonpecuniary harms who actually recover from 
the pool of funds. Thus, the products liability doctrine imposing pain­
and-suffering damages on the manufacturer of a defective product 
that causes injury involves, at minimum, a type of redistribution from 
those who do not suffer nonpecuniary losses (who pay the higher 
price, but get no payment in return) to those who do suffer nonpecu­
niary losses (who pay the same higher price, but also recover an award 
after the accident). Under our framework there is no reason to rule 
out a priori horizontal redistribution as unwarranted. 
A similar conclusion applies to our accident-proneness example: 
Changing the due care standard from an objective one to a subjective 
one, in general, should not have much of a redistributive effect on the 
class of defendants. Such a shift, however, would cause a horizontal 
transfer to the less able. 
2. The Haphazardness Argument Revisited 
The haphazardness complaint that is lodged against income-ad­
justed legal rules also does not have the same force when applied to 
nonincome-based redistributive legal rules, when the nonincome char­
acteristic is not easily observed. Recall that the haphazardness cri­
tique includes both a complaint about inaccuracy and a complaint 
about underinclusiveness. The problem with this critique is that, with 
respect to nonincome characteristics, the tax-and-transfer system will 
not necessarily be more precise or more inclusive. 
For example, the advantage of a subjective due care standard (and 
of pain-and-suffering damages) in tort law from a distributional per­
spective (as well as from an efficiency perspective) would be its poten­
tial for precision beyond what could be imagined in a broad-based tax 
approach. That is, a court hearing a tort case would be better able to 
observe whether the individual defendant is above average or below 
average with respect to accident proneness than a tax collector would. 
The court would have a comparative advantage at observing an indi­
vidual's ability to avoid accidents (or costs of care) because making 
that assessment would enhance the efficiency of the legal rule as well. 
The same holds if defendants ex ante could observe the below-average 
potential victims and take excessive care in those instances. 
In the case of insurance discrimination on the basis of disease-re­
lated genes, denying the use of such genes-to produce cross-subsi­
dizing transfers from those without the genes to those with them-
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would seem to provide a considerably greater degree of accuracy in 
the amount of the transfer than could be accomplished through the 
tax-and-transfer alternative. 
As for the underinclusiveness complaint, it is of course true that all 
of the rules we describe in this Section are underinclusive in the fol­
lowing sense: There will be some accident-prone people who will not 
be affected by the rule (either because it will not affect their accident­
avoidance incentives or because they will not have insurance),  there 
will be some individuals who will experience pain and suffering not in 
connection with a tort suit (and thus will not be able to collect dam­
ages), and there will be some individuals with disease-related genes 
who will not have insurance (and who thus would not benefit from the 
cross-subsidization our proposed rule would engender). All of those 
statements are true. It is not clear, however, that the tax-and-transfer 
system could do a better job. With respect to accident proneness, the 
tax-and-transfer system conceivably could be more comprehensive, 
but, again, at some considerable cost in terms of reduced accuracy or 
substantially higher administrative costs. The same could be said for 
nonpecuniary losses and disease-related genes. 
3. The Double-Distortion Argument Revisited 
The double-distortion argument does not apply to the rules dis­
cussed in this Section (redistribution with respect to accident prone­
ness, nonpecuniary losses, or genetic diseases), since redistribution on 
· the basis of proxies other than income does not entail a work distor­
tion. It is not that we have found a way to avoid the use of proxies for 
well-being. To the contrary, proxies for well-being would have to be 
used in these settings as well. Thus, if society were to get serious 
about reducing accident-proneness inequality (which, again, we are 
somewhat skeptical of) , then courts would have to make use of some 
sort of proxy or set of proxies. Likewise, in the context of pain-and­
suffering damages in tort cases, when it comes to determining the ap­
propriate amount of the redistributive transfer (that is, damage pay­
ment), a range of proxies is possible, from case-by-case testimony 
concerning the degree of emotional distress associated with a particu­
lar injury to a more standardized approach (where certain injuries au­
tomatically give rise to certain amounts of pain-and-suffering 
damages). The point is that the well-being proxies we identified in 
this Section (unlike, say, income or wealth) do not correlate with work 
effort in any obvious way. Genetically-determined diseases, of course, 
may be the best example, the purest instance of a well-being proxy 
that is representative of brute-luck inequality-and hence uncon­
nected to work effort. 
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Furthermore, as we argued above, we have identified examples of 
redistributive legal rules in the tort and insurance contexts that either 
produce no distortion or tend to reduce distortions. For example, the 
subjective-negligence standard (rather than a standard based on the 
"reasonable person") not only has redistributive benefits-shifting re­
sources from the more able to the less able-but also enhances the 
deterrence function of tort law. The same goes for pain-and-suffering 
damages. Awarding pain-and-suffering damages actually enhances 
deterrence by forcing potential injurers to bear the full costs of their 
decisions, not just the pecuniary costs.277 Moreover, even if these 
rules were considered inefficient, we have identified independent, dis­
tributive justice grounds for adopting them. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom among law and economics scholars seems 
to be that redistributive policy should focus on income inequality and 
that the task of redistribution should be left exclusively to the tax-and­
transfer system. As to this latter conclusion, political theorists seem to 
agree as well. One aim of this Article is to question this conventional 
wisdom. Although we agree that income or wealth inequality should 
be a primary target of the redistribution-minded policymaker 
(whether from a welfarist or a nonwelfarist perspective) ,  we also be­
lieve that other types of inequality (or other proxies for unequal wel­
fare) ought to be considered as well. 
As to income inequality, according to our comparative-advantage 
framework, legal rules in some circumstances (in particular, as a 
small-scale income-based lump sum tax, along the lines that Jolls has 
suggested278) can usefully supplement the tax system in reducing in­
come inequality. As we have emphasized, however, the effects of in­
come-redistributive legal rules are complicated because of the 
presence of liability insurance, which will exacerbate some of the inef­
ficiencies of such rules but, at the same time, will enable liability insur­
ance companies to serve as privatized tax collectors, supplementing 
the role currently monopolized by the Service. 
With respect to nonincome measures of inequality, there may be 
many situations in which the legal system-or some hybrid of the legal 
system and the tax system-is either the better observer of the ine­
quality in question, the better redistributor with respect to it, or both. 
We have focused on a few examples-genetically-determined dis-
211 See sources cited in note 215. This conclusion assumes that the cost of tailoring the 
negligent rule and the moral hazard effect of awarding pain-and-suffering damages are 
minimal. 
278 Jolls, Behavioral Economics, note 36. 
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eases, pain and suffering from personal injuries, and accident prone­
ness. With respect to all of those types of inequality, redistribution 
through the legal system may be able to reduce brute luck-based ine­
quality in a way that avoids the traditional conflict between efficiency 
and distributive justice. 
Throughout this Article we assumed that there is a "redistribution­
minded policymaker," who has decided that some type and amount of 
redistribution is called for. In other words, some unspecified poli­
cymaker has chosen the type of inequality that is to be reduced and by 
how much. That assumption has allowed us to focus on the question 
of principal concern to us: how that policymaker might choose the 
optimal redistributive policy instrument, whether it be the legal sys­
tem or the tax-and-transfer system, or some combination of the two. 
As a result of this assumption, however, we have evaded the ques­
tion of which policymakers-legislators or judges-should be respon­
sible for making those initial decisions. Put more pointedly, should 
the legislature always be the policymaker that decides what type of 
redistribution and how much? Or is there some role for judges, acting 
to some extent independently of the legislature, in making such deci­
sions? For example, should a court, acting independently of the legis­
lature, attempting to implement what it sees as society's redistributive 
aims, adopt an income-redistributive tort tax or a subjective due care 
standard or pain-and-suffering damages in tort or a nondiscrimination 
principle in insurance law with respect to genetically-determined dis­
eases? Or, instead, should the court implement such redistributive 
rules only after the legislature has first explicitly expressed its (and 
society's) "preference" for such redistribution? 
There is a view that only legislatures should be allowed to make 
those initial redistributive determinations, never the courts. Most who 
hold this view seem to fall into one of two camps.279 First, some argue 
that there is (and should be) a theoretical and practical "isolation" 
between legal rules or private law on the one hand (the reasoning of 
which is somehow is considered "scientific" and devoid of value judg­
ments) and society's distributive values, which are manifest through 
the legislature.280 Other critics of redistributive judicial initiatives ar-
279 Another possible view to support the division of labor conclusion is that the tax-and­
transfer system is less intrusive to people's liberty than private law. We briefly touched 
upon this point at note 9. For a response see Kronman, note 9, at 501-07. 
280 E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 3-14 (1 995). Weinrib argues, among 
other things, that private law, when rightly understood as being based on corrective justice 
(and not distributive justice), is "purely juridical and completely nonpolitical ." Id. at 214. 
Weinrib also argues that social purposes, extrinsic to the relationship between the parties, 
even if they otherwise seem desirable, cannot be accommodated to the nature of private 
law justifications. Id. at 204-16. For a discussion of Weinrib's "isolation thesis," see Ha-
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gue that, even if court decisions are not isolated from society's values, 
the institutional role of the courts always should be to enforce the 
distributive status quo ante. This is because that status quo reflects 
the legislature's distributive values, which in turn reflect society's 
values. 
In our view, the private law purist argument is based on a naive 
conception of private law. It should come as no surprise, given the 
general tenor of this Article, that we hold the view that private law 
can be legitimately redistributive. Moreover, there is much to be said 
for the view that private law is, in an important sense, inevitably dis­
tributive in character.281 Under this view, any judicial decision, 
whether it enforces the status quo ante or deviates from it, has some 
distributional consequences; there are winners and losers (besides the 
parties who litigate) in every court decision. And because, for any 
given violation of a legal rule or standard, there is always a menu of 
remedies for a court to choose from, by choosing one remedy and not 
the other, courts necessarily make a general distributive decision­
general in the sense of influencing not only the parties disputing 
before the court but also the "potential" parties that are subject to the 
court's jurisdiction.282 Thus, there is an important sense in which pri­
vate law must be at least distributive, if not redistributive.283 
noch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 138, 142-
54 (1999) [hereinafter Distributive Foundation]. 
28t Dagan, Distributive Foundation, note 280, at 147 (arguing that a nondistributive pri­
vate law is an impossibility). Dagan argues that private law in general and the idea of 
property in particular cannot be seen as having an "inner intelligibility that can be deci­
phered without recourse to public values." Id. at 139. In Dagan's view, for example, prop­
erty, as a human-created institution, is an open-textured term that is subject to different 
interpretations about its content and scope and always can be modified in accordance with 
society's changing values. Id. at 148. 
282 To give a simple example, consider a case of nuisance. There are several different 
decisions courts can make, ranging from an injunction against the polluter to different 
levels of damages for the plaintiffs. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 
1089 (1972). As is well known, all of these decisions have different distributive conse­
quences, not only for the parties disputing before the court but also for parties who may 
later be bound by the rule. For a menu of remedies in the law of restitution, see Dagan, 
Distributive Foundation, note 280, at 149. 
283 In addition, not only do courts have a menu of different remedies to choose from for 
any given violation, but they also have a menu of efficient remedies to choose from. To 
mention just one example, it is well known that there are several Pareto optimal rules for 
the classic nuisance dispute. See Calabresi & Melamed, note 282; James E. Krier & Stew­
art J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liabil­
ity Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1996); Ian Ayres & Paul M. 
Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1 (2001); Ronen Avraham, Modular Liability Rules (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & 
Econ., Univ. of Mich. Working Paper No. 01-003, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa­
pers.cfm?abstract_id=272816. Thus, a court's task, even according to the holders of the 
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The second argument for limiting court-initiated redistributive poli­
cies-that is, the view that courts should always privilege the legisla­
ture-endorsed distributive status quo-goes to the question of what 
we mean by the term redistributive. The proponents of this view, un­
like the private law purists, acknowledge that legal rules cannot be 
detached from their distributive consequences and thus from society's 
distributive values. In addition, however, they seem to believe that 
the legal status quo ante fully reflects society's distributive prefer­
ences. Hence, if a court renders a decision that upsets the distributive 
status quo, that court is redistributing. According to this view, courts 
should not redistribute; rather courts should avoid deviating from the 
distributive result inherent in the existing status quo, because, if the 
status quo did not reflect the legislature's (and by extension the citi­
zenry's) distributive preferences, the legislature would have changed 
the laws.284 
This privilege-the-distributive-status-quo argument has some intui­
tive appeal. There are, however, a number of responses to it. We 
briefly summarize some of those responses here, without defending or 
endorsing any of them. As already mentioned, the basic thesis of our 
Article-and the comparative-advantage framework-can usefully 
apply however one reacts to the following arguments. Our objective 
at this point is only to get the relevant issues on the table. 
First, it could be argued that the privilege-the-distributive-status­
quo view ignores the teachings of public choice theory. For example, 
an adherent of public choice might contend that there is no single 
"preference" of the legislature with respect to anything (including dis­
tributional questions) but rather only the preferences of the different 
rent-seeking interest groups that lobby the legislators. Of course, 
there are good reasons to be skeptical of the strongest normative 
claims of public choice theory. For example, a radical public choice 
perspective would have difficulty explaining the strong and widely 
shared intuition that legislative outcomes-that is, statutes-generally 
are regarded as having the force of law. 
privilege-the-distributive-status-quo view, cannot be stripped completely from distributive 
considerations, because the Kaldor-Hicks criterion in itself is indeterminate. Duncan Ken­
nedy, Law-and-Economics From the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 New Pal­
grave Dictionary, note 109, at 470. This has led Kennedy to argue that "it is hard to take 
seriously the proposal that the courts should just apply Kaldor-Hicks and stay out of dis­
tributive questions." Id. 
284 To take an example of such legislative overruling from our framework, consider the 
case of pain-and-suffering damages in tort law. In many states, the legislatures became 
unsatisfied with state court rulings regarding pain-and-suffering damages.· The result was 
that most state legislatures capped pain-and-suffering damages in all tort cases, some lim­
ited their scope to only some types of torts, and some did both. See generally Feldman, 
note 223, at 1567-68, and sources cited therein. 
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Still, what we know about legislative interest group dynamics at 
least should make us also somewhat skeptical of the legislative status 
quo ante with respect to the worse off in society-those whom redis­
tributive policy is supposed to benefit. Indeed, some hold the view 
that courts should have a leading role in protecting the welfare of dis­
advantaged groups, whose disadvantage sometimes is maintained by, 
if not the result of, the legislative dynamic in Congress. Thus, when 
the legislative process gives rise to systematic biases against a disad­
vantaged group, so goes the response, the courts might play an impor­
tant role in initiating a redistributive response.285 
Second, even if we think that Congress, in some important sense, 
can have a unified preference about distributive matters, it is unlikely 
that the existing legislative status quo ante always will reflect that 
preference. Given the complexity of the legislative process and the 
costs of statutorily changing the law, it may be that in some cases the 
status quo does not reflect the existing legislature's distributional pref­
erences. On this view, legislative "transaction costs" may prevent the 
legislature from enacting what are, in some sense, its true preferences; 
and courts adopting redistributive rules might be viewed as attempting 
to capture the legislature's unspoken (as yet unenacted) true 
preferences. 
Of course, the contrary view is that those "legislative transaction 
costs" are really "benefits" in the sense that they prevent legislation 
from being enacted that has not met a sufficiently high threshold of 
support in Congress; and courts that try to adopt Congress' unenacted 
preferences are being unduly activist. Our point is only that the latter 
interpretation need not always trump the former. At least sometimes, 
we can imagine courts getting ahead of the legislature in a way that 
the legislature, in an important sense, approves of. What is more, we 
are not talking about constitutional lawmaking. Whatever redistribu­
tive rule the court might adopt could be reversed by the legislature, if 
the court in fact has misread the legislature's intent.286 
A final response to the privilege-the-distributive-status-quo argu­
ment is at base an undemocratic one. It can be argued that, even if 
legislative decisions (including their silences) fully reflect the prefer-
285 As one obvious example, consider the fact that for many years Congress' endorse­
ment of (or inaction with respect to) racial discrimination was clearly (and to some extent 
still may be) responsible for the existing distribution of benefits and burdens along racial 
lines. 
286 See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982). 
Thus, taking our example of the subjective due care standard in tort, there is no reason to 
presuppose that state legislatures' silence on the issue is a deliberate distributive decision. 
It is just as likely that the silence is due to the legislatures' unawareness of the regressive 
cross-subsidization embedded in the objective, untailored standard. 
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ences of the society as a whole, universal principles of justice some­
times should trump society's preferences. Of course, identifying the 
occasions when judges, rather than legislators, should be the exposi­
tors of such "universal principles" is notoriously difficult. Still, to say 
that courts should never engage in such an enterprise seems difficult 
to defend.2s7 
2s1 Some scholars also contend that the privilege-the-distributive-status-quo position ig­
nores important expressive dimensions of the law. According to this view, it is problematic 
to accommodate in the same legal culture a purely self-interest-driven, efficiency-based, 
ostensibly nonredistributive private law with an egalitarian, expressly redistributive system 
of taxation and transfers. As Hanoch Dagan puts it, " ' [i]t seems artificial . . .  to expect that 
the same person who is not required to pay (almost) any attention to the fate of others' 
with respect to her private property 'will recognize the legitimacy of the claims of others 
(equally strangers) [with regard] to fragments of her resources when the tax collector asks 
his due. ' "  Dagan, Takings, note 40, at 792 (quoting Hanoch Dagan, Unjust Enrichment: A 
Study of Private Law and Public Values 57-58 (1997)). 
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